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ABSTRACT 
Can a country function without a legislative framework able to inform decision-
making processes taken at different spheres of government? To what extent 
would actions conducted at various spheres of government be efficiently 
coordinated and informed by appropriate channels of constitutional provisions 
and legislative amendments to consolidate financial and intergovernmental fiscal 
relations policy-making tools for the realization of an efficient local developmental 
state? 
Answers to the above mentioned two questions refer to normative fiscal policy 
principles and prescriptive instruments of intergovernmental fiscal transfer 
design, whose orientation suggests better ways of framing sound and coherent 
programs and interventions that strengthen cooperative synergy and transfer 
knowledge of experience gained in empirical investigations and various South 
African environments of higher academic learning. 
Growing evidence acknowledges South Africa as one of the young democratic 
countries that has been going through a period of transition over the past three 
years as it changes its system of public finance from a structure suited to the old 
apartheid system to one consistent with the new South African Constitutional 
dispensation. While the former system was highly centralized, the new 
constitution makes a clear commitment to municipal governments as important 
providers of government services, with greater tax and spending powers. Even 
as local autonomy has been substantially increased, there remains uncertainty 
as to the most appropriate design of a system of intergovernmental fiscal grants 
to metropolitan areas and townships. This study analyses this situation and 
further develops a generic design for intergovernmental transfers and its 
suitability to the realities of South African municipalities on the ground within the 
framework of Cooperative Government. This study concludes that fiscal 
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management, as a cross-cutting discipline, is a powerful instrument for 
government’s revenue sources at the national, provincial and local government 
levels. Financial management should be regarded as a co-coordinating 
mechanism managing government’s expenditure and catalyzing sound financial 
relationship for an efficient management in the country, thus allowing government 
to budget effectively for the delivery of goods and services in order to attain the 
constitutional mandate of a developmental state. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The winds of change in South Africa brought no t only dramatic transformation in 
the overall governance and policy transformation; but also culminated into a 
system which sought to adjust to new challenges and opportunities brought in by 
the outer environments. One of the changes was the relevance of 
intergovernmental relations within the whole framework of macro-economic and 
political set up. However, the way the contention of intergovernmental relations 
and its fiscal and financial management system are defined and organized in 
South Africa today needs to be revisited; especially when we take into account 
the global landscape of socio-economic and political forces – which, to a great 
extent has direct implications on the autonomy and sovereignty of domestic 
policy-making. In fact, a substance body of evidence suggests that the South 
African administrative system does not adequately address the welfare of 
individual citizens and the principle of fiscal equity is often thwarted regardless of 
their domicile. The objective of this study zooms into the nature of profound roots 
underlying these causes – which is one of the ultimate goals for decision-making 
in any political dispensation. The revitalization of the intergovernmental relations 
system needs to be approached from a dimension of critical and empirical 
questioning and evaluation of the epistemological substance of key principles 
underpinning financial management system against the backdrop of policies, 
legislations and practices that guide the political system – which is the primary 
objective of this study. 
 
Although this paper is an attempt to evaluate the content validity, efficiency and 
effectiveness of the fiscal and financial management system feeding into a 
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cooperative government dispensation and its mandate for a better life for all – 
evidence suggests that the related administrative financial and fiscal efficiency of 
political system in any country determines the delivery quality of public services 
and the welfare of its citizens. In this regard South Africa is not exception. It is in 
light of these aforementioned premises that the focus of the study is geared 
towards the effort to analyzing a case in terms of assessing the validity of the 
principles and practices underpinning the core values and practices of a financial 
and fiscal system and its operations therein. The findings of the study will 
consolidate the theory and postulate recommendations where contractions and 
loopholes are identified.  
 
This chapter is organized in the following manner – section 1.1 provides a 
general introduction to the research under study and is followed by a background 
illustrating the geo-political context in which it is undertaken (section 1.2). In 
section 1.3 the problem to the study is postulated, channeled by the 
methodological framework (section 1.4) depicting the empirical design suitable to 
the successful reach of the objectives stipulated in this study. Section 1.5 is a 
depiction of the layout outlining the different sections of chapter one. At last, but 
not least section 1.6 presents a short summary to chapter one. This is illustrated 
in Figure 1: below. 
FIGURE 1: BREAKDOWN OF CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 1.1 
Introduction 
SECTION 1.2 
 
Background to the 
study
SECTION 1.3 
Problem statement 
SECTION 1.4 
Methodological 
framework 
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Summary 
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Layout and outline 
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1.2 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT OF THE STUDY 
 
In the context of the introductory classifications (section 1.1), the background to 
the study intends to conduct a scientific inquiry regarding the degree of 
cooperative government effectiveness and the extent to which it impacts, 
positively or negatively on the performance of the financial and fiscal 
management system in South Africa. Having highlighted the Financial 
Department of the Metro City of Cape Town as the research's unit of analysis 
and departure for scientific investigation, it is hereby the contention of this study 
to identify the background to the problem and elaborate on the likelihood of how 
national macro-economic policy framework together with apartheid legacy and 
demarcation board policies impinge on government intervention. The research 
study aims to finds out how the above impact on the geo-political organization of 
the fiscal and financial nature and how the last curtails or shrinks the effort of 
local spheres, especially that of the metro City of Town to deal effectively with 
delivery problems, improvement of lives and social change.  
 
One of the key elements of IGR1 Constitution mirrors the comparison to that of 
South Africa and India, whereby the state does not see the three spheres in 
terms of conflictual and competitive counterparts. Contrary to this, the state 
mainstreams them as inherent promoters of sound intergovernmental relations 
between the different level of the Government (Levy &Tapscott, 2001: 1). 
International experience suggests that every system of intergovernmental fiscal 
relations be strongly supported by policy pronouncements, legislation systems of 
checks and balances built into government structures as the core of good 
governance in order to help empower the citizens in a sustainable way (Shah, 
2005:xi). This demands a complex process, which entails negotiating the gap 
                                            
1 The relationship between and within the different spheres of government. The aim of 
intergovernmental relations is to ensure cooperation for the delivery of an effective and 
accountable public service. 
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between the technical requirements for interaction between the different layers of 
the governing structures and the imperatives of political power relations (Levy & 
Tapscott, 2001: 2), as an incentive that motivates the public servants and 
policymakers so much so that Shah (2005: ibid) recalls that the rewards and 
sanctions linked to results that help shape public sector performance is rooted in 
a country’s accountability frameworks: Sound public sector management and 
government spending is a key toward the determination of a course of economic 
development and the ability to shape social policies to address the soaring 
problems of the poor and other disadvantaged groups such as women and 
elderly in the society.  
 
1.3  PROBLEM STATEMENT  
 
Cooperative2 government is a new paradigm in South Africa. Owing to apartheid 
legacy, the distribution of South Africa’s revenue among the nine provinces has 
been fundamentally skewed and distorted and followed racial and clientelism 
categorization. Social security was disturbed, unemployment rates soared and 
juvenile delinquency posed serious problem. Given the principles of cooperative 
government spelt out in the Constitution and its implications on financial and 
fiscal management system, development and delivery, it is my contention that 
clear problem statements concerning the study be attempted before any other 
thing and lucid background tabulated and pursued.  
 
                                            
2 Cooperative Governance refers to the study placed on the three spheres of government by the 
institution to coordinate their actions and legislation, exercise their powers in a way, which does 
not encroach on the geographic, functional or institutional integrity of government in another 
sphere (Presidential Review Commission, 1996). By cooperative government we mean cardinal 
values of government for the country sketched in the principle of chapter three of the Constitution, 
and encompassing the institutional ennoblement of these values through appropriate 
intergovernmental structures and institutions to be established by the Act envisage in section 41 
(2) of the Constitution 
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One of the big challenges highlighted by the scholars following the transitional 
Constitution of South Africa in 1993 was the crisis of cooperative government, the 
harmonization of interests and the partnership dispensation among political 
parties, social groups, provinces, workers unions, government bodies, 
parastatals, private companies as well as non-governmental and local-based 
organisations (Haysom, 2001).  
 
1.3.1 CORE PROBLEM STATEMENT: 
 
The core problem statement of this study gravitates around the need for an 
improved and efficient financial and fiscal management3 system in South Africa 
against the backdrop of constitutional amendments (chapter 3). From the onset 
the study maintains that government overregulation is cumbersome to the 
efficient delivery of services and should be changed. It generates vertical 
imbalance (fiscal gap) between the revenue raising ability of sub-national 
spheres and their expenditure responsibilities. Moreover, fiscal inequality, 
alarming trends of horizontal disparities aligned alongside with lack of 
government revenue equity across provinces and sub-national spheres are some 
of the direct serious implications of the institution of cooperative government on 
the fiscal and financial management system in South Africa. All these, coupled 
with externality effects of municipal expenditure not being included in the 
equalization formula, fail to provide correct optimal level of public services with 
proper incentives across sub-national spheres.  
 
1.3.2  KEY PROBLEM AREAS  
 
In order to give further substance to the above mentioned problem statement, the 
following four key problems have been highlighted and outlined in this study. 
                                            
3 Fiscal Management: The management of government revenue and everything that influences it, 
including debt levels and sources and levels of tax revenue. 
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KEY PROBLEM AREA 1: INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS' SYSTEMS - A 
STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE 
 
The present debate is located within the broad framework that provides an 
overview on the way governmental cooperation has been incorporated in the 
South African design. Furthermore, it deals with the problems drawing from the 
origins and principles of cooperative government, its constitutional provision and 
how this impacts on the political change and transformation as a whole. It gives 
strategic conclusions, drawing on recent perspectives on intergovernmental 
transfers, fiscal as well as financial management systems in South Africa as 
practical examples illustrating the importance of cooperation within a 
decentralized political dispensation.  
 
The study of this kind suggests the need for developing a strategic perspective in 
such a way that puts the field of financial and fiscal management not only within a 
South African context, but also within a more strategic perspective. In this way, 
the objectives of the study will bear with key issues in outer environment, 
especially those that pertain to sound financial and fiscal management across 
departments. This will give a contribution of sound financial and fiscal 
management system to senior officers, government officials, politicians as well as 
policy makers. 
 
KEY PROBLEM AREA 2: COOPERATIVE GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
The challenges of cooperative government have direct constitutional implications 
for the South African financial and fiscal management system in other spheres of 
government. This suggests a normative consideration that resulted into the 
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second key problem reflecting on how attempted budget reforms and changes in 
the assignments of functions should be handled rather than on how they are 
being made. This is important in order to help gain in-depth understanding on the 
way the Division of Revenue raises income and how it makes discretionary 
choice (using a formula) over the split and allocation of expenditure budgets 
between and across different structures of government. Such assignments of 
functions at different intergovernmental levels have serious implications on the 
future of sub-national governments with far reaching constraints for the fiscal 
relations on the three spheres of government. It is in the confines of the above-
mentioned parameters that this study is conducted. 
 
KEY PROBLEM AREA 3: INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS AND 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
The general framework of fiscal relations among three spheres of government in 
South Africa is rooted within the current version of the Constitution. In order to 
maintain sound intergovernmental relations between and across spheres, it has 
maintained that some cumbersome legislation pose a serious problem to the 
efficient revenue generating that has implications on effective delivery of services 
to the poor. Such legislation is mechanical and need to be changed. However, 
any attempt to reform and change the assignment of functions has had further 
impact for the fiscal relations on the three spheres of government.  
 
In this section we will attempt to address specific issues related to constitutional 
amendments for cooperative government (objective of the study). In light with the 
aforementioned problem, it will be essential to dwell on the third issue and its 
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implications for intergovernmental financial and fiscal relations4 in South Africa. 
This will serve as a legislative framework for understanding the context in which 
budget reforms and changes in assignment of functions render the future of sub-
national governments uncertain. These factors, coupled with the constitutional 
amendments have far reaching implications for fiscal relations and 
intergovernmental grants across the three spheres of government. 
 
KEY PROBLEM AREA 4: EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL GRANTS AND ITS RATIONALE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
The fifth problem concerns the need to build a theoretical understanding 
underpinning the concept of intergovernmental grants design within the broader 
national and provincial context in order to minimize fiscal gap and disparities in 
revenue sharing and bring about fiscal equity among various spheres of 
government. However, it is argued that fiscal externalities are always difficult to 
measure, as a corollary, it follows that intergovernmental grants are not easy to 
design since unspecific and inaccurate grant system yield unintended 
undesirable consequences.  
 
This section explores the analytical framework influencing the transfers on three 
areas, i.e., local expenditures for Intergovernmental grants services, locally 
generated revenues for infrastructure services, and the mix of types of public 
intergovernmental services provided by national government to sub-national 
spheres within the context of cooperative government. This will allow theoretical 
predictions on intergovernmental grants to be tested using available already 
processed data on HIV/AIDS CGs in public health, Education and Social 
Development sectors to test the validity of the financial system in South Africa 
                                            
4 The fiscal and financial relationship between and within the different spheres of government. 
The aim of intergovernmental relations is to ensure cooperation for the delivery of an effective 
and accountable public service. 
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from the year 2000 to 2010. Content analysis is used to analyze this longitudinal 
data set cross-sections and time periods in order to find out whether  the design 
of categorical grants have a statistically significant effect on public expenditures, 
local revenue generation, and the mix of services provided at the sub-national 
level. In light with this understanding, attention needs to be given to the ground of 
the fact that local sphere in South Africa is not only a state organ closer to the 
people, but chiefly it is considered to be the point of implementation5 of all 
government programmes since service delivery by all spheres of government 
come together in a focal point of coordination and alignment at the local level (De 
Visser, 2005: 222).  
 
Given above-mentioned requirements, a methodological orientation been 
designed in order to give a scientific and methodological framework to the study. 
This involves different techniques in the process of data collection, data analysis, 
interviews, observation and data interpretation as well as the interpretation of 
secondary sources of information.  
 
1.4  PURPOSE, OBJECTIVES AND ASSUMPTIONS  
 
1.4.1  PRIMARY OBJECTIVES  
 
The main and general purpose of the study is to investigate the challenges of 
cooperative government and its implications for the financial and fiscal 
management systems in South Africa.  
                                            
5 This is a procedure of putting policy into practice, where activities are presented to achieve the 
set objectives. It therefore involves a series of determinations and allocations, which lead to a 
degree of change in the circumstances of the targets, based on central statement of intention. 
O’Toole (1986: 183) suggests that policy implementation refers to “…all that is part of the process 
between initial statement of policy and ultimate impact on the world”. This implies that policy 
implementation is a process that constitutes the various stages in the performance of actions. It 
also includes the responses from the target groups, the outcome of the implementing agencies’ 
actions and the assessment thereof. 
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1.4.2  SECONDARY OBJECTIVES  
 
In order to obtain the primary objective the research is divided into secondary 
more specific objectives these include: 
 
1. To present an overview of generic principles underpinning the theory of 
cooperative government in South Africa.  
 
2. To sketch the importance of financial and fiscal relations and its approach to 
cooperative government within a political context in which these issues are called 
to play a role in shaping improved and effective financial and fiscal systems. The 
intention here is to highlight the vice and virtues resulting from an intricate IGR 
system of cooperative government in a decentralized dispensation. 
 
3. To stress the importance of conceptual issues underpinning the theory of 
cooperative government and IGRs. Challenges, instruments and implications for 
the 2001 constitutional amendment and other transitional legislation on 
intergovernmental coordination will be highlighted in bold fashion; and the scope, 
structures, processes and factors influencing cooperative government postulated 
in the first instances. 
 
4. To illustrate the application of specific employed methodologies such as 
purposive convenience sampling as illustrated by Patton (1990) and Mouton 
(2001:57) in the process of data collection in order to reach the objectives of the 
research design of the study. 
 
5. To provide an empirical application of a conditional grant design as a case 
study across sectoral Departments in South Africa, i.e. the department of 
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Education, Health for HIV/AIDS and Social Development - analyzing numeric 
data within the broader context of intergovernmental transfers. In light of this 
illustration, more detailed accounts of the constitutional context and the 
contextual background in which such transfers are allocated are discussed and 
postulated.  
 
6. To present the findings and identify the government weaknesses and strong 
points and make conclusions or direct recommendations for future consideration 
with a view to making the government financial and fiscal systems more effective 
and efficient in achieving its anticipated objectives.  
 
The following section (section 1.4) dealing with methodological orientation of the 
study provides an introductory methodological overview in the mapping up of 
intergovernmental financial and fiscal management in South Africa. 
 
1.4.3  RESEARCH ASSUMPTIONS: 
 
The study is based on the assumption that government overregulation is 
cumbersome to the efficient delivery of services and should be changed. It 
generates vertical imbalance (fiscal gap) between the revenue raising ability of 
sub-national spheres and their expenditure responsibilities. Fiscal inequality, 
alarming trends of horizontal disparities aligned alongside with lack of 
government revenue equity across provinces and sub-national spheres are some 
of the direct serious implications of the institution of cooperative government on 
the fiscal and financial management system in South Africa. All these, coupled 
with externality effects of municipal expenditure not being included in the 
equalization formula, fail to provide correct optimal level of public services with 
proper incentives across sub-national spheres. It is in light of the above that the 
following assumptions can be postulated: 
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"Insights into the precise institutional arrangements that guide public policies and 
processes on revenue equity between and across provinces and sub-national 
spheres with respect to budgets, expenditures and policies on the delivery of 
public services will lead toward more effective and efficient cooperative 
government in the course of economic development in South Africa". 
 
In reference to the above-mentioned assumption, we will attempt to base our 
analysis on the premises that reinforce the management arrangements in the 
total institutional system by asserting and maintaining that: "Sound financial and 
fiscal management systems are a key that will lead toward more effective and 
efficient integrated delivery of services within the framework of cooperative 
government in the City of Cape Town". 
 
1.5 METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The study as outlined in this discussion provides the reader with the analytical 
framework, the method of data collection and measuring techniques, the 
structure of the interview as well as the choice of the study locality. The study 
employs a qualitative methodology and a collection of statistical data referred to 
as secondary sources. These sources comprise library books, journal articles, 
policy documents and newspapers and bulletins to be reviewed. Primary sources 
are interviews with personnel from the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC), 
provincial and local government as well as member of the general public where 
applicable. Interviews were conducted with different Directorates under 
Metropolitan Department of Finance and their managers in the City of Cape 
Town as well as academics where applicable.  
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1.5.1  SCOPE AND STUDY LOCALITY 
 
The locality of the study is the City of Cape Town in the Province of the Western 
Cape. The City of Cape Town is urbanized comprising both formal and informal 
settlements and townships along the periphery. There are two reasons for 
choosing Cape Town Metropolitan municipality. First, since the local government 
elections, Cape Town has engaged in developing its Long Term Strategic 
Framework, which overshadows its Integrated Development Plan and three year 
budget framework. Secondly, the City of Cape Town has had a long vibrant civic 
society presence. Civics and ratepayer organizations have long been engaged in 
protest actions and collective consumption issues against poverty and ill-oriented 
social service delivery programs; especially in areas that have been 
disadvantaged by the apartheid past policy regime. They continue to pay a 
significant stakeholder role in the current activities of the City, as this study will 
show. 
 
The section provides an introductory outline to the methodology followed during 
the recording and collection of data, which included theoretical analysis and 
assessment as well as an empirical study. The empirical component contained 
observations and experimentation in the real world based on the basic approach 
to the field of social sciences and techniques by Mouton (2001: 52), Mouton and 
Marais (1997), De Wet (1998) and Bailey (1996: 174). The study employed 
theoretical consideration based on conceptual clarification on key issues in the 
field of cooperative government with a typically South African financial and fiscal 
framework. Various challenges have been identified with reference to the 
practices, legislation and policy that suggested synchronization and synergies in 
the future study of this kind. In addition, a case has been applies and information 
gathered fed into interpretation for key findings in close substantive empirical 
correlation and soundness with key area statements and objectives supported 
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most of the theoretical predilections in the handling of data based on this study. 
In short the study found that the tax price of services, and the design of grants 
have statistically significant effects on public expenditures, local revenues 
generation, and the mix of services provided at the sub-national government 
spheres. For instance, one of the three types of intergovernmental grants 
analyzed showed positive and significant implications on total sub-national 
expenditure for HIV/AIDS in health care, Education as well as Social 
Development cross-sectoral services. 
 
1.5.2  METHODOLOGY LIMITATIONS  
 
However, the study needs extensive research and views of the researcher are 
that due to the limitation of the methodology used and time constraint in the 
collection of information, he cannot venture any attempt to generalize the study to 
the whole South Africa.  
 
1.6  THESIS STRUCTURE AND OUTLINE 
The thesis is divided into 6 chapters, Figure 2: below illustrate the structure. 
 
FIGURE 2: SUMMARISED BREAKDOWN OF THE STUDY 
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The study consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 provides the introduction and 
background to the study. Chapter 2 provides a discussion of the theoretical 
perspectives and debates and an overview of the financial and fiscal relations’ 
approach to cooperative government in South Africa. Chapter 3 discusses the 
intergovernmental fiscal relations system and more specifically the implications 
for the fiscal and financial management system in South Africa. 
 
Chapter 4 discusses the methodology design and research techniques used to 
conduct the investigation and analyse the findings. This chapter presented an 
outline of the study as a whole and the conceptual and methodological 
framework within which we have attempted to approach the study while striving 
to present to the reader various components of the topic under study, their 
interrelation and connectedness. The design of the study attempts to address the 
problem and aims of the study discussed in section 1.3. In section 1.4 
(methodological framework), specific employed methodologies will be discussed.  
 
Chapter 5 discusses as the case study the design of the intergovernmental grant 
system in South Africa. The grant system and the HIV/Aids grants in particular is 
used to discuss the mechanics and workings of the intergovernmental finance 
and fiscal relations. And last but not least, in Chapter 6 recommendations are 
made and concluding remarks provided.  
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ON COOPERATIVE 
GOVERNMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL AMAENDMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the context of the objectives of the study as outlined in the problem statement 
(section 1.3), the background to the study (section 1.2) as well as the 
methodological orientation (section 1.4) - this chapter is rooted within the 
constitutional version that seeks to explore the general framework for 
intergovernmental relations among the three spheres of government. 
Nevertheless, difficulties in implementing its provisions as they currently appear 
have so far suggested amendments to the current constitutional dispensation. 
The chapter is organized in ten interrelated components as illustrated in Figure 3: 
below. 
 
FIGURE 3: BREAKDOWN OF CHAPTER 2 
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It has been remarked that attempted budget reforms and changes in the 
assignments of functions have resulted in rendering the future of sub-national 
government difficult and uncertain with far reaching implications for the fiscal 
relations on the three spheres of government, since IGRs have fundamentally 
been shaped by the current version of the Constitution (Act 108 of 1996). As 
already stated earlier, the theoretical framework of the study maintains that 
government overregulation is cumbersome to the efficient delivery of services 
and should be changed since it generates a fiscal gap between the revenue 
raising ability of sub-national spheres and their expenditure responsibilities. A 
range of experience demonstrates that the National sphere fails to raise revenue 
efficiently, especially when tax rates are the same across provinces, causing 
excess dead weights losses in the economy. 
 
In South Africa the Constitution establishes three spheres of government, which 
are distinctive, interrelated and interdependent. Fiscal relations between tiers of 
government are determined by the political system and constitutional 
arrangements between different governments level (Break, 1980). For Musgrave 
et al (1985) efficient financial arrangements are cornerstones that stimulate 
service delivery processes in order to ensure that national policy objectives are 
carried out. They strike at the welfare of citizens through the provision of 
essential services. Arora (2001: 246) hold that financial matters in 
intergovernmental relations are the basis of all political structures as no level of 
government can execute its functions effectively and efficiently without adequate 
finances. Gildenhuys (1997) concurs with latter view by maintaining that, 
“…intergovernmental relations are an important condition for sound financial 
relations that each government must have sufficient money at its disposal to be 
able to pay for the costs of the functions being executed by such government 
level”. A key issue in intergovernmental fiscal relations is the assignment of 
functions and finances to different levels of government (Fjeldstard, 2001: 144). 
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This is due to the fact that the right of existence of each government level is 
justified by rational allocation of functions and revenues (Gildenhuys (1997). 
Oates (1999) identifies three major functions for the public sector aligning aside 
with the traditional theory of fiscal federalism, such as macro-economic 
stabilization, income distribution and resource stabilization. Details of the three 
major functions have been documented in academic discourse about IGRs and 
fiscal federalism6.  
 
Evidence strikes to the fact that grant system (chapter 5, section 5.6) in South 
Africa, despite improvement in tax collection (chapter 2, section 2.5.2 and 
chapter 3, section 3.11 and 3.12.3) in the previous financial year and 
sophisticated budget methods, remains inconsistent and unpredictable. There is 
no guarantee of how sub-national governments will receive each year. Du Plessis 
(1971) states that revenue sharing formulas used in intergovernmental system 
must ensure that funds will be available in the future. For sound financial 
relations, intergovernmental fiscal arrangements must create a fair amount of 
security and certainty with regards to the following: 
I. Equitable revenue sharing7 and annual revenue received for such sharing; 
II. Allocation of revenue resources by means of which a government own 
resources for supplying revenue of repetitive nature on a yearly basis is 
secured; 
III. The availability of loans which will secure the supply of capital income for 
capital formation;  
                                            
6 Fiscal federalism is a system whereby fiscal authority that is expenditure and taxation decisions 
is devolved to subnational governments (provincial and local). This may the result of either 
constitutional provisions or internal agreements of government.  
7 The Treasury defines the allocation of the national, provincial and local spheres of government 
as required by the Constitution (National Treasury, 2005: 163). Furthermore, it is the share of 
funds in the National Revenue Account that sphere of government is entitled to constitutionally. 
The criteria on which this division is based are listed in Section 214 (2) of the 1996 Constitution. 
See Annexure E: Division of Revenue Act. 
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IV. The nature and extent of public functions including all legal and other 
constraints to be considered;  
V. The possible intervention of one governmental level in the affairs of 
another governmental level; and  
VI. The prospect for the continued existence of a certain government level or 
institution (Gildenhuys, 1997). 
 
The financial needs of government vary widely and are always larger than fiscal 
capacity to pay for them; the need exists to within available means (McKenzie et 
al, 1985). Allocation of functions to levels of government where they can be best 
executed must correspond with allocation of revenue sources and most of which, 
as Mikesell (1995) remarks come with problems. The problems that usually occur 
with the allocation of revenue sources are the spillover effect, and the vertical 
and horizontal fiscal inequalities. Those fiscal inequalities are the result of tax 
system, the presence of externalities as well as vertical and horizontal 
inequalities (Franzel, 1984). Mikesell (1995) suggests that in order to minimize 
further problems of fiscal inequalities that result to lack of funds by other levels of 
government to execute their functions, most government adhere to the two 
revenue sharing system. Like in South Africa, the two systems of revenue 
sharing are vertical and horizontal sharing.  Horizontal revenue sharing entails 
the sharing of revenue between governments on the same level, and may be 
achieved by the redistribution of the tax base amongst various governments at 
the same level. Vertical revenue sharing8 on the other hand entails the division of 
revenue between various government spheres in a country, namely national, 
provincial or regional and local levels. One level of government, usually central 
level, imposes taxes and revenue collected for its partial spending by another 
government level (Gildenhuys, 1997). 
 
                                            
8 Vertical division: The division of revenue between spheres of government. 
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The assertion by Fjeldstard (2001: 144) holds that “…a key issue in 
intergovernmental fiscal relations is the assignment of functions and finances to 
different levels of government, as a final sum of intergovernmental fiscal 
relations.’’ The Constitution of South Africa requires the three spheres of 
government to share nationally collected revenue equally. Provincial and local 
governments may also receive other allocations called grants from national 
government either conditionally or unconditionally. In the following section 
(section 2.2) the principles of cooperative government are highlighted and 
documented. 
 
2.2 THE PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
Conventional wisdom on decentralization is generally centered on the right 
balance between the principle of autonomy and supervision in order to create a 
system of decentralization susceptible to address developmental challenges9 in 
the lives of the constituencies and the countries supporting their democratic 
mandate. In chapter 3 of the Constitution of South Africa, provision is given to the 
spheres of government to put national interest at the forefront through 
cooperating with each other and avoidance of unhealthy competition over political 
and economic resources of the country. The way the principle of cooperative 
government is spelt out in the Constitution of South Africa gives suspicion on the 
fact that it is binding on all three spheres of government, including organs of the 
state in the conduct of their activities. The principles for cooperative government 
and intergovernmental relations are found in section 41 (1) of the Constitution 
which states that all spheres of government and all organs of state within each 
sphere must: 
                                            
9 For the purpose of good understanding around the issues at local level, development here is 
referred to as a mechanism that has three processes: - Satisfaction of material needs, -- 
Enhancement of choice, - Equitable distribution of wealth, thus putting people at the center of 
every development planning processes and schemes. 
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(a) Preserve peace, national unity and indivisibility of the Republic; (b) secure the 
well-being of the people of South Africa; (c) provide effective, transparent, 
accountable and coherent government for the republic as a whole; be loyal to the 
constitution, the Republic and its people; (e) respect the constitutional status, 
institution, powers and functions of government in the other spheres; (f) not 
assume any power or function except those conferred on them in terms of the 
Constitution; exercise their powers and perform their functions  in a manner that 
does not encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity  of 
government in another sphere; and Co-operate with one another in mutual trust 
and good faith by: - (i) fostering friendly relations; (ii) assisting and supporting 
one another on matters of common interests; (iii) informing one another and 
consulting one another on matters of common interests; (iv) coordinating their 
actions and legislation with one another; (v) adhering to agreed procedure; and 
(vi) avoiding legal proceedings against one another. 
 
One of the critical and controversial issues contained in the Constitution of South 
Africa and that seems to have gone beyond the classical quest for balancing 
autonomy and supervision is the fact that Section 41 (1) is the epitome of 
themes, provisions and mechanisms that cannot be categorized as ‘autonomy’ or 
‘supervision’ per se. This is for example seen in section 41 (1) (h) above, where 
the Constitution entrusts all spheres of government, including local government 
to cooperate with one another in mutual trust and good faith… by coordinating 
their actions and legislation with one another. Nevertheless, it is not clear 
whether this supervision refers to the question of one sphere supervising the 
other or it is an example of assertion of autonomy (De Visser, 2005: 209). 
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2.3 A LOCAL DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 
 
The transfer of power and autonomy to local government is a new development 
in South Africa. The new vision of local government encapsulates far more than 
its previous role, as a regulator and service provider. The Constitution confers 
upon local government developmental duties spelling out priority to the basic 
needs of the community to promote social and economic development. Local 
government has an encompassing role of promoting civic, political, social and 
economic justice and the institutionalization of democratic practice. Thus, the 
performance of local government is therefore, seen as the genesis for promoting 
regional and national development.  
 
The Constitution (Act No. 108 of 1996: 81), calls for a robust local government 
system, which can be able to provide, key government priorities, i.e., democratic 
and accountable government for local people; ensure the provision of services to 
communities in a sustainable manner; promote social and economic 
development; promote a safe and healthy living environment; and encourage the 
involvement of communities and community organizations in the matters of local 
government. Taking cognisance, as a matter of fact, of the new role of local 
government as a developmental local government, and referring to the large-
scale grassroots linkages and infrastructure investment, Moosa as quoted in the 
White Paper on Local Government (1997: 1) raises a fundamental question: 
 
“Local government is at the heart of development in South 
Africa. Through its grassroots linkages, infrastructure 
investment programs, local economic development strategies, 
partnership with the private sector and integrated development 
plans; local government is the public service agency best able 
to have a direct and enduring impact on the lives of its citizens. 
The Constitution and local government legislation give 
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municipalities significant powers to meet these challenges, but 
these powers mean nothing without the capacity and resource 
to implement them”. 
 
It is obvious that the instrument toward meeting the goals of development local 
government enshrined in Chapter 2 of the Constitution will be a myth without a 
strong financial and fiscal management system. This encapsulates a strategic 
plan on how to raise revenue nationally and the recommendations as on how this 
revenue might be shared between and across spheres of government, in order to 
implement these priorities and meet the goals provided in Chapter 2 of the 
Constitution. It is in this regard that the Constitution requires that an Act of 
Parliament should prescribe the division of nationally raised revenue between 
national, provincial and local government. The DORA (as it is referred to), must 
take into account recommendations from the Financial and Fiscal Commission 
(FFC)10, and criteria stipulated in sub-section 214 (2) of the Constitution. Within 
the framework of these requirements, the Annual Division of Revenue Bill is the 
outcome of government’s policy deliberations on expenditure priorities for the 
period ahead (National Treasury, 2005: 126). This is discussed in chapter 3 of 
the study. 
 
2.4  CHALLENGES OF COOPERATIVE GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
The primary aim of this section is to provide an overview of the way, in which 
cooperation has been incorporated in the South African institutional design as a 
contributory factor to the formulation of an institutional principle necessary to 
make a success out of any decentralized form of governance. The second aim 
underpins the way in which, the principle of cooperative government (as already 
discussed in section 2.2 above) has been given effect in the South African 
                                            
10 An Independent body established by Chapter 9 of the 1996 Constitution to make 
recommendations to Parliament and Provincial legislatures about financial issues affecting the 
three spheres of government (Treasury, 2005: 163). 
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constitutional dispensation within the scope of a decentralized three-tier system 
of government. 
 
The third aim highlights the challenges and implications of such constitutional 
amendments to thwart or disrupt the very autonomy in other spheres of 
government conferred in terms of the Constitution - thus contributing to a great 
extent with redundant contradictions, a slow pace in delivery causing a death-
knell in the distribution of goods and services to the poor. The main question here 
now, is whether the South African Constitution provides room for an agreed 
normative framework for Cooperative governance in which mutual respect and 
recognition are key aspects. Nevertheless, lessons of experience show that the 
constitutional court has given the certification judgment of merit in terms of the 
principle guiding intergovernmental relations and cooperative governance in 
South Africa: 
 
“[I]ntergovernmental cooperation is implicit in any system where 
powers have been allocated concurrently to different levels of 
government and is consistent with the requirement […] that 
national unity be organized and promoted” (In Re: 1996 (10). 
 
In chapter 3 of the Constitution of South Africa, provision has been made for a 
conceptual framework in terms of ‘cooperative government’, which underlines the 
principles of cooperative government and intergovernmental relations. It defines 
the nature of the three spheres as it is constituted as national, provincial, and 
local spheres of government which are ‘distinctive, interdependent and 
interrelated’ (Republic of South Africa (Act No. 108 of 1996: 25 (1)). In section 40 
(2) the Constitution instructs the three spheres of government to adhere to the 
principles that are provided therein, i.e., the attempt to conduct their activities 
within the parameters provided in the chapter in terms of the Constitution.  
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The study of concurrency management between provincial and national 
government is highlighted as a facilitating benchmark that sets up comprehensive 
guidelines and conceptual framework that includes local government as one of 
the three partners of the common good in the public sector. Scholars and 
academics have interpreted the ‘distinctiveness’ component to refer to the 
autonomy that each sphere of government enjoys (Steytler, 2002a: 2). The fact 
that the spheres are ‘interdependent’ means that the exercise of autonomy by 
any sphere is supervised by the other spheres of government and the degree of 
‘interrelatedness’ to the others points to the fact that each sphere should exercise 
its autonomy to the common good possible of the country as a whole, by 
cooperating with the other spheres (Steytler, 2002a: op cit).  
 
Section 40 (1) of the Constitution of South Africa states that South Africa is 
constituted as national, provincial and local spheres of government which are, 
“…distinctive, interdependent and interrelated”(Murray, 2001: 66).  The treatment 
and powers in the last Constitution is seen to promote or sanction an integrated 
system of government in which both national and provincial governments are 
deeply implicated in each others’ functioning (Haysom, 2001: 43). The degree of 
exclusivity or concurrency (chapter 2, section 2.2) being given precedence over 
certain matters of national interest rise critical questions about the degree of 
autonomy to local spheres; whose principles, mechanism, processes and modus 
operandi are either spelled out or predetermined by legislative framework in 
terms of the Constitution (White Paper on Local Government, 1998: 6). The 
sensitivity given in section 41(1), states that “…all spheres of government and all 
organs of state within each sphere must preserve peace, national unity and 
indivisibility of the Republic”, etc. It should exercise the power without 
encroaching on the geographical, functional and institutional integrity of 
government in another sphere; and should co-operate with one another in mutual 
trust and good faith by fostering friendly relations, assisting and supporting or 
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informing one another on mattes of common interests (Republic of South Africa, 
Act 108 of 1996: 25). By establishing a tripartite form of government, the 
Constitution imparts a legal platform of social interaction by stimulating the ethos 
of intergovernmental relations to take place. These powers, which are allocated 
to provinces are either exclusive or concurrent and are listed in Schedule 4 & 5 of 
the Constitution (Act 108 of 1996: 148-151); which include matters that are 
usually not considered to be of national importance or potential implications 
(Murray, 2001: 69). South Africa has two types of responsibilities allocated 
between the three spheres in terms of the Constitution. These are either 
concurrent or exclusive. Absolute powers underpin absolute responsibilities over 
those that are assigned to a particular sphere to have absolute control over those 
that are executed with the sole hope in mind, to achieve public good for all.  
 
The fact that section 44 (2) states that Parliament may legislate on schedule 5 
matters “…when it is necessary (a) to maintain national security; (b) to maintain 
economic unity; (c) to maintain essential national standards; (d) to establish 
minimum standards required for the rendering of services; or (e) to prevent 
unreasonable action taken by a province which is prejudicial to the interests of 
another province or to the country as a whole” (Murray, 2001: 69). Schedule 4 is 
concerned about concurrent responsibilities to refer to share powers between two 
or more spheres of government. This encapsulates the matters on which both the 
national and provincial spheres of government make laws. This list includes 
important matters of basic foundation for reconstruction and development of any 
country, situated at the bottom of Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, such as 
education, medical attention, housing as well as social welfare (Murray, op. cit). 
In order to meet the requirement of a local developmental state, which is based 
on the idea of service delivery to the people, the government through the Division 
of Revenue11 (DORA) entitles funds to different spheres through equitable share 
                                            
11 Allocation of funds between the spheres of government, as required by the Constitution. 
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raised nationally. The Constitution besides gives provisions to sub-national 
governments of other allocation from national government revenue, either 
conditionally or unconditionally12. The Constitution describes South Africa as “…a 
state of law, independent, sovereign, one and indivisible, social and democratic 
state” (Act 108 of 1996: S1); and to the heavy concentration of power in the 
national sphere (Murray, 2001: 68).  All law-making power in South Africa is 
vested in national legislature unless it has been expressly granted to provincial or 
local government (Act 108 of 1996: S43). This feature leads many scholars and 
analysts to start questioning the constitutionality of the autonomy given to 
different spheres of government to whether South Africa is strong-centered 
unitary system or a semi-federal state or both.  
 
Intergovernmental Relations has become a more technical regulatory instrument 
that needs a wide range of experience and skills in the delivery process, in light 
of the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act (Act No. 97 of 1997), which 
reinforces section 214 of the Constitution. It promotes cooperative government 
on fiscal, budgetary and financial matters and prescribes the process for the 
determination of the equitable share and allocation of revenue (chapter 2, section 
2.5.2) raised nationally. It establishes the Budget Council and Budget Forum – 
the consultative intergovernmental forums for the budget and fiscal management 
process. This is seen in section 9 and 10 (4) of the Act (Act No. 108 of 1996), 
which sets out the consultation process to be followed with the Financial and 
Fiscal Commission (FFC), including the process of considering recommendations 
made with regard to the equitable division of nationally raised revenue (National 
Treasury, 2005: 225). 
 
                                            
12 The discussion on Equitable share, conditional or unconditional grants, direct or indirect, cash 
or in kind grants as well as that on municipal financial and fiscal management systems of South 
Africa will be discussed later on. 
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Good financial governance in fiscal and financial affairs of municipalities and 
municipal entities extends the scope that encapsulates sound financial 
responsibilities in ensuring transparency,  accountability and appropriate lines of 
responsibility in the fiscal and financial affairs of municipalities and municipal 
entities; the management of their revenues, expenditures, assets and liabilities 
and the handling of their financial dealings; budgetary and financial planning 
processes and the co-ordination of those processes with the processes of organs 
of state in other spheres of government; borrowing; the handling of financial 
problems in municipalities; other financial matters (Budget Review, 2003: 117).  
 
The above underlined issues are very pertinent to any system of 
intergovernmental relations operating within the framework of a unitary 
mechanism of decentralization. In order to understand the pertinence of such 
issues and actual challenges to cooperative government in South Africa, it is 
necessary to capture the conditions in which the South African government of 
national unity acquired its negotiated freedom, the origins of a system of 
cooperative government and its institutionalization in the Interim Constitution and 
the cost of such a negotiated freedom. The next section stimulates the discussion 
along this line. 
 
2.4.1  THE ORIGINS OF COOPERATIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
The Constitution of South Africa recognizes the separation of powers between 
three spheres in terms of national, provincial and local spheres of government. 
Section 40 (1) asserts that the three spheres of government are distinctive, 
interdependent and interrelated. The degree of intergovernmental relations’ 
distinctiveness refers primarily to the constitutional allocation of powers to each 
sphere on one hand. On the other, however the principle of interconnectedness 
and interdependence refers to the exercise of the role of supervision for the 
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autonomy exercised by one sphere in order to avoid tensions and is pursued by 
the common good of the country (White Paper on Local Government, 1998: 7). 
The principle of autonomy is critical and paramount to every decentralized13 
government since it ensures that local spheres14 of government fully exploit their 
potential in order to respond to the challenges felt by the degree of 
responsiveness to people’s needs. This section discusses the origins of 
cooperative government in South Africa and provides a short illustration on its 
key principles spelt out in terms of the Constitution.  
 
The final Constitution is constituted in part, of such responsibilities whose 
inherent features mirror the particular nature to the elaboration of a system of 
‘cooperative government’ (Hayson, 2001: 44). Following the federalist debate that 
was prevalent at the dawn of South Africa’s negotiation in 1990, it was obvious 
that a broad consensus began to gain momentum on the most difficult issues 
pertaining to the agenda of the constitutional process. One of the most intractable 
issues concerned the question of autonomy and the functions to the provincial 
governments thereof. Many argued that federalism15 would be a vehicle for the 
promotion of secessionist and insurrectionary forces (Haysom, 2001: ibid), while 
others advocated for it in terms of the promotion of accountability and 
democracy, especially since it allowed the emergence of diversity and difference. 
                                            
13 Jaap de Visser for this cause distinguishes three sub-principles of autonomy, namely ‘local 
autonomy, functional powers and financial autonomy. 
14 A developmental local government and the degree of its interrelation with regards to the ethos 
of decentralization gives rise to the following predicament, i.e., what should those states that are 
apprehensive about the idea of equipping local governments with the necessary skills and 
resources in order to achieve development do? In the attempt ton respond to theses questions, 
three institutional principles emerged from the authors’ mind: autonomy, supervision and 
developmental local government as an institutional design in South Africa in line with the 
dispensation of decentralization as one of the good factors for development. 
15 During the entire period of constitutional negotiation, February 1990 to March 1994, the country 
was racked by violence, particularly in KwaZulu Natal where an estimated toll of 10 000 people 
died in political conflict, chiefly between supporters of ANC, the Congress of South African Trade 
Union (COSATU), United Democratic Front Alliance on the one hand, and supporters of the 
Inkata Freedom Party (IFP) on the other. Much of the opposition of the ANC both within ad 
without the constitutional deliberations took the form of demands for the autonomy of KwaZulu 
Natal. 
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African National Congress (ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) 
on the one hand, were concerned with the transformation of institutions and 
patterns of privileges and power in South Africa by supporting strongly a unitary 
state. On the other hand, however National Party (NP) lined up with the Freedom 
Front (FF), the Democratic Party (DP) and the Inkata Freedom Party (IFP) in 
favor of a maximum devolution of responsibilities coupled with the greatest 
degree of autonomy of provincial governments (Hayson, op cit). With the 
insurrectionary forces and the death toll that took place in KwaZulu Natal, 
“federalism” became an escape-goat to blame and lodge complaints at the 
doorsteps of the autochthon province as murderers, as much more as a 
hindrance than a help. Haysom 92001: 45) adds: 
 
“The first breakthrough in the federal debate began to emerge with a conceptual 
approach to national and provincial powers which can best be seen in the 
distinctively South African formulation on ‘concurrent’ legislative and executive 
powers. This understanding of concurrent powers finds expression in both the 
Interim and the Final Constitution of the land”. 
 
2.4.2  CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND POLITICAL CHANGE 
 
The framers of the new Constitution held a unity of vision for the reconstruction 
and development of South Africa. For this, Constitutions worldwide have always 
been seen as a map that spells out procedural and administrative justice in order 
to achieve substantive equality among the population; or like a torch that 
illumines the dark curtain of an obscure labyrinth of bewildered and impoverished 
masses. Cooperative government is an integral and necessary part of all 
successful systems of government in the world. It is asserted that effective 
intergovernmental relations are critical to any Constitution having multi-faceted 
spheres or multi-level system of government, to work properly (Murray, 2001: 
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66); and South Africa is no exception. This section discusses the constitutional 
context of cooperative government in South Africa, and its implications for 
political change. 
 
Section 1 of the Constitution describes South Africa as “…a state of law, 
independent, sovereign, one and indivisible, social and democratic state” (Act 
No. 108 of 1996: S1); and to the heavy concentration of power in the national 
sphere (Murray, 2001: 68).  It is obvious that all law-making power in South Africa 
is vested in national legislature unless it has been expressly granted to provincial 
or local government in terms of the Constitution (Act No. 108 of 1996: S43), 
bicamerally composed of National Assembly and National Council of Provinces. 
This is an index that distinguishes South Africa from, for example, the United 
States of America. With regard to the IGR system of USA, only those powers the 
states think the federal government should have were conceded at the early 
stage of the single country formation; and all the remaining power remained 
within the discretion of autonomous states (Murray, 2001: 68). Canada has 
separate lists of federal and provincial powers (Murray, op cit).  
 
By identifying and making provision for the other spheres of government as 
autonomous structures that enjoy their free administration and autonomous 
management of their economic, human financial and technological resources; the 
Constitution of South Africa has given a legal framework intended to secure the 
division of powers or functions among different levels. Two aspects of the system 
of dividing powers are however, commonly included in a Constitution – first, the 
determination and actual allocation of different functions and; secondly, 
processes that determine important aspects of the relationships between the 
spheres, including the role that sub-national units play in national elections or 
national law-making. This shows how the paradigm of cooperative government 
has become a more technical regulatory instrument with a wide range of 
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experience on delivery, in light of the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act (Act 
No. 97 of 1997), which reinforces section 214 of the Constitution.  It promotes 
cooperative governance on fiscal, budgetary and financial matters and prescribes 
the process for the determination of the equitable sharing and allocation of 
revenue raised nationally. It establishes the Budget Council and Budget Forum – 
the consultative intergovernmental forums for the budget and fiscal management 
process. This is seen in section S9 and S10 (4) of the Act, which sets out the 
consultation process to be followed with the Financial and Fiscal Commission 
(FFC), including the process of considering recommendations made with regard 
to the equitable division of nationally raised revenue (National Treasury, 2005: 
225). 
 
2.4.3  INTERVENTIONS OF THE NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL 
GOVERNMENTS 
 
Section 100 of the Constitution provides for the intervention of the national 
executive in provinces and municipalities in case they are not able to fulfill an 
obligation in terms of legislation. In this case, section 155 is amended to add 
subsection 8 to support the provision of section 100. It allows national legislation 
to provide for the exercise of executive and legislative authority on behalf of the 
municipal council when the council cannot function or to resolve serious and 
persistent financial emergencies in the municipality (Department of Provincial and 
Local government, 2001: 4). In order to fulfill the obligations of the relevant 
sphere of government, the national executive can issue a directive to the 
provincial executive or the municipality describing the extent of failure and stating 
any steps required to meets its obligations. The national executive can assume 
the responsibility for the relevant obligation in the province or municipality. 
Section 139 provides for provincial intervention if the municipality fails to fulfill its 
obligations in terms of legislation or the Constitution (Act No. 108 of 1996:76).  
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The effect of the two sections is to allow the national executive to intervene 
directly in municipal affairs if the municipality fails to fulfill its obligations. This 
calls for coordination between the actions of the provincial and national 
executives. Subsection 3 (b) of Section 100 requires national legislation that 
regulates the national executive intervention process to be co-ordinated with its 
counterpart at the provincial level. This does not provide for any ground in 
suggesting a direction toward resolving any disputes relate to timing of 
intervention between the provincial and national executive. The Constitutional 
Court has made it clear in its First Certification-judgement (para. 264) that this 
discretion should be exercised in terms of  the general principles of 
intergovernmental and cooperative government, spelled out in  section 41 (1) of 
the Constitution, i.e., all levels of government , among others, “…should respect 
the constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions of government in the 
other spheres of government and  exercise their powers and functions in a 
manner that does  not encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional 
integrity of government in another sphere” (Department of Provincial and Local 
Government, 2001:4).  
 
2.5  SUMMARY  
 
In summary, evidence shows that the amendment of the constitutional framework 
has direct implications to bear on a holistic change and transformation within the 
whole set up of financial and fiscal management systems in South Africa. 
Financial and fiscal management systems in South Africa encapsulates this fact, 
especially with regard to constitutional change in terms of section 100 and 139, 
i.e., provisions have been provided for intervention by National and Provincial 
spheres of government in the affairs of sub-national governments. This 
experience raises highly critical implications for municipalities in case they fail to 
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fulfill their obligations. The failure calls for a point of coordination and alignment 
between the actions of the provincial and the national executive. As in so many 
cases, especially with reference to tax cohabitation, the existence of vertical 
externalities due to tax overlapping and their associated costs suggests that the 
allocations of tax powers should be based on efficiency grounds rather than on 
political identity of the various spheres of government. To this end, a range of 
experience demonstrates the situation where the National sphere fails to raise 
revenue efficiently, especially when tax rates are the same across provinces 
without causing excess dead weights losses in the economy. Given this context, 
the implication of the strategic conclusion from this situation is that revenue 
sharing arrangements may be efficient ways of raising government’s revenue. 
 
It can be expected that the study of cooperative government is deeply rooted 
within the contextual framework of financial management, fiscal management 
systems and intergovernmental relations among the three spheres of 
government. As a corollary, it follows that difficulties in implementing its 
provisions as they currently appear have so far suggested amendments to the 
current constitutional dispensation. The discussion on the theory of cooperative 
government as outlined in this chapter has an abundant and rich background 
since the advent of the country to democracy in 1994 following the interim 
intergovernmental fiscal relations between spheres of government, across organs 
of state and sectoral entities. Attempting to bring all these diversified government 
bodies within the framework of alignment and coordination in such a way that 
brings about synergies, efficiency and effectiveness to the financial and fiscal 
management systems is, in fact a challenge that institutional arrangement within 
the whole government body will need to capture as a question of interest.  
 
Intergovernmental relations take various forms. These goals amount from the 
government’s effort to equalise the revenue share based on formula (vertical split 
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after top slicing) to horizontal mechanisms of financing sub-national spheres 
using transfers and grants (section 3 and 5). In so doing, the government is 
committed to the distribution of income to the people through three main social 
sectors such as education, health care and social welfare as well as transport in 
order to alleviate poverty in the country.  The difficulty arise due to the fact that 
certain municipalities, given the fact that they earmarked as focal points for 
government delivery and implementation, lack or do not have the same fiscal 
base and capacity to raise the funds compared to others in order to address 
these issues and reach a certain degree of autonomy, due to divergent 
geographical conditions as swell as socio-economic orientation. Critics rise on 
the degree of municipal financial and fiscal autonomy with regard to the 
interference of government to intervene earlier or latter in the affairs of 
municipalities through transfers or oversight (De Visser, 2005). For this reason, 
an Act of Parliament has been enacted to take into account recommendations 
from the FFC, and criteria stipulated in subsection 214 (2) of the constitution with 
the view to ensure a sanctioning procedure to the non-appliance in terms of the 
law. 
 
Section 227 (2) of the Constitution states that the revenue sub-national spheres 
raise cannot e deducted from their share of nationally raised revenue, but 
evidence show that the national government does deduct other funds local 
government is receiving from national government, including conditional grants 
for capital or operating expenditure. Within the framework of financial and fiscal 
management systems, the MTEF across ministries has been put into place with 
the view to bring cooperation, enhance financial stability and fiscal feasibility, 
encourage investment and make the program evaluation of cooperative system 
easier.  
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CHAPTER 3: INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS AND THEIR 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FISCAL AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the context of the objectives of the study as depicted in the introductory 
chapter, associated to the study of key selected concepts in the field of financial 
and fiscal management within the broader context of cooperative government in 
South Africa, the discussion outlined in this chapter endeavors to establish an 
overview of conceptual constitutional amendment and its implications for the 
financial and fiscal relations. Attention will be given to section 77 and 120 of the 
Constitution that have been amended to provide for the recognition of bills that 
offer exemptions from any national taxes as money bills. As the paper will show, 
this recognition has serious implications for financial management and the 
presentation of budgets across the three spheres of government. Further more it 
has the meaning that any exemptions from taxes should be reflected as income 
in the budget of the sphere of government receiving an exemption. By the same 
token, the sphere of government granting an exemption should consider it as an 
expense. This chapter is organized in five sections. Section 3.1 gives an 
introductory outline to the study backed up by an overview highlighting the 
sources of revenue and intergovernmental expenditures (section 3.2); taxation 
and tax overlapping (section 3.3) is also explained in light of a fiscal management 
system within a decentralized dispensation and has been followed by municipal 
and fiscal management systems at the local level of government (section 3.4). 
Section 3.5 deals with comparative sources taxing powers and the emergence of 
a financial and fiscal system in South Africa and underpins the instrument of 
effective intergovernmental fiscal system (section 3.6). State intervention in sub-
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spheres of government (section 3.7) has been highlighted followed by the 
constitutional framework and legislative implications for financial management 
(section 3.8). At last, the conclusion to the chapter (section 3.9) has been 
postulated. This is illustrated in the following Figure, Figure 4. below: 
 
FIGURE 4 : BREAKDOWN OF CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As with the above discussion on the framework of financial and fiscal 
management systems where the MTEF across ministries has been put into place 
with the view to bringing cooperation, enhance financial stability and fiscal 
feasibility, encourage investment and make the program evaluation of 
cooperative system easier. In all the spheres of government, there are two 
important effects that the amendment of the two sections mentioned above have. 
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First of all, the costs of delivering services to be reflected in full (Lee et al, 1997: 
22), and this will allow decision-making and transparency in the public sector. 
Secondly, the amendment intends to pave a way for the introduction of reverse 
revenue sharing arrangements, i. e., in case the municipal government grants the 
property tax exemption to a building that is owned by either the national or the 
provincial government, such an exemption will be recorded as income on the side 
of the relevant government. In this way, the amendment makes reverse revenue 
sharing arrangements a plausible idea in South African fiscal system. 
 
3.2  SOURCES OF REVENUE AND GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES  
 
It is observed in South Africa that most of the revenue or taxes available to the 
government is collected by the national government and paid into the National 
Revenue Fund (Republic of South Africa, Act No. 108 of 1996: S213,) from 
whence it is allocated equitably to National, Provincial and Local spheres of 
government (Republic of South Africa, Act No. 108 of 1996: S214 (1) (a, b, c), 
Act No. 108 of 1996; FFC, 2002: 36). Significant changes to the volumes of the 
National Revenue Fund are likely to have positive or negative impacts on the 
factors listed in S214 (2) a-j. In this regard, sections 228 and 229 of the 
Constitution play a very important role in empowering on one hand, sub-national 
governments with regard to the revenue collection pattern through the imposition 
of specific taxes, levies and duties for specific public goods and services (Lee et 
al, 1977: 38), but prohibit them from imposing Income Taxes, customs duties and 
Value Added Tax16 (VAT) (FFC, 2006: 152). The assignment of function on the 
                                            
16 Income Taxes, customs duties and Value Added Tax16 (VAT) are functional areas of exclusive 
national legislative competence, which account for a large percentage of total revenue collected 
at national level. . This implies that those functions that are not included in the schedules and that 
fall under the national government are areas of exclusive national government legislative 
competence. Examples of those account for defence and the ministry of foreign affairs. 
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other hand, is outlined in schedule 417 and 518 of the constitution. Part B of both 
schedules includes local government matters over which the two spheres of 
government have legislative competence. By the same token, areas that fall 
under local government but are not listed in either of the two schedules are areas 
of exclusive local government legislative competence. Examples of these are 
functions such as passing municipal budget. Tax structure always has been and 
always will be a greatly debated topic. The crux of the problems to devise a tax 
system that is equitable, though equity can only be judged by the values imposed 
by the beholder. Lee et al (1997: 38) lists two different types of equity principles. 
For him the first principle is the ‘ability to pay that involves matters of horizontal 
and vertical equity’. Horizontal equity refers to the equal treatment of equals, i.e., 
persons of identical economic status would pay identical taxes, while vertical  
equity is the fact of treatment for unequal unequally and this second principle 
refers to the benefits attempting to relate revenue to expenditures(Lee et al, 
1997). 
 
3.2.1  IGFRs AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT 
 
As already stated above, Income taxes, corporate taxes, taxes on payroll, taxes 
on property as well as domestic taxes on goods and services, including Value 
Added Taxes (VAT) constitute the main revenue source for national government. 
Most of the revenue that government receives is spent as transfers to the 
provincial sphere of government19. This largely finances concurrent functions of 
the two spheres such as education, social services, housing, public transport and 
                                            
17 Schedule 4 contains functional areas of concurrent national and provincial legislative 
competence.  
18 Schedule 5 outlines functional areas of exclusive provincial legislative competence. 
19 Provincial governments are primarily tasked with social services as well as roads and regional 
economic planning and development, but education, health and welfare services - the three most 
expensive items in the country’s whole budget are functions shared by the national and provincial 
government, but their delivery rests with the province. Local governments deliver basic services 
including water, electricity and refuse collection. 
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health. While Section 214, Part (1) of the Constitution stipulates that an Act of 
Parliament must provide for the Division of Revenue (DoR) raised nationally 
among national, provincial and local spheres of government, the methodology to 
be used in determining the equitable shares is not mentioned in the Constitution 
(FFC, 2002: 64). When we look at the number of functions in both schedules and 
their share of total government expenditure, it is clear to assert that the provincial 
sphere has been assigned more functions than it has powers to raise revenue, 
and this is one of the factors that constitutes a challenge within the framework of 
cooperative government management (Petersen et al, 1993: 156) in South Africa. 
Section 214 of the Constitution is cognisant of this situation and introduces 
revenue sharing arrangements between the three spheres of government. This 
includes both vertical20 and horizontal division of revenue.  
 
It is important to note that before the vertical split is conducted, the national 
government conducts a process called ‘top slicing’, which involves the 
subtracting of the debt service costs and contingency reserves from total revenue 
before it is divided across the three spheres of government (Budget Review, 
1999: 7). This amount is sliced of the top so that it remains available to all three 
spheres of government. The top slice goes to pay for four items, i.e., Debt service 
cost – the interests the government pays on its loans; Contingency reserves – 
the pot of money government sets aside for anticipated needs or national 
emergencies; Skills development21 – the levy collected from private sector 
employers for a fund for training and skills development for personnel; Donor-
financed spending – money from foreign donors to specific projects and thus not 
part of revenue available to be shared. The remainder after top slicing is revenue 
                                            
20 Vertical division of revenue is a political process and does not use a formula.  
21 Skills development and donor-financed spending are new additions to the national revenue 
fund but do not create an increase in the total amount taken off the top slice for debt servicing. 
The skill development scheme is entirely funded by the private sector, and the donor-financed 
spending category was created to provide greater information and transparency. This money was 
previously spent, but not reflected in the budget. 
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available for division for the three spheres22 of government. The horizontal 
division of revenue uses formulae for both provincial and local spheres of 
government (FFC, 2004: 120). This is shown in the figure below. In many cases, 
local authorities either lack access to broad-based tax bases or are unable to 
generate sufficient revenues to meet the costs of providing mandated public 
services. Section 18 (1) of the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) requires 
Provincial Treasuries to promote and reinforce transparency and effective 
management, including that of the provincial departments as well as provincial 
public entities (FFC, 2004: 152). 
 
As a matter of conclusion, it is clear to argue that the proposed revenue sharing 
formula is based on the principle of equity, namely that the comparable 
jurisdictions within a country should provide comparable levels of goods at similar 
levels of taxation (Abedian et al, 1997: 65). Funds appropriated to national 
government priorities as equitable share are used mainly for functions that are 
exclusive to national government such as Defence and police, prisons, justice, 
finance, trade and industry, labour and international relations as well as 
concurrent functions as listed in the schedule 4 of the constitution. As a 
consequence, there has been many debates over what the equitable share of 
each sphere of government should be, and a formulaic approach to split available 
revenue has subsequently been adopted (FFC, 2002: 64). See Figure 2.2 on 
page 50 for detailed clarifications. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
22 The rationale for unconditional transfers to local governments is based on the principle of 
attaining vertical and horizontal equity while ensuring that the transfer system is able to cater for 
interjuridictional externalities as well as correcting for administrative weaknesses. For more 
information, read the research reports of the Financial and Fiscal Commission for the Division of 
Revenue 2007/08 by Jaya Josie, Bongani Khumalo and Tania Ajam. 
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3.2.2  IGFRs AT THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT 
 
The equitable share for the provinces is another key budgeting principle in the 
constitution. Sections 214 and 227 state that each province is entitled to an 
equitable share of revenue raised nationally. The underlying reason for the 
purpose of the equitable share is to provide provinces with resources to uphold 
national standards in providing those services that are the concurrent 
responsibility of national and provincial governments. On paper provinces still 
retain some independence in setting their own budgets and determining how their 
equitable share is spent, in practice however, much of the provinces’ funds are 
tied up in fulfilling National Executive mandates or upholding contractual 
obligations.  
 
The total funds transferred to the provinces from the national government take 
three forms: the equitable share23 (unconditional allocation) delivered as a block 
grant constitutes about 55.8% of total revenue available for division. Conditional 
grants24 occupy about 10% of total transfers to the provincial sphere of 
                                            
23 Equitable share is the most important intergovernmental transfer that a municipal government 
is entitled, to be used to assist municipalities in providing basic needs and meet the government 
mandate as stipulated in the Bills of Rights, chapter 2 of the constitution. Historically, the DPLG 
provides equitable share through “funding windows”, i.e., and different funding purposes using 
different criteria. This will be discussed later in this chapter. 
24 Grants build down to three distinctions, i.e., they can be conditional or unconditional, direct or 
indirect, cash or in kind. Conditional grants are used to direct the spending of grants in receiving 
municipalities. These are allocated according to specific needs such as the availability of 
academic hospitals, the need to modernize financial management practices, etc. Theses 
conditional grants are earmarked to be spent to specific functions, these are areas where national 
government functions are shared by provincial governments, or require cooperation and 
empowerment of provincial authorities for their delivery. Unconditional grants are allocated under 
limited conditions relating to the transfer, in this regard only equitable share is unconditional. 
Direct grants flow directly from transferring departments to the municipality, while unconditional 
grant flow via intermediary, such as provincial departments. A grant is described to be in kind 
when the transferring department directly administers it. It is said to be in cash when the money is 
transferred by the receiving municipality. To illustrate the terminology, by the way of an example 
the water service operating subsidy is an indirect grant used to fund 300 water schemes. Before 
the schemes are transferred, this is a grant-in kind since the schemes are under DWAF 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Intergovernmental fiscal relations and financial management systems 
in South Africa  
 
 
 
 
University of the Western Cape,  October 2009  43 
 
government (National Treasury, 2002: 157) and agency payments. In this regard, 
provinces get more than national government in terms of transfers, and shows 
out the degree of fiscal inequities that the current intergovernmental fiscal 
framework has introduced in South Africa. This is highlighted in chapter 5 dealing 
a case study within the framework of an empirical application of conditional 
grants in South Africa. 
 
There are nine provinces in the country and the amount of each province’s 
equitable share is computed using an objective, technical formula that aims to 
take into account the size and demographics of its population, the relative size of 
its rural communities and the poverty level of the province. The formula relies on 
the official statistics of Statistics South Africa (formally CSS), but also utilizes 
data from the department of health and education.  
 
For the time being, the formula has seven components with the following 
weighing given to each factor: 
 
• Education Share (41%): this component is determined based on both the 
size of the school-age population between 6 and 17 years in the province 
and the total number of students enrolled in public schools. School-age 
children receive twice the weighing as the number simply enrolled. 
 
• Health Share (19%): regarding the fact that all citizens are eligible for 
public health services, this share is based on the proportion of the 
population without access to medical aid being given much more attention 
than the number of people who have private medical aid. 
 
                                                                                                                                  
(department of water and forestry) control. After the transfer, the grant will be ultimately be 
phased into equitable share and treated as unconditional. 
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• Social security or welfare Share (18%): this share covers social security 
grants25 based on the estimated number of people entitled to social 
security including the elderly, disabled and children weighed by the 
poverty index from Income and Expenditure Survey. 
 
• Basic Population weighing (7%): derived from each province’s share of the 
total population of the country. 
 
• Backlog component (3%): the backlog component is divided between 
provinces based on the distribution of capital needs as registered in the 
schools registers of needs, the audit of hospital facilities and the share of 
the rural population in the country. 
 
• Economic output component (7%): this component of the formula 
recognises that some expenditure are due to the province’s economic 
activity, and not just the size of the population, such as the maintenance of 
roads. Currently provinces have different limited taxing power. This part of 
the formula attempts to compensate wealthier provinces that are 
disproportionally affected by this limitation. 
 
• Institutional component (5%): this amounts the same for each province, 
regardless of the size of the population. This is because government 
operations entail overhead costs regardless of the size of population 
served (FFC, 2006:122). 
 
 
 
                                            
25 For example, the number of children under age six in the province would determine the 
childcare component of the welfare share. The number is then adjusted by an income factor for 
that province. This is done because the income level of recipients of old age pensions and 
children support grants are taken into account in determining eligibility. 
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FIGURE 5: VERTICAL DIVISION OF NATIONAL REVENUE 
 
R million 
 
 
1999/00 
 
2000/01 
 
2001/02 
Total revenue raised nationally 
 
216,780 230, 722 247,250
Top slice 
Debt service 
Contingency reserves 
Skills development 
Donor-financed spending 
 
50,072 
48,222 
1,100 
1,000 
750 
 
55,070 
49, 820 
3, 500 
1,000 
750 
 
55,359 
52,609 
8,000 
2,000 
750 
 
National Equitable Share 
Conditional grants to Provinces 
and Local Governments  
As percentage of National 
Equitable share 
Retained for national 
Departments 
As percentage of National 
Equitable Share 
Provincial Equitable Share 
Local Government Equitable 
share 
 
78,733 
 
8,761 
 
11.1% 
 
69,972 
 
88.9% 
86,302 
 
1,673 
 
81,100 
 
8,361 
 
10.3% 
 
72,739 
 
89.7% 
92,071 
 
2,480 
 
84,489 
 
8,257 
 
9.8% 
 
76,232 
 
90.2% 
96,822 
 
2,580 
 
Total revenue available to be 
shared 
National equitable share as 
Percent 
Provincial equitable share as 
Percent 
Local equitable government 
Share as percent 
 
 
166,708 
 
47.2% 
 
51.18% 
 
1.0% 
 
175,652 
 
46.2% 
 
52.4% 
 
1.4% 
 
183,891 
 
45.9% 
 
52.7% 
 
1.4% 
Addendum26 
Provincial allocations 
Including conditional grants 
Local government share 
 
96,736 
94,420 
 
2,316 
102,912 
100,432 
 
2,480 
107,659 
105,079 
 
2,580 
 
Source: Budget Review (1999: 6) Provincial and Local Government Finances. 
Also see Annex E, page. 8. 
 
This section discussed sources of provincial revenue, intergovernmental sources 
and own sources and the recommendations of the Financial and Fiscal 
Commission, using seven components of the formula. It is clear that he findings 
                                            
26 The Addendum refers to appropriations made in the Supplementary Estimate of Expenditures. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Intergovernmental fiscal relations and financial management systems 
in South Africa  
 
 
 
 
University of the Western Cape,  October 2009  46 
 
outlined in this section have concluded that conditional grants27 occupy about 
10% of total transfers to the provincial sphere of government and agency 
payments. In this regard, provinces get more than national government in terms 
of transfers. Nevertheless, a large percentage of the money received by 
provinces goes spent on the three biggest functions decentralized to provinces 
against the capacity the provinces have to contract borrowing mechanisms or 
generate own income. Of the total expenditure of provinces, almost 38.6% go to 
education, 23.4% to health, while 18.9% goes to welfare (see chapter 5). On the 
whole, social services occupy over 80 of total provincial expenditure and the 
remainder goes to non-social services and amounts to 19.1% of total 
expenditure. 
 
3.3  TAXATION AND TAX OVERLAPPING 
 
It has been mentioned earlier that section 228 of the Constitution has been 
amended to remove the provision that the provinces can impose surcharges on 
the ‘tax base’28 and replace it with the provision that provincial governments can 
impose surcharges on any tax. The word ‘tax bases’ have a definite meaning as 
it differs from a tax. In this way it has been observed in fiscal cycles that the 
deletion of ‘base’ contributes to further complication of the meaning of section 
228. A tax can be divided into a number of components, namely tax base, tax 
rate and tax yield or revenue (Gravelle, 1999: 256). These three terms, although 
interrelated, do not bear the same meaning. In the first place a tax base referred 
to in the current version of the Constitution actual means an object on which the 
                                            
27 Treasury sees Conditional grants as allocation of money from one sphere of government to 
another, conditional on certain services being delivered or on compliance with specified 
requirements (National Treasury, 2005: 160). 
28 The size and number of sources that government can tax. In this case the explanatory 
memorandum provides reasons for the omission of ‘base’ It says that the reference to tax bases 
is deleted as the words have no definite meaning in the context they appear in the section. That 
the reference to tax bases was irrelevant for the purposes of interpreting the intention of that 
particular provision. 
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tax rate is applied (Gravelle, 1999: ibid). For instance in the case of Income Tax, 
a tax base would be income of an individuation or company (Mikesell, 1995: 
358). In the case of fuel levies, the base would be consumption petrol or diesel. 
The tax rate on the other hand is a percentage that is imposed on the base of a 
tax. The meaning of this is that if the national government charges 10% of a 
particular base, for instance, the provincial government can add two percentage 
points on this rate that will accrue to itself.  
 
Tax yield means the total revenue that is generated as a product of a particular 
tax rate and tax base (Mikesell, 1995). In this case a province can be entitled for 
instance, to 10% of the total revenue generated from that particular tax. This 
latter arrangement is what is commonly known as revenue sharing arrangement. 
It is important to note that ‘surcharges’ as outlined in the constitution implies an 
additional levy on a given tax base or, more specifically, an incremental rate on a 
given tax rate. This means that the national government does not expect to share 
revenue from any tax base with any individual province. In fact the constitutional 
provision presumes that a surcharge on a national tax would result in additional 
revenue for the province concerned without adversely affecting the revenue yield 
of the national government. In effect, the incidence of such an additional tax 
would fall on the final consumer. It is assumed that one of the reasons why the 
Constitution was amended was perhaps to delete the ‘base’ since bases are 
sometimes mobile across provincial boundaries. In this situation, it follows that 
reference to a tax base would effectively mean an immobile base, except where 
surcharges are very much like lump sum taxes on the same base in all provinces 
in the country. Reference to ‘any tax’ of national government has a whole range 
of meaning. This can mean that revenue from a given base, in which case the 
arrangement would be the equivalent to revenue sharing that is currently in 
existence, perhaps adjusted for each province’s potential to generate revenue 
sharing in a literal sense.  
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The national and provincial government can be trapped in the classical situation 
of the common revenue pool problem. Although the Constitution does not intend 
introducing revenue sharing in the form of a surcharge, the latter has problems if 
it is not capped. The imposition of taxes by different spheres of government on 
the same base may result in a situation where the combined tax rates are higher 
than would otherwise be the case if there were single occupation of tax bases 
(Sobel, 1997). There is, however, another point that is worth mentioning in this 
case. The existence of vertical externalities due to tax overlapping as outlined by 
Keen (1998), and their associated costs suggest that the allocation of tax powers 
should be based on efficiency grounds rather than on political identity of the 
various spheres of government. To this end, Sobel (1997) demonstrates a 
situation where the national sphere of government fails to raise revenue 
efficiently when tax rates are the same across provinces, i.e., without causing 
excess dead weight losses in he economy. The implication of the conclusion from 
this situation is that reverse revenue sharing arrangements may be an efficient 
way of raising government revenue. 
 
3.3.1 PERSONAL INCOME TAX SURCHARGE 
 
The Katz Commissions Seventh Interim Report considers the practicability of 
imposing a surcharge on Personal Income tax (PIT). The Commission’s interest 
in this issue was trigged by the exclusion of PIT in the list of those taxes that 
provinces cannot levy according to section 228 (1) (b) of the Constitution. The 
Commission has carefully considered the implications of the surcharge on the 
administrative capacity of the South African Revenue Services. It has thus, 
recommended against the surcharge on the ground of the fact that SARS does 
not have administrative capacity to administer this tax. This is against the FFC’S 
view that SARS has capacity to administer the surcharge. 
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Secondly, the Katz Commission contradicts the FFC’s recommendations about 
introducing a system of rebates. Instead, it proposes a system of abatements 
arguing that the FFC’s recommendations amount to a tax’ on national tax rates’, 
which is unconstitutional. Nevertheless, as noted earlier, the relevant section of 
the constitution has now been amended to remove the words ‘tax base’. It is 
clear that this amendment have an impact on the Katz Commission’s 
recommendations on the subject. A notable feature of the Katz Commission 
recommendations is the absence of explicit reference to the effect on total 
revenue of two spheres of government co-habiting the same tax base. Paragraph 
2.15 of the recommendation attempts to relate to this particular situation, but 
concludes that surcharges more than the tax room creates an impression that 
higher tax rtes are always accompanied by correspondingly high tax yield. 
 
3.3.2 PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS’ TAXES  
 
Provinces are entitled to an equitable share of national revenues. This is a 
requirement that is found in both the interim and the new constitution. As already 
explained in the sections above, in addition to government grants, a province or a 
municipality is allowed to raise loans in order to meet the requirement of capital 
or current expenditure in accordance with reasonable conditions determined by 
national legislation (Department of Finance, 1997: 4). The Borrowing Powers of 
Provincial Government Act (1996) requires that during the fiscal year, loans for 
current expenditure may be raised only with the view of bridging purposes and 
should be repaid within twelve months of the same fiscal year.  One of the body 
which is at the heart of the new national-provincial budget process within the 
decision-making financial framework of cooperative government is the Budget 
Council, that consists of the nine MECs Finance, the Minister and Deputy 
Minister of Finance, and officials from the Department of Finance and State 
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Expenditure, and the provincial Treasuries (Department of Finance, 1997: ibid. 
The FFC attends as an observer, and during this process the Budget Council 
recommends to Cabinet the shares that each province should receive after the 
national priorities coupled with the recommendations of FFC have been taken 
into account and set aside. 
 
Subsection 1 (b) of Section 228 allows the provincial legislature to impose flat 
rate surcharges on the tax base29 of any tax, levy or duty that is imposed by 
national legislation, other than the tax base of corporate income tax, Value Added 
Tax, rate on properties or custom duties. This aforementioned section is 
amended and the sentences ‘the tax base of’, since these words do not have a 
‘definite meaning in the context they appear in the section’. It moreover attempts 
to raise a number of issues regarding the sharing of taxes from a particular tax 
base as well as harmonisation of such taxes to take account of the Laffer curve 
effect.30Tax bases fall into four categories, that is, income taxes, consumption 
taxes, wages and wealth, and according to Gravelle as cited in Meyers (1999: 
255) all taxes have arguably one or more of these bases. For example, a capital 
gains tax is commonly thought of as a tax on income, but it is imposed only if a 
transaction (a sale) occurs. In the same token, an inheritance or estate tax is 
commonly thought of as a tax on wealth, but it is imposed only if wealth is 
transferred. 
 
3.4  MUNICIPAL FINANCIAL AND FISCAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS  
 
In this section the researcher will attempt to discuss first of all, the key themes in 
light of the South African municipal finance, sources of municipal revenue, 
                                            
29 Tax base is the aggregate value of income, sales or transactions on which particular taxes are 
levied. 
 
30 A curve that shows the relationship between tax rates and total revenue raised. 
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intergovernmental sources and own sources; and examine how these issues 
connect to IDPs.  In the second position, he will highlight the requirements and 
legislation behind the MFMA as well as municipal borrowing. A key issue that we 
need to understand is financial problems such as municipal interventions and 
how it is geared toward meeting people’s needs. This will guide the discussion 
toward considering key issues in South African municipal finance, such as the 
source of funding (section 2.4.4 and chapter 2 of the study) and the regulation of 
municipal finance; municipal spending; financial problems and related 
consequences. The various local governments are not simply subunits of their 
respective provincial governments, nor are the provinces subunits of the national 
government. Evidence shows that each government has substantial authority to 
decide what services will be provided, how it will be provided, and how and what 
amounts revenues will be raised (Lee et al, 1997: 282). Unlike the apartheid 
system of centralized government in which policies were set by the national 
government and their administration delegated to provinces which in turn 
delegated responsibilities to local tiers of government.  
 
The way South Africa raises funds and distributes it to the three spheres of 
government needs to be understood in the first place. It has been stated that one 
cannot discuss municipal finance in isolation as if it were a watertight 
compartment of the municipal machine; in that every single aspect of municipal 
administration of necessity has financial implications, and those who are 
bestowed responsibilities to provide service to the people should be given 
authority on how to create new revenues to supplement over their expenditure 
(Cloete, 2003: 57). The key provision for municipal revenue is found in Section 
227 of the constitution of the Republic, which sets out the main structure of South 
Africa’s fiscal system. This section states that local government has an 
entitlement to an equitable share (of the revenue raised nationally to enable it 
provides basics services and perform the functions allocated to it (Act no. 108 of 
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the Republic of South Africa, Act of 1996: S227). May receive other allocation 
from national government revenue; and can raise additional income itself, which 
may not be deducted from its share of national government revenue.  
 
The national raised revenue is raised nationally and efficiently to the South 
African revenue service, but this money does not belong to the national sphere of 
government (Abedian et al, 1997). This encapsulates the reason behind the fact 
that all the three levels of government have entitlement to an equitable share of 
the national raised revenue. The Constitution sets up the principles so that the 
equitable share is allocated between these three spheres of government from 
national level to local level via either a department such as the DWAF or the 
DPLG. Fiscal capacity can generally be defined as the ability of a jurisdiction to 
generate taxes and other revenues from own sources. Local government needs 
financial resources to carry out their functions. To make any financial policy 
decision – whether the decision entails potential new bond issues, new operating 
programmes, or operating programmes, a key step in the decision-making 
process is an assessment of existing fiscal capacity available to support that 
decision (Petersen, 1993; 177). 
 
To understand the tax revenue from which a community’s fiscal capacity derives 
the economic context in which this base exists must be understood. First, the 
built environment values and other property values reflect local economic 
conditions. Second, other components of the tax and revenue base, especially 
those coming from income and sales taxes are sensitive to economic cycle. 
Finally, the ability of residents to pay any tax or user charges largely depends on 
their assets and income (Petersen, 1993: 179). Municipalities, in a financial 
literature, are expected to be mostly self-sufficient and generate most of their 
total revenues from own taxes. Metropolitan municipalities collect 97% of total 
revenue from own sources. Non metros with budgets of over R 300 millions 
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generate 92% while those with budgets less than R 300 million generate 65%. 
The main sources of revenue are utility fees (32%), property taxes (21%), RSC 
levies (7%), transfers (8%), and other local sources of taxes and levies (32%) 
(Lee et al, 1997: 282). However, critics rise on the degree of municipal financial 
autonomy since higher spheres of government intervene earlier or in the middle 
of the process of the affairs of municipalities through transfers and oversight. 
 
It is in this regard that the Constitution requires that an Act of Parliament should 
prescribe the division of nationally raised revenue between national, provincial 
and local government. The DORA must take into account recommendations from 
the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC), and criteria stipulated in sub-section 
214 (2) of the Constitution, and ensure that non-compliance to its provisions is 
sanctioned in terms of the law. Within the framework of these requirements, the 
Annual Division of Revenue Bill is the outcome of government’s policy 
deliberations on expenditure priorities for the period ahead (National Treasury, 
2005: 126). The requirement for acting DORA is set in Section 214 of the 
Constitution. An enacting DORA requires consultation with provincial 
governments, SALGA and the FFC - takes into account any recommendations of 
the FFC before DORA is enacted. In addition to these requirements, the 
parliament considers certain factors, which are set out in Act 214 before enacting 
DORA, by requesting the parliament to allocate the national revenue equitably. 
One of the important features of DORA is that it provides municipalities with three 
own allocations, i.e., allocation for the existing year; allocation for the next two 
coming years with the intention reflected in the Constitution of providing 
predictability in order to improve the municipal planning. As with provinces, 
section 227 (2) of the Constitution states that the revenue local governments 
raise cannot be deducted from their share of nationally raised revenue (Act No. 
108 of 1996: 131). In fact, when it comes to the determination of local 
government equitable share, the Finance Ministry does consider what other 
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funds local government is also receiving from national government – including 
conditional grants for capital or operating expenditure. It is important to note that 
this amount constitutes 3.6% of total revenue available for sharing. Conditional 
grants are provides to sub-national governments to promote norms and 
standards, facilitate transition, address backlogs, and to address national 
priorities. According to the new system of intergovernmental transfers for local 
government, the equitable share formula for municipalities is composed of four 
components: 
 
The municipal institutional grant: this supports administrative capacities of 
municipalities, i.e., funds for operating and maintaining basic facilities for local 
government so that local authorities lacking infrastructure or administrative 
capacity to raise taxes can at least operate at a minimum level. The municipal 
basic services transfer: supports the provision of basic services to low-income 
households. This is intended to ensure that all South African residents have 
access to basic municipal services. The amount of the grant is computed by 
multiplying the number of people in poverty by the cost per person of providing 
services this sum is then multiplied by the fraction of that need which will be 
covered by the municipal basic services grant. Actually there are about 284 local 
municipalities rationalised down to from 771. Among these, there are 42 District 
Councils, 6 category A metropolitan Councils plus 24 substructures (Municipal 
Demarcation: Act 27 of 1998). The FFC recommendation formula for 2004 (FFC, 
2006: 123) was used to allocate revenue among the 231 municipalities: 
 
       LES        =       S          +           B       +       I    +    T   +   m 
 
Where the total local government equitable share (LES) allocation is divided 
among municipalities by means of a formula comprising five major elements and 
weighing:  
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I. S is a basic service grant to support municipalities in their delivery of basic 
services 
II. B a basic component to fulfill other constitutional and legislative 
responsibilities 
III. I an institutional support component to aid municipalities in financing core 
administrative functions 
IV. T a tax capacity equalization grant to encourage municipalities to take 
responsibility for raising own revenue; and 
V. m a spillover grant to provide finance for services with inter-municipal 
spillover31 effects (Financial & Fiscal Commission, 2006: 122). 
 
Equalization transfers: are used between substructures within the same 
metropolitan council jurisdiction in order to equalise the tax base with the purpose 
to rectify the uneven development in metropolitan areas where households, 
capital investment, and labour are not spread smoothly throughout an area, 
leaving some local authorities with a weaker tax base than others. Municipal 
expenditure is organised in such a way that about 30% of expenditure is 
allocated to bulk services, 31% to salaries, 8% to repairs and maintenance, 13% 
to capital charges, 4% to funds contributions and 14% to general expenses. 
 
3.4.1  MUNICIPAL FISCAL POWERS 
 
In terms of Section 229 of the Constitution a municipality may impose rates on 
property and surcharges on fees for service provided by or on behalf of the 
municipality; and if authorized other taxes, levies and duties but no municipality 
                                            
31 Some services create important benefits for residents outside of the local authority in which 
they are undertaken. When programmes benefit people other than those incurring costs for them, 
they are said to create spillover. These transfer payment support the essential infrastructure for 
those programmes with positive economic spillover. 
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may impose income tax, value-added tax, general sales tax or customs duty as 
these are the kind of taxes used in order to raise national revenue. Besides, 
private sector is a final source of revenue for municipalities for municipal 
infrastructure. Municipalities are exploring different ways of raising finance for 
municipal infrastructure. This is just particularly because capital projects have the 
ability to generate revenue. With this in mind municipalities are turning to PPPs, 
and Borrowing (loans and bonds). Funding for Capex and Opex are also 
considered in this line as well. This is discussed in the subsection below. We 
should bear in mind that chapter 2 of MFMA establishes National Treasury with a 
wide range of functions and powers to coordinate macro-economic policy and 
coordinate integrated financial and fiscal relations, managing the budget 
preparation process, implementing DORA and enforcing effective management 
of revenue, expenditure, assets liabilities. Other three key players in the affairs of 
the municipalities are SALGA, DPLG and FFC. 
 
3.4.2  BORROWING FRAMEWORK 
 
Borrowing for both provincial and local government is largely regulated by section 
230 of the Constitution as well as the Provincial Borrowing Powers Act of 1996, 
but this section does not prescribe the borrowing framework for the national 
sphere of government. For the municipalities (chapter 4, section 4.7), the 
Municipal Finance Management Bill (2001) dedicates a chapter on municipal 
borrowing. In this way, it is clear that most of the borrowing is undertaken at the 
national sphere of government. Moreover, borrowing is undertaken on behalf of 
sub-national governments, in the same way the proceeds are made available for 
the vertical split. 
 
Further clarification of some of the above selective constitutional amendments 
and the assumption of the municipal legislative authority is important to 
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understand in light of the study. As mentioned earlier, the Constitution is 
attempting to create an arrangement which both national and provincial spheres 
of government can assume legislative obligations of a municipality. In this case 
one would expect that in so far that the province can assume responsibility for a 
municipal obligation, then it follows that the obligation in question effectively 
becomes a provincial obligation, at least temporary. Section 100 (1) (a) (b) of the 
Constitution says that “the national executive may intervene when a province 
does not fulfill an obligation in terms of legislation or the Constitution, excluding 
an obligation to pass legislation in the case of province” (Act No.108 of 1996: 59). 
However, in the case of legislative obligation the situation would be slightly 
different, especially if the assumed obligation becomes a provincial obligation, in 
that it would not matter whether the province in turn fails to resolve the problem 
or not. Under certain conditions, the province may for instance assume 
responsibility to pass a municipal budget but fails to pass that budget, as was the 
case with the municipality; in this case the national executive would not be able 
to intervene, due to a number of reasons. One of these is the fact that this is a 
legislative authority and it is, in light of section 100(1) of the Constitution as 
amended and mentioned above, ‘an obligation to pass legislation in the case of a 
province’. This particular provision creates a lock-in effect against the national 
executive in circumstances like the one described above. This legislative 
implication on the internal functioning of cooperative government boils down to 
the problem of timing, consultation and overriding interventions. 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that section 100 (3) of the Constitution provides a room 
for legislation that coordinates the intervention processes of both section 100 and 
139 (a) (b) (c) of the Constitution, it is not however, clear whether this particular 
issue will be dealt with in that legislation. In conclusion, this section suggests that 
the Constitution foresee problems with coordination of intervention activities and 
processes. Until this problem is solved and clarified, this particular amendment 
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will be self-defeating and will further complicate intergovernmental fiscal 
relations. 
 
3.5  REVENUE AND, COMPARATIVE SOURCES OF TAXING POWERS  
 
Assignment of functions is a major step toward an Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Relations system. This together with revenues sources and taxing powers among 
different levels of government play a key role in the determination of the 
economic efficiency of a country. The aspect should be driven by the principle 
that ‘assignment of expenditure responsibilities to different levels of government 
must be matched with the assignment of revenue responsibility’. This is because 
expenditure needs of each level of government must be established before the 
issue of revenue is handled, in that the economic efficiency of revenue can only 
be attained after having clear knowledge of expenditure needs (Cloete et al, 
2003). Generally local government are assigned revenue bases that are relatively 
immobile and do not lead to serious inequalities in the country. These bases are 
in many cases low yielding and difficult to administer because of their local 
nature. The assigned local sources of revenues to local governments never 
provide adequate yields to meet local expenditure requirements. 
 
On the other hand the center usually collects relatively more revenue compared 
to their assigned expenditures (Division of Revenue, 2003). This implies that 
central government grants to local governments must be part of the system of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations. In a cooperative government system, it is often 
stated that if decentralization is to be a reality, sub-national government must 
control their own sources of revenue (Cloete et al, 2003: op cit). The assignment 
of taxes to different levels of government is, in fact quite a complex political 
exercise. This raises a critical question that must be put in mind – which revenue 
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source should be assigned to sub-national spheres and which measures should 
be put into place to effect these assignments? 
 
In the attempt to respond to the above question, some key principles are 
necessary to guide our discussion on the following issues, that is: Sub-national 
governments should not be assigned the functions of macroeconomic 
stabilization and redistribution of income. As a corollary, it follows that taxes that 
influence stabilization such as corporate income tax and progressive individual 
tax will be exclusive aligned with the central government. Each level of 
government should be assigned taxes that are related to the benefits of its 
spending. In this way, the central government should be responsible for 
expenditures having externalities benefits or that are characterized by economies 
of scale not realized at the national level.  
 
The collection of the revenue for sub-national spheres should be protected by the 
Constitution or legal framework. In some countries, like the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, where evidence witnesses huge reserves of minerals, the question 
should be to know whether the central or local area should be responsible in the 
taxing of natural resources where these are located. It might be loyal that where 
revenues from natural resources are substantial and concentrated 
geographically, sub-national taxes of such resources would involve issues of 
vertical imbalance between the central government and the sub-national 
government, and horizontal fiscal disparities among sub-national governments. It 
should be advisable that this section be considered in concomitance with 
subsection 5.6.2 of the study on vertical fiscal imbalances and subsection 5.6.3 
discussing horizontal fiscal disparities. 
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3.6  AN EFFECTIVE INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL SYSTEM 
 
Financial relations exist within the framework of an intergovernmental system as 
one of its political environment. In order for it to survive as an instrument of 
coordination and alignment of policy between the three spheres of government, 
the institution of intergovernmental relations should prove to be financially 
sustainable, viable, sound and effective in its financial, political and administrative 
pursuit of the well-being within the ambit of the public sector. Further more; it 
should endeavor to promote efficiency, accountability and economic growth32, at 
the same token address the developmental mandate and needs as well as 
institutional arrangement mechanisms at different levels of the government33. 
                                            
32 Any increase in the total amount of output, income and spending in the economy is refereed to 
as Economic Growth. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and many economists, 
including Paul Stiglitz (the chief economist for the World Bank) are now beginning to see that 
‘growth is good’ approach to economic development, but the way that growth is achieved and the 
conditions that satisfied it are now being questioned. In the UK, for instance, up till 1954, national 
goals were set to meet the needs of the people, i.e.; building 300,000 houses a year, or 
establishing a national health service. Curiously enough, in 1954 the head of the British Ministry 
of Finance introduced the idea of measuring the prosperity of a nation by its annual economic 
growth rate. He then, focused on achieving a 3% annual growth rate, and this in fact doubled the 
national income per person over a 20-year period (Esset & Fair Shair, 2000: 5). The main goal 
shifted from the attention from social policy and people’s actual needs of increasing the size of 
the economic cake to achieving economic growth; and more accumulation of money rather than 
more services became the government big concern. It is argued that in 1989, an Irish economist 
Douthwaite as cited in Esset & Fair Shair (2000: 5) attempted to produce on a list the benefits of 
doubling Britain’s per capita income and found that almost every social indicator was worse over 
the last 33 years. This was coupled by chronic disease has increased, crime went up eight-fold, 
unemployment soared and many more marriages ended in divorce: “I looked for gains to set 
against these losses, which in most cases I felt had to be blamed on growth…; the unquestioning 
quest for growth has been an unmitigated social and environment disaster. Almost all of the extra 
resources the process has created have been used to keep the system functioning in an 
increasingly inefficient way. The new wealth has been used to produce non-returnable bottles, 
supertankers, heavy lorries, plastic which can never be recycled…It has at the same time 
enabled banks, insurance companies, stock-brokers and accountant to expand from 493, 000 to 
2,475,000 employees. At the same time, over three million people have been unemployed. Very 
little was left for more positive achievement after everyone had taken their share”. 
33 Development connotes steady progress toward improvement in the human condition (increase 
in the standard of living through the enhancement of the purchasing capacity of the people rather 
than maximization of elite profit); reduction and eventual elimination of poverty, ignorance 
(through education), and disease’ and expansion of well-being (health care) and opportunity for 
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The effectiveness and efficacy effort in terms of the operation of the system 
should be canalized toward delivery of goods and services that could provide 
autonomy to the sub-national government in order to be able to alleviate poverty 
to the poor. This refers to the assignment of powers and functions between 
spheres of government in relation to financial matters according to specified 
criteria in terms of the Constitution. 
 
3.6.1  STATE INTERVENTION IN SUBSPHERES OF GOVERNMENT 
 
According to De Visser (2005:186) if the exercise of the monitoring provisions, 
discussed in terms of section 100 and 139 of the South African Constitution, 
provisions have been provided for intervention by the provincial government into 
the affairs of that municipality on a two-fold outlook. While the first component of 
the provision seeks to allow national government to intervene in both provincial 
and local government, section 139 of the Constitution however, states that only 
provinces can intervene in the municipality if it does not fulfill its executive 
obligations. This will remove the impression created by the current version of the 
constitution that the three spheres of government are hierarchically related to. 
This means that national government can only intervene in provinces when the 
later fails to fulfill its executive obligation.  
 
The second point about the constitutional provision is that they allow national and 
provincial spheres of government to intervene in local government when it fails to 
fulfill its obligations in terms of legislation or the constitution. The crucial point 
raised in this particular amendment points to the fact that the two spheres, i.e., 
                                                                                                                                  
all (employment, increased salary margin…). It entails rapid change, but change alone is 
insufficient; it should be directed to specific ends. Development involves societal transformation – 
political, social and cultural as well as economic; it implies modernization – secularization, 
industrialization; and urbanization but not necessarily westernization. It is multi-dimensional, with 
scholars and practitioners disagreeing, however, on relative emphasis priority and timing. See 
Esman, MJ. (1991) Management dimensions of development. Perspectives and Strategies. 
Kumarian press, Connecticut (p.5).  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Intergovernmental fiscal relations and financial management systems 
in South Africa  
 
 
 
 
University of the Western Cape,  October 2009  62 
 
the national and the provincial government can both intervene when the 
municipality fails to fulfill both its executive and legislative obligations. According 
to De Visser (2005: 185), a ‘veto’ power to intervene in the affairs of sub-national 
spheres seems to contradict potentially the principle of autonomy that was 
identified as being crucial to decentralized development. De Visser supports his 
argument by quoting Article 356 of the Indian Constitution making the institution 
of the president’s Rule that “…the President, on the advice of the state governor 
or suo moto, can dissolve a state legislature and take over the government of the 
state”. This provision has been used on 111 occasions since 1950 merely on the 
ground of egoistic reasons and undermined intergovernmental relationship in 
India and De Visser, like Frank Fanon34 owns that the same abuse is not 
impossible in South Africa. Nevertheless, the amendment makes it clear that the 
national sphere of government cannot intervene in provinces when they fail to 
fulfill a legislative obligation. Petersen (1991: 10) on the appropriate role for 
government had this to say: 
 
“The legislative objective of government is to do for a community of 
people whatever they need to have done, but cannot do at all, or 
cannot so well do, for themselves – in their separate and individual 
capacities. In all that the people can individually as well for 
themselves, government ought not to interfere”. 
 
3.6.2  HIERARCHICAL RELATIONS IN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
 
Financial management levels of hierarchy were introduced when the Constitution 
allowed other spheres of government to intervene and assume responsibility for 
other sub-national spheres of government. The Constitution of South Africa 
recognises municipalities to have legislative obligation and powers to pass by-
laws (Department of Finance, 1997: 4.7) such as municipal budget - also 
recognized as one of the by-laws that municipalities pass. Section 215 (2) 
                                            
34 Things fall apart. 
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indicates that legislation must prescribe the form and structure of municipal 
budgets, their sources of revenue and the way in which proposed expenditure 
should comply with national legislation (Department of Finance, 1996: 4.8). 
However, the provision implies that national and provincial spheres are 
authorized to pass the budget of a municipality in the case of intervention. This 
illustrates the content of section 19 of the Municipal Finance Management Bill 
that allows the municipality to spend an average of 8% per month of its 
previously approved budget for current expenditure. This provision makes it clear 
that there is no need for other spheres of government to assume this legislative 
responsibility in case the municipality cannot pass its budget. This amendment 
constitutes a constitutional confusion that results in disruption and tension 
between the spheres of government, since provisions of individual pieces of 
legislation are not in synergies and synchronization with one another. This leads 
to the situation where, in case the failure to pass a municipal budget persists for 
an extended period of time, the assumption of this responsibility by another 
sphere of government will stand to be reasonable. However it would be important 
to define the length of time that is reasonable before the other sphere can 
intervene, since a growing body of knowledge suggests that the application of an 
intervention provision should be premised on a balance between the principle of 
autonomy and the need for effective oversight by senior governments (De Visser, 
2005: 185). 
 
3.6.3  DILEMMA IN THE COORDINATION OF INTERVENTIONS 
 
In terms of the above observation, the emphasis and effect of the two sections 
intend to allow the national executive to intervene in municipal affairs in case of 
failure or lack of appropriate skills in the fulfillment of its obligations. This failure 
calls for a point of coordination and alignment between the actions of the 
provincial and the national executives. Subsection 3 (b) of section 100, requires 
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national legislation that regulates the national executive intervention process to 
be co-ordinated with its counterparts at the provincial level. However, it is not 
clear from the side of the constitutional provisions, which sphere of government 
gains precedence in intervening in the affairs of the municipality, when the latter 
fails to fulfill an obligation. 
 
The arrangement introduced by the current constitutional amendments might 
discourage a provincial sphere of government, for instance, from intervening into 
the affairs of government if it expects the national government to override its 
directives. The national government might expect the provincial government to 
intervene in certain matters, and this timing problem can lead to a delay in 
intervention that can, in turn, compromise service delivery effectiveness. The 
same situation applies to the appropriateness or effectiveness of directives 
issued to a municipality or assumption of municipal authority by either sphere of 
government. Is it possible for national government to override an intervention of 
the provincial government in terms of Section 139 of the Constitution? 
 
Recent changes in the manner of intervening have attempted to include two 
types of intervention in terms of section 139 against the backdrop for balancing 
the degree of autonomy and supervision, i.e., financial intervention and regular 
intervention. 
 
3.7  CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND LEGISLATIVE IMPLICATIONS 
FOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
 
In South Africa, the Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998, section 34 (3) (b) 
provides for the dissolution of the municipal council in case an intervention in 
terms of section 139 of the Constitution has not resulted in the council being able 
to fulfill its obligations in terms of legislation. It is not in fact clear, how the 
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amendment to section 100 of the Constitution would fit into this. In principle, one 
would expect the national executive to intervene if provincial executive 
intervention has resulted in a situation described by Section 34 (3) (b) of the 
Municipal Structures Act. This would be before the council dissolves, as there is 
always a possibility of improvement after the national executive has intervened 
(De Visser, 2005). As it becomes more and more clear on the discussion on the 
implications for the constitutional provisions on Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Relations (Tapscott, 1998: 9), section 159 of the Constitution appears to have 
been amended in order to prevent immediate dissolution of council without giving 
it an explicit constitutional basis. This is in response to the provisions of the 
Municipal Systems Act pertaining to the dissolution of the council. Section 155 (8) 
(b) of the Constitution was introduced as a direct result of provisions of chapter 
11 of the Municipal Finance Management Bill (MFMB). 
 
The two aforementioned sections constitute good examples of a situation where 
the Constitution is put in a reactive position in relation to other pieces of 
legislation. In as far as the purpose of the Constitution is to provide a normal 
framework for national legislation, its status is compromised. This may lead to a 
situation where the entire intergovernmental fiscal relations framework as 
outlined in the Constitution is guided by the provisions of individual pieces of 
legislation that are usually sector specific, rather than by what is good35 for the 
country as a whole. 
 
3.8 SUMMARY 
 
Section 228 and 229 of the Constitution provides that sub-national government’s 
tax may not be exercised in a way that materially and unreasonably prejudices 
                                            
35 Goods and services that would not be provided in a pure free-market system (e.g. defense, 
police and security), and largely provided by government (National Treasury, 2005:167). 
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national economic policies, economic activities across boundaries, or national 
mobility of goods, services, capital or labour. This statement implies that 
provincial taxes are required to be neutral as far as practical. Since a surcharge 
on the other hand implicitly means that governments should not end on the 
wrong side of the Laffer curve, the provision of the two section introduces an 
additional  constraint, i.e., that of neutrality. Tax neutrality would mean that such 
taxes should generally be imposed on those resources that relatively immobile 
across boundaries (Sobel, 1997: op cit). An option in the case of provinces would 
be to impose surcharges that mimic Pigovian taxes. In this case, once a 
surcharge has been identified for one of the national government tax base, a 
fixed surcharge compatible with the Loffer curve criterion would be imposed at 
the margin for all the provinces. This would ensure that there are no inter-
provincial differences in levels of taxes applied to a particular base. This, in effect 
neutralises any incentives to move tax bases from one province to another. Since 
the Constitution does not allow regulation of sub-national taxes, this could be a 
practical alternative.  
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGICAL ORIENTATION 
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Further to the methodological perspective employed in this study order to meet 
the objectives discussed in section 1.2, this section deals with the methodology 
followed during the recording of information and collection of data. The 
methodology employed includes theoretical analysis and assessment as well as 
an empirical study. The empirical component contains observations and 
experimentation (a discussion on the intergovernmental transfers design). The 
methodology used is based on the basic approaches to the field of social 
sciences research and techniques by Mouton and Marais (1997), De Wet et al 
(1998) and Bailey (1982). Besides, this study employs qualitative method of data 
collection referred to as secondary sources and, which comprise library books, 
journal articles, policy documents and newspapers as well as bulletins to be 
reviewed in the formulation and operationalisation of the themes under study. 
The breakdown of chapter 6 is illustrated below: 
 
FIGURE 6: BREAKDOWN OF CHAPTER FOUR  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 4.1 
Introduction 
SECTION 4.2 
Method of data 
collection 
SECTION 4.3 
 
Description of the  
Research instrument 
SECTION 4.4 
 
Research design & 
Sampling 
 
 
SECTION 4.5 
Questionnaire & 
individual interviews 
SECTION 4.6 
 
Ethical 
consideration
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4.2  METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION 
 
This study is empirical in nature. It uses qualitative forms of data collection 
method using statistical data in the form of unstructured and structured interview 
schedule formats. A number of unstructured interviews has been undertaken with 
experts on the subject matter. Discussions were held with Directors and 
technocrats falling under the Division of Finance at the Metropolitan City of Cape 
Town as well as academics and researchers. The rationale of this method was 
aimed at gaining first hand information on various aspects of financial and fiscal 
management mechanisms within the system of cooperative government, using 
the City of Cape Town as a case study. The theory employed and the 
background information gathered from my field research informed both the 
consolidation of findings and enlightened the researcher on the shaping of a 
balanced opinion based on empirical data and evidence. Creswell (1994: 21) 
provides an appropriate justification for the use of qualitative research 
approaches in studies that are exploratory in nature. As a matter of fact, growing 
evidence and various lessons of experience maintain that this type of design is 
appropriate in instances in which not much has been written about the subject 
under investigation as is the case with this study. Ragin (1994: 91-93) provides a 
further understanding of the use of qualitative methods of data collection by 
eloquently concluding the following statement:  
“Qualitative methods of data collection are often identified with 
participant observation, in-depth interviewing, fieldwork and 
ethnographic study; and they are data enhances as in-depth 
knowledge is yielded, correcting any misrepresentations or new 
representations about the subjects in the study”. 
 
4.3  DESCRIPTION OF THE RESEARCH INSTRUMENT 
 
Research methodology necessitates a reflection on planning, structuring and 
execution of the research in order to comply with the demand of truth, objectivity 
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and validity. Hence, research methodology focuses on the process of research 
and the decisions that the researcher has to execute the research project. In the 
human sciences, two basic methodologies can be distinguished: qualitative and 
quantitative methodological models. Although types of research and research 
methods are often associated with the field or academic discipline in which the 
research is conducted, these two mentioned above are of importance in all 
scientific investigation. The next section below is an attempt on the elaboration of 
such methods. 
 
4.4  RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLING 
 
Primary sources account for interviews with personnel from the Financial 
Department of the Metropolitan City of Cape Town to which the researcher was 
exposed for a period of four months. In order to obtain the different perceptions, 
the sample size consisted of both practitioners and theoreticians. During his 
interview time table, the researcher contacted quite a large number of people, 
however due the time constraint of such high-rank officials he only got hold of a 
total number of ten Directorates and the staff under each of them as well as 
academics and practitioners came to a total number of thirty people. For more 
information, see Appendix B on page 145 of this research. These people have 
been chosen based on a methodology called ‘sampling through rational choice’, 
which consisted of identifying respondents who, according to the judgment of the 
researcher witness an acquisition of knowledge or experience in the area 
concerned by the study in order to meet the requirements of the methodological 
design. Besides, it used random purposeful sampling technique. Leedy, 1997 
and Patton (1990) highlight the intricacies of random purposeful sampling in 
instances where the unit of analysis is based a still small sample size. In their 
explanation, they emphasize the fact to which this type of methodological design 
"adds credibility to sample, especially when potential purposeful sample is larger 
than one can handle by reducing judgment within a purposeful category".  
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This methodology was selected and applied to this kind of study because the 
research was based on a small sample size and allowed to save time, money 
and effort (convenience sampling). The weakness of this type of methodology is 
that judicious extrapolations cannot be attempted to the whole rest of South 
Africa. As stated earlier, the qualitative research approach generally employs 
observation in the pursuit for data collection requiring the impact of people and 
institutions in order to illustrate and substantiate certain key concepts needed to 
add a rich tonus to the research under study. Such observational techniques are 
always used to determine how individuals or groups of persons react under 
specific circumstances, either natural or artificial (De Wet et al, 1981: 163-165). 
In this view, “…every recording made should be a true reflection of what was 
observed at the precise moment, and not of what was anticipated or predicted”. 
The researcher was in the position to subject one group of thirty people (ten 
Directors36 and their related managers, occupying different functions under the 
Department of Finance in the City of Cape Town, seven personnel assistants and 
three falling in the category of other) to a particular political situation which 
changed from time to time, while the situation remained unchanged for the other 
group, then compared the behaviour of the two groups and drew conclusions 
based on empirical evidence.  
 
The qualitative method of data collection is indispensable due to its commitment 
to seeing the world from the point of view of the actor or participant, and owing to 
this commitment to see through the eyes of one’s subjects, close involvement is 
advocated (Brynard et al, 1984: 78). The fundamental theme of study under 
qualitative research is a phenomenological one, where the actor’s perspective 
was the empirical point of departure - it was a focus upon a real life experience of 
people. It is worth citing Brynard and Hanekom at length on the question of 
qualitative methodology as they substantiate on the fact that this type of 
                                            
36 See Appendix B at the end of this research for an understanding of their roles and positions.  
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methodology allowed the researcher to know people personally and to see them 
as they are; to experience their daily struggles when confronted with real-life 
situations in their work setting. This enabled the researcher to interpret and 
describe the actions of people.  
 
4.4.1 SAMPLING TECHNIQUE 
 
A small group was selected by the researcher from the population size for study 
purpose as a representative of a large population (Bryman et al, 1984). There are 
so many reasons why the researcher chooses a sample as a miniature 
representation of a big reality, and some of these reasons account for the 
simplification of the research, since it was easier to study a representative 
sample of a population37 rather than studying the entire world; for time 
economization, because studying a large geographical area was embarrassing 
and time consuming or cost-cutting, since the interviews, observations and 
questionnaires used for data collection from the sample size was cross-cutting, 
and the institution of cooperative government is scattered over a proportionally 
large geographical area such that it was costly and difficult to handle.  
 
4.4.2  SAMPLE GROUP 
 
The population group for this study is based on appointed government Directors 
and senior Managers and planners under the Department of Finance of the 
Metropolitan City of Cape Town where cooperative government institution is 
challenged by lack of efficiency. One public sector institution and a number of 
respondents from independent bodies were selected for the purpose of this 
                                            
37 For the purpose of sampling, population does not refer to the population of a country but to 
objects, subjects, phenomena, cases, events or activities which the researcher chooses to 
research in order to establish new knowledge. See Bryman and Hanekom, 1984:43. 
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study.  In each institution a number of people were selected for interview in order 
to sustain the validity of variables38 on the topic under study. 
 
Under the City of Cape Town, the Department of Finance provided access to 
confidential information, such as financial statements and reports, government 
legislation, Acts of Parliament, human resource statistics, etc. As a public 
sector39 institution the City of Cape Town has all the necessary organizational 
systems, infrastructures, policies, strategy and culture in place and possesses 
leaders who have the essential technical skills to perform their responsibilities 
effectively. This criterion was important in the study since it allowed the 
researcher to control both internal validity and assist in controlling the threats of 
maturation. Since this study uses a qualitative approach, it employed the 
following data collecting methods that will be dealt with in the following section. 
 
4.5  QUESTIONNAIRE AND INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEWS 
 
4.5.1  CLOSED AND OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
The questionnaire intended to measure the challenges of cooperative 
government and how this, as a matter of fact, had direct implications on the 
financial and fiscal management system in South Africa. It tested the validity of 
whether insight into the institutional arrangement of cooperative government from 
                                            
38 A variable can be defined as an empirical factor or property which is capable of employing two 
or more values. As pointed out earlier, a research problem is generally expressed as a general 
question about the relations between two or more variables. The most important type of variables 
is the dependent and independent variables. A dependent variable is that factor which is 
observed and measured to determine the effect it has on an independent variable. The 
dependent variable varies with the introduction or removal or manipulation of the independent 
variable. An independent variable is that factor which is deliberately varied, manipulated or 
selected by the researcher in order to determine its relationship to an observed phenomenon 
which constitutes the dependent variable. For more information concerning dependent and 
independent variables, see Brynard et al, 1984. 
39 Public sector is referred to as national government, provincial government, local government, 
extra-budgetary institutions, social security funds and non-financial public enterprises (Treasury 
(2005:167). 
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which a sound and efficient financial and fiscal management system depends, in 
the course of economic development is a key factor both for eradication of 
misadministration in the public sector and a strong pillar for good financial 
governance and efficient intergovernmental fiscal design.  
 
4.5.2  QUESTIONNAIRE / INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
This research questionnaire only contained basic questions and both the 
questionnaire in question and interview schedule (Appendix A) were used as a 
framework for both respondents that completed the questionnaire in their own 
time as well as for discussion with interviewees in an interview situation. With 
regard to ethical principles outlined in this paper the identity of interviewees will 
be protected and individual statements will not be used in the report. 
Respondents will be consolidated and research findings will be presented in 
aggregated fashion.  
 
4.5.3  IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS 
 
The main reasons for conducting the in-depth semi-structured and unstructured 
interviews were to be found in the examination of key emerging trends and 
themes emanating from the questionnaires and further, to explore the perceived 
reasons for the challenges of intergovernmental fiscal relations on the 
improvement of revenue sources at sub-national levels and its enhancement for 
service delivery implying on improvement of conditions of life in the long run. 
Four sets of interview schedule were prepared and all four broad categories of 
research questions were, as stipulated above, made of a mixture of open and 
closed-ended questions. The content of each category of research questions is 
almost identical for both groups of respondents with the exception of a few 
variations. These are tabulated on the appendix A at the end of the study and 
highlight similarities and differences in the construction of the interview schedule.  
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4.6  SUMMARY 
 
This chapter discussed the methodological framework followed during the 
recording of information and collection of data. The methodology employed 
included the theoretical analysis, assessment as well as empirical study. 
Empirical because it used a qualitative form of data collection method in the form 
of structured and unstructured in-depth interview schedule format. The main 
reasons for conducting the in-depth semi-structured and unstructured interviews 
were to be found in the examination of key emerging trends and themes 
emanating from the questionnaires and further, to explore the perceived reasons 
for the challenges of intergovernmental fiscal relations on the improvement of 
revenue sources at sub-national levels and its enhancement for service delivery 
implying on improvement of conditions of life in the long run. Four sets of 
interview schedule were prepared and all four broad categories of research 
questions were made of a mixture of open and closed-ended questions. The 
content of each category of research questions were almost identical for both 
groups of respondents with the exception of a few variations. 
 
The rationale of this method was aimed at gaining first hand information on 
various aspects of financial and fiscal management mechanisms within the 
system of cooperative government, using the City of Cape Town as a case study. 
A sample size of thirty experts was chosen, using a methodology called 
‘sampling through rational choice, purposive sampling and convenience 
sampling’. It consisted of identifying respondents both practitioners and 
theoreticians who, according to the researcher witnessed an acquisition of 
knowledge and experience in the area concerned by the study in order to meet 
the requirements of the methodological design.  
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The theory employed and the background information gathered from field 
research informed both the consolidation of findings and enlightened the 
researcher on the shaping of balanced opinion based on empirical data and 
evidence. Although This study used convenience and purposive sampling design 
as appropriate methods of data collection and analysis due the fact that this type 
of design saves time, money and effort, the researcher is reserved to generalize 
the findings to the whole South Africa since such a small size of the sample 
cannot be representative of all the 284 municipalities and six Metropolitan Cities 
in under the challenges of cooperative government in South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE DESIGN OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL GRANT IN SOUTH 
AFRICA AND PRESENTATION OF FIELDWORK STUDY  
 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Intergovernmental transfers have become a buzzword in the study of cooperative 
government in developing countries in the last century and this has been 
accounted for a number of reasons. Some of these reasons point to the 
decentralization dispensation and the shrinking of the state social autonomy in 
countries under democratization phase. Other reasons, as is the case in South 
Africa, underpin the political mandate of national government to fulfill the 
obligations of a local developmental state with a number of sources of revenue 
and functional political responsibilities devolved to the sub-national governments. 
In the light of this effort, the institution of cooperative government in South Africa 
endeavors to manage the constitutional design of several types of transfers in 
order to attain a certain degree of efficiency and equity at the local sphere level in 
the provision of services.  
 
The objective of this chapter is to review the literature on intergovernmental 
grants, including grant objectives, and alternative grant design. In this case the 
researcher will develop theoretical clarification on intergovernmental transfers at 
the sub-national spheres. Surprisingly, in line with this purpose and the objective 
outlined in this study, evidence shows that there is no research literature on 
grants administration in South Africa to compliment the extensive international 
literature on grant design (Winkler, 1994: 65). This will be identified and 
discussed together with the rationale for such transfers and their implications for 
a grant design thereof. Below is a diagramed representation of chapter 5. 
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FIGURE 7: BREAKDOWN OF CHAPTER 5.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intergovernmental transfers build up into two broad categories: non-matching and 
selective matching grants. The clarification as well as definitions of these two 
types of grants is explained in the subsequent subsections below: 
 
5.2.1  TYPOLOGICAL OVERVIEW OF IGF TRANSFERS 
 
This section has the specific objective of defining key concepts used on the 
subject relating to intergovernmental fiscal transfers in South Africa. In line with 
the key words, it is already apparent from the discussion of the study thus far that 
key concepts used include inter alia, conditional grants, unconditional transfers, 
equalization, vertical fiscal imbalance as well as horizontal fiscal disparities. 
These concepts, together with related terminology, will receive particular 
attention in the section which follows. The section should be read in conjunction 
with the discussion on conceptual clarifications on taxation and tax overlapping 
(section 3.4), and the discussion pertaining to conclusions and policy 
recommendations (section 3.5).  
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5.2.2 NON-MATCHING TRANSFERS 
 
Non-matching transfers40 may be either selective (conditional) or general 
(unconditional). The rationale for unconditional transfers, also called equitable 
share of government’s vertical split of revenue to sub-national spheres of 
government unconditionally s based on the principle of attaining vertical and 
horizontal equity while ensuring that the transfer system is able to cater to 
interjuridictional externalities as well as correcting for administrative weaknesses. 
 
FIGURE 8: REFLECTION OF INTERVIEW RESULTS ON NON-MATCHING 
TRANSFERS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In South Africa, evidence shows that unconditional transfers are the most used 
through a formula as that has already been mentioned in this section above, and 
discussed in section 2.2.2 of chapter 2. Nevertheless, results of conducted 
interviews show a very weak depiction (8.2%) of two respondents preferring this 
type of intergovernmental intervention, while 9.8% (three respondents) preferred 
the adoption of BIG under the pretext of helping the poor families in South Africa. 
In as much as a stronger proportion of ten respondents (32.1%), especially those 
in Metropolitan City of Cape speculated around the option of the central 
government rewarding successful municipalities that demonstrate fiscal and 
                                            
40 Refer to intergovernmental Financial and Fiscal Relations on page 2.2. 
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financial administrative maturity in raising revenue as well as utilizing their 
financial scare resources with caution in opposition to those municipalities that 
mismanage or outsource their services. Surprising enough, observations have 
been made on the fact that nine respondents or 22.1% (a higher statistical score) 
of the sample size pointed that the government should provide more funding to 
lower spheres with the view that sub-national spheres of government are the 
focal points of policy alignment and delivery of basic services and whereby 
people’s needs are the most felt. The following Figure 8 is a reflection of this 
situation. 
 
5.2.3  SELECTIVE NON-MATCHING TRANSFERS 
 
Selective non-matching transfers offer a given amount of funds without local 
matching, provided they are spent for a particular purpose 9see section 5.7). 
Such conditionality ensures that the recipient government’s spending on the 
specific category is at least equal to the amount of transfer monies. If the sub-
national recipient government is already spending a certain amount that is equal 
to grant funds, some or all of the grant funds may be diverted to other uses. The 
theory on the study of intergovernmental transfers shows that increase in 
expenditures on a specified category would, to a certain extent, be equal to grant 
funds. Evidence has proven that the lumpiness of investments in areas such as 
infrastructure may result in increases in expenditures exceeding grants. In this 
regard, higher spheres of government should play an important role in order to 
facilitate a smooth implementation of services by lower spheres, especially those 
that have been earmarked as infrastructure backlog areas and whose 
implementation of such infrastructure services would require huge amounts of 
funds exceeding the scope of allocated grants. In this reference the intervention 
of macroeconomic type, for instance from central government ten respondents 
(25.1%) is one example that would lead to the creation of conducive legislative, 
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administrative and fiscal environment to the delivery of such services in lower 
spheres as well as infrastructure development by ensuring among local 
municipalities the uniform financing and maintenance of infrastructure involving 
more central government responsibilities. Refer to Figure 9 below for substantive 
clarity. 
 
FIGURE 9: REFLECTION OF INTERVIEW RESULTS ON SELECTIVE NON-
MATCHING TRANSFERS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.4 GENERAL NON-MATCHING TRANSFERS 
 
The non-matching general or unconditional grant is a transfer made by the 
government to be spent unconditionally without any minimum expenditure 
expectation in any given area. This type of grant is a stimulant for local spending 
in that it does not necessarily bind the municipality, and can be spent on a 
combination of public goods or services in order to provide tax relief to the local 
communities without modifying relative prices. In some empirical studies, 
observations have been made on the portion of these grants as it retains greater 
local spending tending to exceed local government’s own revenue relative to 
residents’ income. The implication of this type of grant is that for political, 
technical and bureaucratic reasons, grants to local governments tend to result in 
more local spending than if the very grants were made directly to local 
communities. 
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FIGURE 10: REFLECTION OF INTERVIEW RESULTS ON SELECTIVE NON-
MATCHING TRANSFERS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This provision is an effort toward central government’s responsibility to address 
equalization of revenue and use of horizontal mechanisms of transfers and 
grants in order to address fiscal inequality and inefficiency of revenue nationwide 
to obtain a certain degree of sub-national equality and fiscal autonomy. The 
result of interviews conducted depict fourteen respondents (44.0%) of the total 
sample size finding this type of transfer a good attempt towards fiscal 
equalization and eight respondents (24.3%) strongly agreeing that government 
should not fail in its endeavour to address revenue equalization through transfer 
mechanisms as well as financial grants. The following figure, Figure 10 is shown 
on above page as a reflection of the views of respondents on this issue. 
 
5.2.4 SELECTIVE (CONDITIONAL) MATCHING TRANSFERS 
 
Cost-sharing program or selective matching transfers require that funds be spent 
for specific purposes and that the recipient government matches the fund to 
some degree. This type of subsidy has two implications; - the income implication 
and the price or substitution implication. In the former the subsidy provides the 
community with more resources, some of which may make acquisitions on more 
assisted services. In the latter, however, the local communities concerned 
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acquire more for a given budget, since the subsidy reduces the relative price of 
assisted services. In this way, both implications are said to stimulate 
expenditures on the assisted category. It has been observed that matching 
transfers distort local priorities (point of view of thirteen respondents constituting 
39.7% of total sample size agreeing on this issue), in this way they are regarded 
as inequitable in that big and richer metropolitan areas can raise matching funds 
more easily than smaller, poor ones (fourteen respondents or 44.4%).  
 
FIGURE 11: REFLECTION OF INTERVIEW RESULTS ON SELECTIVE 
(CONDITIONAL) MATCHING TRANSFERS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The former implication may be offset if the desired consequence when the 
transfer is intended to internalize effects or achieve overriding national policy 
objectives, the latter eliminated by varying matching rates with metropolitan or 
jurisdictional wealth (refer to Figure 11 above). 
 
5.2.5  RATIONALE FOR GRANTS AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
TRANSFERS DESIGN 
 
As is the case with definitions (discussions above, section 4.3), we need, in this 
section to highlight the economic rationale for transfers and group them into five 
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broad economic arguments for unitary-state transfers in South Africa, each of 
which is based on either efficiency or equity and each of which may apply to 
varying degrees in actual economies.  
 
5.2.6  THE FISCAL GAP 
 
For the purpose of this study, we will attempt to understand the concept of fiscal 
gap as an imbalance between the revenue-raising ability of sub-national 
governments and their expenditure responsibilities. In fiscal management 
terminology, this is referred to as “vertical imbalance”. The vertical imbalances 
are accounted for two reasons (this section can be read in conjunction with 
section 3.4 on taxation and tax overlap). The first is due to inappropriate 
assignment by national government of the taxing and spending responsibilities 
such that expenditure needs of sub-national governments exceed their revenue 
means (see Schedule 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, part A 
compared to Part B, and Schedule 5 Part B as contrasted to part A). The second 
reason accounts to the fact that many taxes are more efficiently collected at the 
central government level responsibilities to avoid tax competition and 
intergovernmental tax distortions. In this way, transfers are necessary to enable 
local level to carry out their expenditure responsibilities. 
 
Empirical evidence (twelve respondents or 38.0%) of agree and thirteen or 34.8% 
of strongly agree) which account for twenty five respondents constituting 73.3% 
of the total sample size, feel that applicable legislation on fiscal and functional 
responsibilities imparted to different spheres of governments is an epitome of 
fiscal gap and should be changed. It creates an unnecessary and cumbersome 
hindrance not beneficial for fiscal autonomy and service delivery at lower spheres 
of government. Other respondents under abstention feel that many taxes are 
more efficiently collected at the central government level competence than the 
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lower one (five respondents or 15.9%) to avoid tax competition and 
intergovernmental tax distortion. In this way, transfers are necessary to enable 
local level to carry out their expenditure responsibilities. Refer to Figure 12 below 
for more information. 
 
FIGURE 12: REFLECTION OF INTERVIEW RESULTS ON THE FISCAL GAP  
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.7  FISCAL INEQUALITY 
 
In order to correct the fiscal inequality that arises naturally in a country of a 
decentralized system, the government should value horizontal equity. Horizontal 
equity thus, is the equal treatment of all citizens nationwide irrespective of caste, 
religion, ethnic group, language, race or political affiliation. Sub-national 
governments have their own expenditure level and taxation responsibilities in 
order to provide their communities with a minimum level of services for the same 
fiscal effort due to their differing fiscal capacities. If the transfers to each local 
state depended on its tax capacity relative to others and upon relative need for 
and cost of providing public services, these differences may be reduced. 
 
5.2.8  FISCAL INEFFICIENCY 
 
The theory on intergovernmental fiscal relations maintain that the same 
differentials which, under certain circumstances give rise to fiscal inequity also 
cause fiscal inefficiency. 
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5.2.9  INTERGOVERNMENTAL EXTERNALITIES 
 
The traditional argument maintains that sub-national governments do not have 
the proper incentive to provide the correct levels of services which yield 
externalities across sub-national spheres. A system of matching transfers based 
on the expenditures giving rise to the effects will provide the incentive to increase 
expenditures (De Visser, 2005: 206). In this way, the extent of externalities will 
practically be difficult to measure, and the correct matching rate to use will be 
somewhat arbitrary. This is due to the fact that the ‘externalities ‘effect of 
municipal infrastructure have not been included in the equalization formula. This 
should indeed, be given serious consideration. Many publicly provided services 
are characterized by ‘spillovers’, costs and benefits that are not experienced 
within the jurisdiction providing the services. These are often called external 
costs and benefits or simply ‘externalities’. It is expected that sub-national 
government will not always provide an optimal level of public services if 
significant externalities exist. They will choose the types and levels of services 
that are best for their local constituencies, ignoring costs and benefits 
experienced by others. Thus can lead to under provision of goods that have 
regional or national benefits, and overprovision of goods that impose costs on 
surrounding jurisdictions or on the nation. Lengthy examples can be cited in this 
regard, too little investment in education, inadequate pollution control, 
underinvestment in regional hospitals, and so on. 
 
Where externalities would be pervasive if a service were to be provided by sub-
national governments, provision by the central government is appropriate. In less 
extreme cases, the central government may provide grants intended to induce 
sub-national government to provide more of the services characterized by 
external benefits. Provisions of services characterized by external benefits are 
sometimes mandated by higher levels of government. As noted earlier, it is not 
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appropriate to mandate the provision of services without providing the required 
funding. It has been noted that externalities are very difficult to measure, as a 
corollary; it is not easy to design such grants. Grants that targeted very 
specifically but inaccurately may yield unintended and undesirable 
consequences. 
 
5.2.10  FISCAL HARMONISATION 
 
The goal for a developmental state is found in its national commitment to 
distribute equitably revenues to sub-national spheres in order to allow them 
provide basic public services and redress the imbalances and infrastructure 
backlog in the society. The aim of national and provincial governments is to 
ensure that all efforts are channeled towards the achievement of common goods 
for all. In this regard, local government is seen as a terrain where different 
stakeholders, agencies, parastatatals, community groups as well as national and 
provincial departments join their efforts in order to meet the basic needs and 
enhance the prestige of those who have been previously disadvantaged in the 
society. Integrated Development Planning (IDP) is one of the most important 
instruments for attaining harmonization and coordination between national, 
provincial and local government. Service delivery by all spheres of government 
comes together in a focal point of coordination and alignment at local government 
level. This ethos has been clearly highlighted by the government through the 
White Paper on Local Government as follow: 
 
“Local government is a sphere of government in its own right, and not a function 
of national or provincial government…; it is increasingly being seen as a point of 
integration and co-ordination for the programs of other spheres of government” 
(White Paper, 1998: x-xi). 
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However, if service delivery alignment and coordination can be best achieved 
through IDP, it is clear that one of the way to accomplish expenditure 
harmonization in a decentralized system of cooperative government is the use of 
non-matching or conditional transfers, provided the conditions reflect national 
efficiency and equity parameters and ensure that every failure in delivery of 
programs should be financially penalized under certain conditions. Such policies 
may encourage uniformity, i.e., the free flow of goods and factors and 
decentralization which may encourage innovation, efficiency and accountability. It 
has been attested that good intergovernmental transfer prorgammes have key 
generic peculiarities in common (refer to section 2.2). Transfers41 are determined 
as objectively and openly as possible, ideally by some established formula. They 
not subject to hidden political negotiation. In fact, the transfer system may be 
decided by the central government alone, by a quasi-independent expert body, 
such as the grant commission, as that is the case in South Africa by FFC, or by 
some formal system of centralized committees. A system that achieves this dual 
objective is to set the total level of transfers as fixed proportion of total central 
revenues, subject to renegotiation periodically (every 2-5 years). In case there is 
more than one grant, the formula or formulae are transparent, based on credible 
factors, and as simple as possible. If several objectives discussed earlier are 
applicable, say some degree of equalization is desirable while at the same time 
the national policy objectives with respect to the provision of minimal standards of 
education are obvious or variable degrees of national support for certain local 
infrastructure activities, it might assist both clarity and effectiveness if separate 
transfers are targeted at each objective. 
 
                                            
41 They are relatively stable from year to year. The rationale is to allow rational subnational 
budgeting, at the same token by using the measures of sufficiency and flexibility; they ensure that 
national stabilization objectives are not disturbed by subnational finances. 
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5.3 PRINCIPLES FOR THE DESIGN OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
5.3.1 AUTONOMY 
 
Intergovernmental grant have three principle objectives, ie. correct fiscal gap 
between revenues and expenditures of sub-national governments; ensure 
fulfillment of national policy objectives; at last compensate for interjurisdictional 
spillovers resulting from services provided by sub-national governments (Winkler, 
1994: 31).  
 
The Constitution of South Africa provides a mandate to sub-national 
governments that have been labeled in terms of ‘developmental local states’, and 
equips them with a constitutionally protected status amongst the three other 
spheres of government. So far, the constitution affords local governments with 
enumerable legislative and executive powers. This means that their revenue 
generating authority giving them access to generate more than 90% of their 
income is protected in the constitution as well as their entitlement to a share of 
nationally raised revenue (De Visser, 2005: 258). 
 
In line with this principle, it is clear that sub-national government should have 
complete independence and flexibility in setting priorities, and categorical 
structure of programs and uncertainty that always surround decision making at 
the central level should not constrain and bind them from generating these 
revenues and delivering these services. The institutional framework affords sub-
national spheres real decision-making powers. Other spheres are under a 
constitutional instruction not to interfere unduly (De Visser, 2005: 259) in the 
affairs of the municipalities. In line with the discussion above, we clearly see that 
the tax base sharing is an instrument allowing sub-national governments to 
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introduce their own tax rates on central bases, and the South African formula-
based revenue sharing, or block grants is consistent with this objective. A very 
strong body of evidence 69.3% of strongly agree and 17.4% of agree accounting 
of 86.7% of the whole sample size witnesses that fiscal autonomy and functional 
status of sub-national spheres of government is never respected, since 
government in other spheres always encroach on geographical and functional 
responsibilities of sub-national government entities in other spheres. The 
following interview results below are a reflection of this evidence by respondents. 
 
FIGURE 13: REFLECTION OF INTERVIEW RESULTS ON FISCAL AUTONOMY AND 
FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3.2  REVENUE ADEQUACY 
 
In section 5.3, on the terminology and definition of Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Transfers, as summarized above, it was contended that the South African 
Intergovernmental Transfer design has highlighted two types of transfers. It was 
said that non-matching transfers may be either selective (conditional) or general 
(unconditional) and selective matching transfers. With regard to the spillover 
effects on intergovernmental conditional transfers (subsection 5.4.4) and its 
relation to fiscal gap (subsection 5.4.1), fiscal inequality (subsection 5.4.2), and 
fiscal inefficiency (subsection 5.4.3), the institutional design for intergovernmental 
transfers might suggest a normative framework for intergovernmental relations 
(De Visser, 2005: 262). Secondly, it should provide a legal framework that 
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enables local government to participate, as an equal partner, in the vertical 
integration of policies of the various levels of government. It should also provide 
mechanisms for decentralized entities that operate at the same institutional level 
to integrate and align their policies. Third, the legal framework should provide a 
degree of institutionalization of intergovernmental instruments in order to ensure 
participation of stakeholders. It was remarked that, in order to do all these, sub-
national governments should have adequate revenues to discharge designated 
responsibilities. 
 
5.3.2  REVENUE EQUITY 
 
Organized local government is recognized in the constitution as a legitimate 
voice for local government, and is represented in parliament by non-voting 
members and may nominate members to the Financial and Fiscal Commission 
(FFC). It has been remarked with bitterness that the promising recognition in the 
Constitution of organized local government as a mature negotiating partner has 
not resulted in a strong local government message voice by the South African 
Local government Association (SALGA) due to a number of reasons (De Visser, 
2005: 264). The meeting of provincial and national finance ministers with local 
governments in the Budget Forum is not cooperative in nature but driven by the 
National Treasury agenda. Allocated funds to sub-national governments should 
vary directly with fiscal need factors and inversely with the taxable capacity of 
each province. This is only possible if the status of government in other spheres 
were respected on the equal level (section 1.2) and not violated42.  
 
Evidenced opinion of theoreticians is unanimous on this issue than that of 
government’s experts (18.6%) and theoreticians. Academics who are engaged 
                                            
42 See section 41 of the Constitution of South Africa on the principles of cooperative government 
and intergovernmental relations. 
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on this statement (72.9%) give more support to the proposition. Organized local 
government has lost the constitutional protection of its influence over the 
imposition of FFC. According to De visser (2005), in conjunction to state 
intervention in spheres of government (section 3.2) and the constitutional 
framework and legislative implications for financial management (section 3.3), it 
has been made clearer that “…the proposals for the statutory nomination 
procedure keep the influence of organized local government intact, but the 
constitutional amendment has damaged local government’s institutional status”.  
 
FIGURE 14: REFLECTION OF INTERVIEW RESULTS WITH REFERENCE TO THE 
PRINCIPLE OF REVENUE EQUIT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A system of weighed representation would be worth considering as it would 
enhance the legitimacy of sub-national governments, “…SALGA’s functioning in 
Parliament is hampered by a lack of capacity, unfortunate nomination process 
and Parliamentary rules that leaves much to be desired,…this would distort the 
balance of democratically generated power at central level and renders SALGA 
an ordinary political actor” (De visser, 2005: 264). 
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5.3.3  PREDICTABILITY, EFFICIENCY AND SIMPLICITY 
 
In the field of policy studies (policy analysis, policy process and institutional 
arrangement), development and management studies, Leonard et al (1995: 9) 
when attempting to define policy as a set of acceptable societal values followed 
in dealing with a problem or matter of concern, state that any policy has a 
predictability component on the state of affairs which would prevail when that 
purpose has been achieved. Following the coherence of ideas as discussed by 
the two scholars above, and with reference to intergovernmental fiscal relation as 
a matter of concern, we might say that any government’s transfer mechanism 
should be able to ensure predictability of sub-national governments’ share by 
publishing five-year projections of funding available. Growing experience 
suggests that improvements in the efficiency or in the quality of public policy 
choices with which services are run are to be found in the neutrality of 
intergovernmental transfers’ design of allocation to different sectors or different 
types of activity at sub-national level (Shah, 2005: 171). The sub-national 
government’s allocation should be based on objective factors over which 
individual units have little control. The formula suggested by the Financial and 
Fiscal Commission (FFC) should not be complex but easy to understand in such 
a way that all the constitutive components of it are realistic with the socio-political 
and environmental as well as demographic features in the country. 
 
FIGURE 15: REFLECTION OF INTERVIEW RESULTS WITH REFERENCE TO THE 
PRINCIPLE OF REVENUE EFFICIENCY 
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5.3.4  MARGINAL INCENTIVE 
 
The proposed intergovernmental transfer design should provide incentives for 
sound fiscal management and discourage inefficient practices. In this way, it 
would be advisable to discourage specific transfers to finance the deficits of sub-
national governments. Grants intended to reflect external benefits of public 
services or to encourage tax effort should affect the “tax cost” of sub-national 
public expenditures. It is appropriate that a grant be designed to reduce the tax 
cost paid by residents of a local government by one fourth to induce to provide 
more of the service than if they considered only the local benefits. To encourage 
tax effort, the central government might provide a grant that matched, not 
necessarily on a one-for-one basis, local government revenues from own 
sources, perhaps subject to upper limit.  
 
Grants should be designed in a way that does not affect the ‘tax cost’ of a sub-
national sphere’s spending capacity. In order to accomplish this, it would be 
necessary that the size of grants not be affected by the amount of revenue a 
local government raises from own sources. In practice, grants should not be 
reduced if local taxes are increased as this is the case in South Africa by the 
minister of finance. If this is achieved, grants will not affect marginal decisions on 
the level of public appending. Interview result depict a consolidated proportion of 
95.5% for respondents complaining about the fact that in practice, central 
government in South Africa through the Minister of Finance generally reduce the 
scope of sub-national grants when local taxes are increased (see Figure 15 
above). 
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FIGURE 16: REFLECTION OF INTERVIEW RESULTS WITH REFERENCE TO 
MARGINAL INCENTIVE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4  OBJECTIVES OF TRANSFER POLICY 
 
This section has the specific objective of clarifying the objectives of 
intergovernmental transfer following the discussion above, together with the 
definition of the word policy. This will give a clear understanding on the key 
components needed in the compilation of the next chapter where we will attempt 
to analyze the Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) within the framework of 
service delivery and municipal spending. 
 
5.4.1  DEFINITION OF THE CONCEPT ‘POLICY’ 
 
According to De Coning (2005: 139), “…policy is a statement of intent”. For 
Easton (1953: 129) “…policy is the authoritative allocation through the political 
process, of values to groups or individuals in the society”. Hanekom (1987: 9) 
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defines policy making as “…an activity preceding the publication of a goal, while 
the policy statement is the formal articulation, the declaration of intent or the 
publication of goal to be pursued”. There is no universally accepted definition for 
the word policy. In fact, the author agrees with the definition of Easton, implying 
that any policy in determining transfers, with regard to intergovernmental fiscal 
relations is an authoritative allocation and includes a political process. This 
entails values and is done by group or individuals or government’s institutions at 
a given level of government. The author so far, puts his head together with 
Hanekom, that policy making is the activity preceding the publication of an 
objective regarding intergovernmental grants. Given the word policy definition as 
a statement of intent as discussed by various scholars above, a wide array of 
evidence suggests several possible targets to grant policy. Though this study will 
not attempt to discuss in length all of the grants and their objectives at the 
disposition of the central government to sub-national spheres, it will suggest that 
attention focus on reducing vertical fiscal imbalance and horizontal fiscal 
disparities and avoid unintended marginal incentives. 
 
5.4.2 VERTICAL FISCAL IMBALANCE 
 
One of the objectives of transfer’s policy is to redress the mismatch between the 
expenditure responsibilities assigned to a given level of sub-national government 
and the revenue capacity allocated to it, in case such exists. Vertical imbalance 
poses a serious problem in South Africa as much as it is quite common 
throughout the world, as central government ordinarily has greater fiscal capacity 
than sub-national governments, for the reasons specified in chapter 1, on the 
principles of cooperative government and the assignment of responsibilities 
thereof, as stipulated in Schedule 4 and 5 of the South African Constitution. In 
order to reduce this fiscal mismatch between national government and sub-
national spheres under certain circumstances, grants system have been 
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introduced in the study of financial and fiscal management in decentralized 
dispensation, in order to overcome vertical imbalance through the canalization of 
funds from the central government to lower-level governments. In order to reduce 
the fiscal  mismatch between national government and sub-national spheres 
under certain circumstances, grants system have been introduced un the study of 
financial and fiscal management in decentralized dispensation (Winkler, 1994 ) in 
order to overcome vertical imbalance through the canalization of funds from the 
central government to lower-level governments.  
 
FIGURE 17: REFLECTION OF INTERVIEW RESULTS WITH REFERENCE TO 
VERTICAL FISCAL IMBALANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, referring to the Municipal Systems Act, a senior cluster of expert 
respondents interviewed (60%) complained that central government assigns 
greater responsibilities to sub-national spheres of government who are close to 
the people with only 10% of transfers devolved to them. On the other hand, it 
does allocate 90% of the total amounts of transfer to the provincial government 
with or without bigger social responsibilities to deliver in terms of the 
constitutional mandate. See Figure 17 above. 
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5.4.3 HORIZONTAL FISCAL DISPARITIES 
 
A second objective of grants is to reduce horizontal fiscal disparities, i.e., 
difference among sub-national spheres of government in the relationship 
between the capacity to raise own revenues and expenditure needs, by 
redistributing fiscal resources among sub-national levels of government. A 
system with no horizontal fiscal disparities would allow each sub-national sphere 
of government to provide the same level of public services with a given set of tax 
rates. Horizontal fiscal disparities may exist whether or not there is vertical fiscal 
imbalance.  
 
While equalization of fiscal capacity is desirable from the view point of short-term 
equity, it can be questioned on the grounds of economic efficiency. Equalization 
may allow people to remain in locations where the provision of public services is 
expensive or opportunities for private economic activities are limited. Thus, there 
may be a conflict between equity and efficiency (section 5.5). From a long-term 
perspective, failure to equalize fiscal capacity may contribute to migration that 
enhances productivity and reduces poverty. 
 
In South Africa grants are often made to guarantee the provision of minimum 
levels of certain services as education, health and nutrition for children and for 
lactating mothers. This can be explained as a necessary step to overcome 
particular forms of externalities (section 4.4), i.e., the concern for the well-being 
of the constituencies, juvenile delinquency, drug addiction, as well as crime in the 
society. Earlier (footnote referencing 19), we explained that grants can be 
conditional, unconditional (section 4.3) or can be seen as a form of redistribution 
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in kind43. In practice, use of funds provided to finance the satisfaction of minimum 
standards is commonly restricted to provision of the services in question.  
 
5.5  EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF GRANTS FOR HIV/AIDS, EDUCATION 
AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA  
 
In this section, our first intention is to review the principles of intergovernmental 
grants, including grant objectives and administrative discretion in determining 
grants allocations. The rationale of our review intends to set the context for a 
future detailed analysis of conditional grants in South Africa. Second, we will 
review and value South Africa’s experience with three innovative sector-specific 
grant designs, from which we can derive lessons of experience for the country 
regarding grant design and administration. 
 
As stated above, it is more common to refer to these transfers as non-matching 
selective or conditional grants (section 5.3). These are called so when permitted 
uses of sector-specific transfers are relatively restricted, in this way the transfers 
are labeled categorical or conditional grants44. In the following sections, we 
analyze the three categorical grants: selective grant for the finance of HIV/AIDS 
(health sector), the finance of basic education associated with HIV/AIDS in the 
education sector and the categorical grant for social development sector. 
 
5.5.1 INTERGOVERNMENTAL ALLOCATION OF FUNDS: A BACKROUND 
 
The National Integrated Plan for HIV/AIDS (NIP) is a joint venture that began in 
the year 2000 and 2001and was driven by the department of health, education 
                                            
43 Provision of food or education directly to the person or recipient concerned. 
44 Conditional grants (CGs) are funds transferred to provincial departments by an administering 
national department conditional on the delivery of certain services or interventions as defined by 
national. 
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and social development with three programs, namely voluntary counseling and 
testing (VCT), Life skills education as well as community and home-based care 
and support (CHBCS). It was obvious that the total pool of funds set aside for the 
NIP was initially split between these three basic programs. In alignment with the 
above, three CGs were put into place in order to finance implementation of the 
three programs mentioned above, which were also split between those funds to 
be spent directly by the national department and those that had to be disbursed 
to provincial departments as CGs (Hickey et al, 2003: 22). Life skills program was 
taken by the department of education, whereas the VCT program rested within 
the responsibility of the department of health. As far as the CHBCS program was 
concerned, both the department of Health and that of Social Development shared 
together its responsibility, with the hope that the department of Health had a 
mandate to implement home/community- based care for chronically ill patients, 
while the department of Social Development was given the mandate of 
implementing a coherent response for orphans and vulnerable children. There 
are three CGs for HIV/AIDS interventions: 
 
5.2.2  LIFE SKILL CONDITIONAL GRANTS 
 
This type of grant is administered by the Department of Education and is divided 
horizontally between the different provinces using the education component of 
the equitable share formula (section 2.2). Evidence shows that the total figure of 
the grant amounted to R 120.47 million in 2003/4 and, as stated above 
(subsection 5.7.2), the broad objective of the Department of Education’s 
HIV/AIDS strategy is channeled toward guaranteeing access to an appropriate 
and effective integrated system of prevention, care and support for children 
infected by HIV/AIDS; and to deliver curriculum-based life skills and HIV/AIDS 
education in primary and secondary schools (Hickey et al, 2003: ibid). 
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The HIV/AIDS conditional grant is the smallest of the three CGs totaling R62 
million in 2003/4. This conditional grant is financed by the Department of Social 
and Development, based on the aspects of CHBCS45 program susceptible to 
provide support to orphans and vulnerable children.  
 
This type of grant is the biggest of all three. It amounts to R314 million in Budget 
2003/4, and in the same year 2003/4 Budget the total allocation for the health 
HIV/AIDS jumped by 50% in real terms and, in addition to providing for rapid roll-
out of the PMTCT and continuation of programme previously covered by CG, the 
expanded allocation intended to finance at least two new components: Provincial 
prorgammes to provide post-exposure prophylactic (PEP) drug treatment to 
women who may have been exposed to the virus due to rape. Centers of 
excellence in AIDS care, to be established in each province attached either to a 
medical school in the province or in a neighboring province. 
 
5.5.3 POLICIES FOR PROVINCIAL ALLOCATION 
 
Two basic allocations or budgeting decisions have been used in order to provide 
evidence of the own spending on the program. Firstly, the determination of the 
global amount of R 120 million for the Life skill prevention programme for 2003/4 
was obtained by splitting the initial budget  between the three NIP programme for 
2001/2 to 2003/4 based on the decision of the National Steering Committee of 
the NIP, consisting of Dr Simela, Chief Director HIV and AIDS; Mr. Edcent 
Williams, chief Director: Curriculum – Department of Education and Dr Maria 
Mabetoa – Director: HIV, Department of Social Development, based on the views 
of the National treasury (Hickey, 2003: 24). Second, the decision was made in 
                                            
45 It should be born in mind that funding from CHBCS is complex. The provincial welfare 
departments receive CHBCS funds from the Department of Social Development, while at the 
same time the health HIV/AIDS CG also makes funds available to provincial health departments 
for the health related aspects of the CHBCS programme.  
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terms of the criteria or rationale and also, with reference to the personality of 
those involved in making the decision. This is due to the fact that resource 
allocation decisions in the public sector need to balance ability to spend with 
need, by prioritizing those provinces that seem to have the highest prevalence 
rates while, on the other hand trying to consider the costs of prorgammes, norms 
and standards, the target population for particular interventions46, etc (Winkler, 
1994: 33). 
 
Bedsides (refer to section 5.7.6), the above allocations for 2001 to 2003/4 the 
departmental allocations for health and HIV and AIDS seems to have grown at an 
annual rate of 16.8%, i.e., from R9.9 billion in 2005/6 to R15.9 billion in 2008/9. 
While the budget growth has been earmarked at 7.6% in 2009/10 to R17.1 billion, 
an average annual rate of 9.6% over the MTEF period will however, reach R20.9 
billion by 2011/12. This, according to economists (Mukotsanjera et al. (2009: 4) 
amounts to real growth of R5.3 billion over six years. The graph below sows the 
rates of growth for health, HIV and AIDS and total national budget for the period 
2005/06 to 2009/10. The rates of growth follow the same trends over the years 
but the total national budget decreased at a higher rate from 2007/08 to 2008/09. 
 
5.5.4  EXPENDITURE RECORDS ON HIV/AIDS CONDITIONAL GRANTS 
 
Central government has an important continuing role to play in a decentralized 
system that requires a restructuring of central government ministries towards 
improved capacity in these areas and away from direct service provision. 
However, one additional role of central government would be ensuring the 
efficient and equitable provision of decentralized public services that can be 
pursued either through mandates and regulations on sub-national governments 
                                            
46 The target population for HIV/AIDS prevention prorgammes is all people, not only those already 
infected by the disease. 
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or through intergovernmental grants, which combine incentives and grant 
conditionality. Winkler ( 1994: 2) warns that neither the mandate nor incentives-
based grants will function well if the finance and provision assignments across 
governments of specific services are not well-defined; if the information system 
does not generate timely reports of specific services on financial and output 
performance of jurisdictions and if there is no mechanism by which this 
performance can be systematically reviewed and penalties assessed in the case 
of deficient performance or rewards given for exceptional performance. 
 
The functioning of sector-specific intergovernmental grants is spent and 
evaluated for primary HIV/AIDS health care, primary education and social 
development. Winkler (1994: op cit) cites three reasons for selecting or directing 
expenditure on these specific services. The first reason is that such services are 
among those mostly frequently being decentralized to sub-national governments 
in current decentralization efforts. The second is that when education and health 
are decentralized to sub-national governments, they often represent over half the 
total sub-national government budget; and the third reason being that these 
services continue to attract the attention of central government’s objectives even 
after decentralization. 
 
Examples of innovative sector-specific grant designs are identified for each of 
these three sectors, and the expenditure of these designs analyzed. The lessons 
learned from this review should be of general applicability to the provinces in 
South Africa. Conditional grants make up approximately 10% of provincial 
revenue, with the bulk of provincial budgets sourced from the equitable share 
(86.5%) and provincial own revenue (3.5%). By ring-fencing the funds, central 
government ensures that national priorities will be sufficiently resourced in 
provincial budgets and that provinces will implement these programs; however, 
the financial and program regulations attached to CG funds create bureaucratic 
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problems and delays in transferring and spending funds, as a matter of fact, 
spending on conditional grants in South Africa is typically quite low, i.e., between 
70.1% and 84.6% as this paper will show (National Treasury, 2001: 16). 
 
5.5.5  IMPROVEMENT ON CONDITIONAL GRANTS 
 
Provinces have been guaranteed to run the HIV/AIDS CGs interventions and 
have been warned not to apply the funds for other purposes. However, 
regardless of this restriction, HIV/AIDS grant schemes witness under-spending 
and low-spending due to accounting structures of government that did not allow 
for spending on CGs to be calculated separately in the first place. Nevertheless, 
massive improvements in spending over the next two years suggest that the 
problem did not concern the CGs alone, but was also due to administrative as 
well as financial management challenges (Hickey, 2003: 31).  
 
“Getting the NIP programs up and running required setting up management 
structures and employing co-coordinators in the provinces, developing financial 
transfer and monitoring systems, and establishing program standards, plans and 
materials. This implies that HIV/AIDS provincial managers have succeeded in 
overcoming the bureaucratic hurdles inherent in the CG mechanism itself – which 
line managers regularly confront when spending other CGs”. 
 
Figure 18: below shows the aggregate provincial spending records on the three 
HIV/AIDS CGs and provide evidence of extensive improvement. Although the 
figures do not include expenditure on funds rolled-over from previous years, they 
reflect, as a matter of fact, provincial spending on the current year’s CG 
allocation. We should bear in mind that almost 85% of HIV/AIDS CG funds were 
spent in 2001/2 and 2002/3.Evidednce shows that in early 2001/2 aggregate 
spending on HIV/AIDS CGs matched or exceeded average expenditure on CGs, 
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as a corollary the usual difficulties experienced with CG spending have proved to 
be surmounted due to progressive improvement in HIV/AIDS programme 
structures and spending procedures (Hickey, 2003: 32). Evidence shows that in 
early 2002/2 aggregate spending on HIV/AIDS CGS matched or exceeded 
average expenditure on CGs, as a corollary the usual difficulties experienced 
with CG spending have proved to be surmounted due to progressive 
improvement in HIV/AIDS programme structures and spending procedures 
(Hickey, 2003: 32). 
 
Nevertheless, one of major challenges experienced in the Department of Social 
Development and the Department of Education concerns lack of institutional 
arrangements with regard to financial and project management, since it is 
maintained that provincial health departments have been able to use provincial 
management funds for their internal staffing (Hickey, 2003). It is evident that the 
issue of technical skills and its related institutional arrangement has witnessed 
divided opinions among the respondents with a large proportion of respondents 
(64.3%) agreeing with the need of this mechanism to be put in place. This 
suggests that institutionalization of financial and project management capacity 
building is one of those instruments that need to be institutionalized within the 
framework of intergovernmental conditional grants in order to achieve a certain 
degree of finality. 
 
FIGURE 18: REFLECTION OF INTERVIEW RESULTS WITH REFERENCE TO THE 
PRINCIPLE OF REVENUE EQUITY 
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According to the 2002 Division of Revenue Bill, all Budgets were transferred to 
provinces in 2000/1. The report witnessed an under spending of almost 30%. The 
reasons for the above-mentioned financial loophole accounted for slow pace in 
the disbursement of funds to provinces; this is worsened by a mediocre 
administrative capacity of those provinces, recipients of the funds (Division of 
Revenue, 2002: 75).  
 
According to Hickey et al (2003), provinces spent 59.5% of the R 16.8 million in 
health HIV/AIDS CGs in 2000/1. The problem of under spending for the 
Department of Health was taken seriously by National Treasury in 2001/2 and 
effort in research toward this problem has been under way and counter measures 
developed (Division of Revenue, 2002: op cit). One of the serious problem posed 
by research on HIV/AIDS CGs is that, first there is not extensive literature and 
research on South Africa, and the second challenge is due to lack of available 
information on whether provinces’ unspent funds were rolled-over from one year 
to the next. Most information found is either distorted or conflicting with that 
provided by the National Treasury when compared to that given by pectoral 
provincial Directors’. To illustrate this in clear terms, we would like to refer to an 
example using National Treasury figure of R 46 million actual spending for 
2001/2. From this, one sees that unspent health CG funds for HIV/AIDS in 
2001/2 amounted to R 8 million47. 
 
The 2002 Adjusted Estimates maintain that none of these funds were rolled-over 
into the next budget year; nevertheless, CG expenditure as reported by National 
                                            
47 Adjusted Estimate of National Expenditure, 2002: viii. 
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Treasury statements far exceeds 100% in a number of cases. This can be 
observed in the case of Eastern Cape’s report of R 11. 395 million actual 
expenditure for 2001/2 to National Treasury, with a total allocation for that year 
amounting to R 6.281 million. 
 
FIGURE 19: IMPROVED SPENDING RECORDS OF HIV/AIDS CONDITIONAL 
GRANTS, BY SECTOR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: 2001 Intergovernmental Fiscal Review and 2001 Budget Review. 
Statements of the National and Provincial Governments’ Revenue and 
Expenditure as well as National Borrowing as at 31 March 2002, and as at 31 
March 2003. More data come from information obtained from interviews48 with: 
Deputy Director for HIV/AIDS, Department of Social Development; and HIV/AIDS 
managers and provincial education, health and social development/welfare 
departments. 
 
This is very likely true that in certain circumstances funds to provinces were 
rolled-over. While Figure 19 above is an illustration of roll-over funds from 
previous year and spending on present year’s CG allocation - attempting to 
                                            
48  Such interviews have been conducted by Alison and Hickey, Nhalanhla Ndlovu and Teresa 
Guthrie from IDASA in 2003. 
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compare expenditure in 2001/2 to the budget allocation for 2001/2, Figure 5.16 
likely compares expenditure in 2001/2 to the budget allocation for 2002/3. this 
situation is due to the fact that, at the beginning of 2003 the Department of Health 
made flexible the restriction on provincial CG spending on HIV/AIDS by 
identifying a list of intervention and leaving provinces to exercise their 
discretionary choice to allocate resources to activities of their own prioritization. 
 
This condition has been accompanied by growing pressures from HIV/AIDS CG 
mangers to spend increased CG amounts to R 333.556 million as compared to 
210.209 million allocations from previous year49.  
 
FIGURE 20: ACTUAL EXPENDITURE ON HEALTH HIV/AIDS CONDITIONAL 
GRANTS, BY PROVINCE FOR 2001/2 AND 2002/3, INCLUDING EXPENDITURE OF 
FUNDS ROLLED-OVER FROM PREVIOUS YEAR 
R million Unaudited 
provincial actual 
spending 2001/2 
Provincial actual 
spending 2002/3 
Percent increase 
in actual 
expenditure 
Eastern Cape 11.395 24.758 117% 
Free State 3.767 16.884 348% 
Gauteng 4.409 16.113 265% 
KwaZulu-Natal 14.240 80.857 468% 
Mpumalanga 1.528 7.946 420% 
North West 2.254 21.245 843% 
Northern Cape 4.665 5.727 23% 
Limpopo 4.701 18.517 294% 
Western Cape 3.566 11.519 223% 
National Total 50.525 203.566 303% 
                                            
49 2001 Intergovernmental Fiscal Review and 2001 Budget Review. Statements of the National 
and Provincial Governments’ Revenue and Expenditure. 
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This situation suggested that provinces would need to spend over 60% of their 
HIV/AIDS CG allocated budget in 2003/4 than they could in 2002/3 in order to 
maximize their expenditure as prescribed by the Department of Health policy on 
HIV/AIDS CG. Aggregate actual expenditure for health HIV/AIDS CG has 
increased from 59.5% in the first year to 82.2% in 2002/3. 
 
Official budget documents maintain that achievements on this grant are 2000/1: 
Spending was 23 % of allocated funds, with the appointment of 11 HIV/AIDS 
provincial co-coordinators and computers being obtained, including the 
appointment of nine more financial administrators (Division of Revenue Bill: 2003: 
82); 2001/2: Contracts of Lifeskills coordinators being extended, and HIV/AIDS 
booklets printed and distributed in each province (Division of Revenue Bill: 2003: 
ibid); 2002/3: 46.5% spent up to end of December 2002, and HIV/AIDS provincial 
coordinators being re-appointed and vacancies filled as they arise. National 
coordinator has been appointed and has enhanced project management 
capacity, effectiveness and efficiency (Division of Revenue Bill: 2003: ibid). 
Figure 20 are illustrations of actual expenditure of Lifeskills CG funds, including 
expenditure of funds rolled-over from previous year, though details on roll-over 
amounts were not available. 
 
Gauteng spent zero in 2001/2 according to National Treasury statement as at 31 
March 2002, in fact the national Lifeskills coordinator in the Department of 
Education reported that Gauteng’s expenditure was actually 81.06% that year.50 
In other circumstances, actual expenditure figures reported to National Treasury 
for 2002/3 exceeded the CG allocation for that year in six provinces, namely Free 
State, Mpumalanga, Northern Cape, Limpopo, Western Cape and Gauteng. 
                                            
50 According to personal correspondence of Hickey et al with Brennand Smith, National Lifeskills 
Coordinator, National Department of Education. 
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From the above explanation, it is obvious that spending over 100% of CG funds 
is out of question. The only understanding is that provinces are reporting 
expenditure on funds rolled-over from the previous year, or erroneously include 
expenditure of departmental funds in their CG reporting to National Treasury. 
 
The following figure, Figure 5.19 depicts actual expenditure as a percent of the 
current year’s allocation, based on National Treasury expenditure statements and 
adjustments, but does not take into account the roll-over expenditure. It is a 
reflection of provinces efforts in the improvement of their spending records from 
66% in 2001/2 to 87% in 2002/3 despite rampant increase in allocation plus 
growing pressure from unspent funds rollover. 
 
FIGURE 21: PERCENT SPENT OF 2001/2 AND 2002/3 HEALTH HIV/AIDS 
CONDITIONAL GRANT ALLOCATION, BY PROVINCE – NOT INCLUDING 
EXPENDITURE ON ROLLED OVER FUNDS 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Feb‐01 Mar‐02
 
 
Provinces Eastern 
Cape 
Free 
State 
Gauteng KwaZulu-
Natal 
Mpumalanga North 
West 
Northern 
Cape 
Limpopo Western 
Cape 
National
2001/2 100% 80% 78% 100% 33% 49% 100% 85% 82% 83% 
2002/3 88% 91% 52% 100% 38% 100% 75% 90% 98% 82% 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5: Design of intergovernmental grants  
 
 
 
 
University of the Western Cape,  October 2009  110 
 
Source: Figures are taken from Statements of the National and Provincial 
Governments’ Revenue. Expenditure and National Borrowing as at 31 March 
2003 except in the cases of Free State, Northern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. In a 
case of provinces reporting to National Treasury of the spending exceeding their 
CG allocation, or report expenditure of departmental funds in addition to CG 
funds or report on expenditure of funds roll-over from previous year. In such 
cases adjustments have been made to the figures in the following cases of 
Eastern Cape 2001/2 National Treasury Statement and KwaZulu-Natal 2002/3 
(see table 3 above). 
 
FIGURE 22: ACTUAL EXPENDITURE ON LIFE SKILLS EDUCATION HIV/AIDS 
CONDITIONAL GRANTS, BY PROVINCE, INCLUDING EXPENDITURE ON ROLLED 
OVER FUNDS 
 
R million Unaudited 
provincial actual 
spending 2001/2 
Provincial actual 
spending 2002/3 
Percent increase 
in actual 
expenditure 
Eastern Cape 7.377 11.163 51% 
Free State 1.232 10.083 718% 
Gauteng 0 18.154                       - 
KwaZulu-Natal 16.8 30.403 81% 
Mpumalanga 3.895 13.449 245% 
North West 3.115 9.452 203% 
Northern Cape 0.944 2.859 203% 
Limpopo 9.969 23.906 140% 
Western Cape 1.391 16.005 1051% 
National Total 44.723 135.474 203% 
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Source: Statement of the National and Provincial Government’s Revenue and 
Expenditure and National Borrowing as at 31 March 2002, and as at 31 March 
2003. 
 
Sufficient information on roll-over funds is unavailable for the Life skills 
conditional grant, as with the health CG due to the fact that not all funds being 
rolled-over went unspent into the next financial year. The National Treasury 
provides proof of R 19 million being unspent for 2002/3 financial year. Evidence 
gives an account of R 605 thousand being rolled-over by the Department of 
Education in 2002/3 with regard to Life skills CG funds owing to outstanding 
claims for the printing of HIV/AIDS materials – which clearly indicate that only 
3.2% of unspent HIV/AIDS Life skills CG funds from 2001/2 were rolled-over into 
2002/3. 
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FIGURE 23: ACTUAL EXPENDITURE OF LIFE SKILLS CONDITIONAL GRANT 
FUNDS, INCLUDING ROLLOVERS BY PROVINCE 
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Provincial actual spending 2002/3
Source: Statement of the National and Provincial Governments’ Revenue and 
Expenditure and National Borrowing as at 31 March 2002, and as at 31 March 
2003. 
 
National Treasury and the Department of Social Development have both provides 
a depiction of a breakthrough on this type of conditional grant such as – the 
establishment of 49 sites, bringing the total number of  sites to 5551; 
approximately 50 000 children have been reached under this scheme; rapid 
appraisal of home/community based care identified 466 projects of which 136 
received government funding (Hickey, 2003: 40); practice guidelines were 
developed and made available to NGOs, CBOs as well as government officials in 
                                            
51 The total number of these sites increases when we take into account the sites funded via the 
Poverty Relief Programme to amount to 185 sites. 
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order to assist in rendering services of prime necessity to children within the 
basic scope of children’s rights and legislation. 
 
FIGURE 24: PERCENT SPENT OF 2001/2 AND 2002/3 LIFESKILLS CONDITIONAL 
GRANT ALLOCATION, BY PROVINCE, NOT INCLUDING EXPENDITURE ROLLED-
OVER FUNDS 
 
Provinces 2001/2 2002/3 
Eastern Cape 63% 41% 
Free State 31% 100% 
Gauteng 0% 100% 
KwaZulu-Natal 100% 96% 
Mpumalanga 84% 100% 
North West 61% 82% 
Northern Cape 78% 100% 
Limpopo 100% 106% 
Western Cape 28% 100% 
National Total 66% 87% 
 
Source: Data in this Table are taken from Statements of the National and 
Provincial Government Revenue. Expenditure and National Borrowing as at 31 
March 2002, and as at 31 March 2003.Provinces reported spending to the 
National Treasury which exceeded their CG allocation, in many cases, but to 
avoid bias on aggregate spending records, adjustments have been made with 
regard to KwaZulu-Natal (2001/2 of R 16.8 m), Mpumalanga (R 13.449 m), 
Northern Cape (R 2.859 m), Western Cape (R 16.00 m), Gauteng (R18.154 m). 
 
The report of National Treasury on this grant was that aggregate spending 
amounted to R2 million in 2000/1 of the total of R5.62 million allocated. On these 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5: Design of intergovernmental grants  
 
 
 
 
University of the Western Cape,  October 2009  114 
 
funds, Free State spent 100% of it allocation and Limpopo spent 87% of its 
budget and the rest of provinces had a constraint in spending their attributed 
budgets in the first year – Northern Cape spending nothing and rolling-over the 
entire R1 million budgets into 2001/2 and Northern reporting only R68.000 
expenditure and requiring the rolling-over of a balance of R1 million budget 
allocation. 
 
In 2001/2, almost all provinces did better on spending their CG budget allocation. 
This includes Northern Cape, North West and Limpopo, managing to spend all 
their unspent funds from the previous year, in addition to a big proportion of their 
current 2001/2 CG budget. Expenditure in 2000/1 was only 35.6%, however 
aggregate provinces spent 81.3% of the total CG budget for 2001/2. Figure 5.20 
shows that this percent raises to 92.7% in 2002/3, while Figure 5.21 depicts 
actual expenditure of both current budget and rolled-over funds, by comparing 
across years to show the rapid increase in spending. The whole scenario is a 
success story showing how provincial HIVAIDS managers were able to rapidly 
increase their absorption capacity from one year to the next. 
 
FIGURE 25: ACTUAL EXPENDITURE OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT/WELFARE 
HIV/AIDS CONDITIONAL FUNDS BY PROVINCE, INCLUDING EXPENDITURE OF 
FUNDS ROLLED OVER FROM PREVIOUS YEAR 
 
R million 2001/2 2002/3 Percent increase 
in actual 
expenditure 
Eastern Cape 1.921 4.798 150% 
Free State 1.500 8.858 491% 
Gauteng 1.000 6.983 491% 
KwaZulu-Natal 1.285 5.144 300% 
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Mpumalanga 2.272 7.102 213% 
North West 1.135 5.463 381% 
Northern Cape 2.432 2.706 11% 
Limpopo 1.601 3.135 96% 
Western Cape 0.983 2.084 112% 
National Total 14.129 46.273 227% 
 
Source: Statement of National and Provincial Government’s Revenue and 
Expenditure and National Borrowing as at 31 March 2002, and as at 31 March 
2003. Figures are corrected against information obtained from Ms. De Beer, 
Deputy Director: KIV/AIDS at the Department of Social Development52.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
52 Eastern Cape: according to J. De Beer, expenditure was only R750.000 with R761.000 under-
spent and requested as rolled-over. National Treasury statement give R1.921 m figure as actual 
spent. The entire unspent funds of R950.000 have been assumed to have been rolled-over from 
2000/2 to become part of the 2001/2 expenditure. KZN: National Treasury gives figure of R1.499, 
but according to J. De Beer, expenditure is R1.285 m. Mpumalanga: The unspent amount from 
2000/1 of R960.000 was rolled-over in 2001/2, and the total spent in 2001/2 was R 2.446 m 
according to J. De Beer. National Treasury gave the figure of R2.272 m. North West: Total 
expenditure during 2001/2 was R1.135486 m according to J. De Beer, including expenditure of 
R1 million rolled-over from the previous year. National Treasury statement give a figure of 
R1.155m actual spent for 2001/2. Northern Cape: R932.000 was rolled-over from 2001/2 and 
2000/1, according to J. De Beer. Total expenditure reported in National Treasury of R2.432m is 
complete spending of 2000/1 and 2001/2 allocations. Limpopo: Total expenditure listed in 
National Treasury of R1.60 m is complete spending of both 2001/2 allocation and R 121.000 
rolled-over from 2000/1, according to J. De Beer. 
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FIGURE 26: ACTUAL EXPENDITURE OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT HIV/AIDS 
CONDITIONAL GRANT FUNDS IN 2001/2 AND 2002/3, INCLUDING ROLLOVERS 
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Source: Statement of National and Provincial Government’s Revenue and 
Expenditure and National Borrowing as at 31 March 2002, and as at 31 March 
2003. Personal correspondence with J. De Beer – Deputy Director for HIV/AIDS 
at National Department of Social Development53. 
 
5.5.6  HIV AND AIDS IN 2009/10 BUDGET 
 
According to (UNAIDS, 2008), HIV prevalence in South Africa is 18.1%, and the 
total allocation for HIV and AIDS for 2009/10 fiscal year are R11.4 billion. This 
amount includes the allocation to the Department of Education (DOE) and the 
Department of Social Development (DSD) for provinces and municipalities. This 
shows that allocations for HIV AIDS are increasing in real terms after the 
adjustments of inflation, with has growth from R1.5 billion in 2005/06 to R4.6 
                                            
53 Refer to information provided on page 42 of “Budgeting for HIV/AIDS in South Africa – A 
Report on intergovernmental funding flows for an integrated response in the social sector” by 
Alison and Hickey, Nhalanhla Ndlovu and Teresa Guthrie from IDASA (2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5: Design of intergovernmental grants  
 
 
 
 
University of the Western Cape,  October 2009  117 
 
billion in 2011/12. Addition HIV AIDS categorical grants of R200 million, R325 
million and R407 million was allocated to roll out the new dual therapy54 and 
expand antiretroviral treatment coverage for the MTEF period. Additional 
resources have been allocated for tuberculosis and HIV and AIDS, and also to 
extend screening of pregnant mothers coming into the public health system and 
to phase in an improved drug regime in order to prevent mother-to-child HIV 
transmission. In 2009/10, Treasury has allocated R11.3 billion for HIV and AIDS 
through the Department of Health, Education and Social Development in order to 
surpass the financing requirements of the National Strategic Plan from 2007-
2011. 
 
FIGURE 27: HEALTH VS HIV REAL EXPENDITURE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.6 SUMMARY  
 
                                            
54 The prevention of mother to child transmission program received particular attention in 2009 
budget for rolling out treatment coverage and implementing the improved dual therapy. 
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In conclusion, as evidence has shown a large proportion of respondents (more 
than 75%) find that applicable legislation is cumbersome to the efficiency and 
effectiveness of a sound fiscal and financial management system in South Africa, 
and should be abolished since it is not beneficial in speeding up the process of 
service delivery. If this does not necessarily mean reinventing sound 
intergovernmental mechanisms in their improvement of financial and fiscal 
management system in decision making, respondents (experts and theoreticians) 
gave their balanced view points on various issues that the government of the day 
needs to take into account. It is the contention of the researcher that all these will 
receive a close attention in section 6.2 and section 6.3 of the last chapter dealing 
with findings and recommendations of the study. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The objective in this chapter is to present the conclusion of the study. In this way, 
the core findings and conclusions will first be presented in section 6.2.1 and will 
be followed by a set of key findings and conclusions for each problem statement 
as demonstrated in chapter 1. 
 
FIGURE 28: BREAKDOWN OF CHAPTER 6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The present discussion focuses on conclusions based on strategic landscape of 
the study (section 6.6.2), the theoretical consideration for a financial and fiscal 
relations approach to cooperative government in South Africa (section 6.2.3 and 
chapter 2), the background to the study, dwelling on constitutional amendments 
framework and its implications on intergovernmental fiscal and financial relations 
(section 6.2.4, section 1.2 and chapter 3); methodological orientation on 
cooperative government (section 6.2.6 and chapter 4); the empirical application 
of intergovernmental grants and its rationale in South Africa (section 6.2.5 and 
chapter 5). The concluding observation will be made in the following discussion 
(section 6.2.7) and conclusions and issues for future studies consideration and 
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recommendation (section 6.2.8) will be postulated in the last section. The scope 
and outline of the chapter is presented below as follows: 
 
6.2 SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.2.1 CORE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
The core problem statement of this study, as depicted in section 1.2 of chapter 1, 
gravitates around the need for an improved and efficient financial and fiscal 
management system against the backdrop of constitutional framework and 
amendments. This need is paramount to the improvement in the conditions of 
being and way of targeted planning at all levels of government. However, 
although the White Paper provides an intergovernmental fiscal relations support 
for the institutional arrangement to cooperative government, evidence from 
findings show that its relevance and practicability is relatively very weak or almost 
inexistent. As a corollary, it follows that any attempt to improve financial and 
fiscal management system pertaining to revenue creation and the ability to collect 
debt management of indigents or senior citizens at local government level (and 
their willingness to pay) is thwarted either by lack of appropriate legislation or 
over-regulation55. Pertinent mechanism is needed in order to allow their 
alignment of policy along IDP priorities between government departments and 
across government spheres. 
 
Conducted interviews reflect this institutional and legislative loopholes and point 
to it as one of the key factors that might lead to an inefficient fiscal management 
and ineffective financial system in the City of Cape Town. This study concludes 
that the support for an efficient financial and fiscal management system can be 
                                            
55  Interview conducted on 30th of April 2009 with Trevor Blake, Director of Revenue in the 
Metropolitan City of Cape Town 
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much improved by better increasing the need for institutional arrangement.  
Policy measures should be introduced to assist in the improvement of conditions 
of life to the poor56. Further, general interviews stress on the fact that practical 
frameworks should be available to facilitate cooperation and policy alignment 
between spheres of government. Furthermore, the central sphere of government 
should intervene only in assisting provincial and local government spheres with 
skilled and experienced staff that can be able to perform their functions where 
these spheres are clearly dysfunctional and not otherwise. 
 
It is the contention of the researcher that institutional arrangements pertinent to 
the framework of financial and project management is a critical tool that should 
guide decision-making processes between the three spheres of government and 
across sectors. These mechanisms needs to be put into place in order to 
strengthen the quality of fiscal and financial management system in South Africa. 
In light with this need, specific findings and conclusions will be highlighted in the 
subsequent discussion 
 
6.2.2 CONCLUSIONS: STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE 
 
The formulation of key problem area one (see section1.3) was informed by the 
identification of the need to develop a strategic landscape on the challenges of 
cooperative government in South African context. This was formulated with the 
view in mind that this should bring to the attention of government elected officials, 
experts and practitioners of independent bodies alike, the potential contribution 
that cooperative government management and financial management systems 
are the foundation of a sound government response to the wellbeing of people. It 
is therefore clear that an improved understanding, especially in the form of 
                                            
56 Interview conducted on 30th of April 2009 with Trevor Blake, Director of Revenue, and 
Metropolitan City of Cape Town. 
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legislation and sectoral policies must develop and feed into fiscal and financial 
issues within the framework of cooperative government in order to sustain 
government actions to achieve its anticipated goals. In this way section 3.2.1 and 
section 3.2.2 of chapter 3 in line with key findings on the strategic landscape of 
cooperative government in South Africa, the following concluding remarks have 
been postulated.  
 
This underlies the idea that massive constitutional57 and political change in South 
Africa has fundamentally affected the way political activity is organized in 
different spheres of the same state. However, the over-regulation and high 
political interventions on sub-national spheres from the top to the local level. The 
cultures of divergent political parties have also acted as a cumbersome scenario 
in policy alignment and delivery processes, especially in the areas where the 
dispensation of certain political parties is seen to be a worship to the false gods 
that no one in the country should be able to question and violated or overridden 
by opponents. In this light a senior Director of the City of Cape Town made the 
following observations: 
 
“Applicable legislation needs to be changed as it is very cumbersome and not 
beneficial for service delivery. It is seen as a hindrance rather than assisting in 
speeding up the process of service delivery”. 
                                            
57 A local sphere in South Africa is overregulated. For instance in chapter 3 of the Constitution of 
South Africa, provision has been made for a conceptual framework in terms of cooperative 
government, which underlies principles of cooperative government and intergovernmental 
relations. Section 40 (2) and section 41 (1) of the same Constitution respectively instructs the 
three spheres of government to adhere to principles that are provided therein, with the view to 
conduct their activities without encroaching on geographical or functional areas of the 
government in other spheres. Interviews conducted, however show that the officials of higher 
spheres of government encroach on them either directly or indirectly or tacitly through cross-
implication as the study will show. For more information on this, refer to De visser and Tapscott 
(2005:186; Tapscott, 1998: 9) and section 3.2.1 of this study. Amendment of section 100 of the 
Constitution and section 34 (3) (b) of the Municipal Structures Act as well as section 155 (8) (b) of 
the Constitution was introduced as a direct result of provisions of chapter 11 of the Municipal 
Finance Management Bill. 
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The involvement of provincial government in the redirection of development 
planning58processes at the local spheres so that it could be brought in line with 
the IDP. Nevertheless, it appears that not only provincial senior government 
officials are not willing to come down for alignment effort, but experience from the 
research findings show that “…they do not have the balanced understanding and 
experience on how local municipalities operate, how they struggle to raise their 
own revenue in alignment with IDP in the effort to deliver basic services to the 
poor. Most local spheres raise 90% of revenue themselves and only 10% are 
assigned to them to account for unconditional transfers”. This gap needs to 
receive attention in the whole politico-administrative set up of the new 
government in reference to the goal of cooperative government as well as that of 
a sound financial and fiscal management system.  
 
There is a lack of macro-institutional policy framework guiding the leadership of 
political parties around the same goals as a nation under one government. With 
reference to the City of Cape Town for instance, the fact that the big proportion of 
the City Council is under DA and not ANC total control raises tensions and critical 
questions in the overall management set up of the City. This also might suggest 
that the strategic planning is aligned along 5-year political plan, which is a 
political term period of mandate rather than a longer term plan that might be 
projected beyond the short-sighted political scope. A cross-cutting experience of 
government requires the capacity and skills to govern and make sound political 
and financial decisions and government should prioritize capacity-building 
aligned alongside those local skilled and experienced staff that can perform their 
functions where these spheres are dysfunctional. 
 
                                            
58 Interviews conducted on 5th of May with Mike Richardson, Chief Financial Officer of the 
metropolitan City of Cape Town. 
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In conclusion, it is clear from the strategic landscape that cooperative 
government in South Africa is more important and that this process requires 
coordination, consultation, financial alignment and participation in which direct 
representation and institutional capacity, especially that pertaining to financial 
and project management to be mainstreamed to empower and foster active 
decision-making processes. It should, furthermore encourage the exchange of 
good practices, financing administration in cooperation, create centers of 
excellence and skills as well as grand government orientations through a 
National Commission by devoting power to provinces and local municipalities 
within a specific focused framework of fiscal and financial management system, 
leaving them with the choice of means of revenue sources. 
 
6.2.3  CONCLUSIONS ON THE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIV ON 
COOPERAIVE GOVERNMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
 
The need for improved understanding of theoretical approaches to financial and 
fiscal relations paramount to the study of cooperative government is highlighted 
as a priority issue (see key problem area two; section 1.5/objective 4). In 
reference to the large variety of intergovernmental fiscal relations in South Africa, 
up to date conceptual clarifications and definitions that are used in academic 
debates have been reviewed, examined and considered. Furthermore, the 
relationship between sources of revenue and government expenditure and 
borrowing in the study of financial and fiscal management has received full 
attention. At the same time, it was also useful to address the IGFRs equitable 
share formula for the provinces as another budgeting principle and right in terms 
of section 214 and 227 of the Constitution (Act No.108 of 1996). The following 
are some of the key findings corroborated by the theoretical perspective on 
cooperative government dealt with in chapter two of this study: 
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A large literature, especially that pertaining to the field of financial and fiscal 
management within the framework of cooperative government exists in South 
African Universities. In line with this, municipalities are expected to generate 
most revenues from own sources. Evidence, both from theory and field 
experience show that Metropolitan Municipalities collect 90% of total revenue 
from own sources. Non-Metros with budgets of over R 300 million generate 65%. 
Is this a justification of what one of the Directors of the Department of Finance of 
the Municipality of Cape Town mentioned earlier as '…discriminatory practices 
that continue to characterize central government in the allocation of transfers to 
local spheres?' In this way, his argument has been supported by official 
correspondence addressed to one of the senior management, and this confirms 
the following: 
 
“We need urgent queries with National Treasury over the DORA on Equitable 
Share: Nelson Mandela received R 456 million; Ekurhuleni R 1099 million; 
Johannesburg R 1234 million; Tshwane R512 m; eThekweni R 1095 m and Cape 
Town R 609 million…this is grossly inequitable for Cape Town. If it is not a 
mistake, we need to obtain urgent legal opinion on what intervention we can 
bring”59. 
 
Interviews conducted with the City of Cape Town shows that in reality, the 
Metropolitan City of Cape Town has an operating budget of R18 billion for 
2009/2010 financial year; out of which only R609 million came as an 
unconditional transfer from central government. One billion have arguably been 
set aside to subsidize three basic services for the indigent population. Critics, 
however rise on the degree of municipal financial autonomy since higher spheres 
                                            
59 Correspondence of the Department of Finance/Mayoral Committee member for Finance with 
Economic and Social Development and Tourism 2009. 
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of government intervene earlier or in the middle of the process of the affairs of 
municipalities through transfers and oversight. In this regard, the Constitution 
requires that an Act of Parliament should prescribe the Division of National 
Raised Revenue (DoR) between national, provincial and local government based 
on the recommendations from FFC as stipulated in subsection 214 (2) of the 
Constitution. 
 
In conclusion, the above discussion in chapter 2 confirms the strong ties between 
revenue and expenditure and conclusively stipulates that funds should follow 
functions and that central government should redistribute funds to where it is 
needed most in order to speed up service delivery process. Moreover, 
government should set an example by paying the municipalities for services 
rendered. 
 
Central government should strive to align the financial year of all three spheres of 
government through the creation, within the office of the President at the highest 
policy level possible a Commission on policy alignment and planning. Lack of 
financial alignment between all three spheres suggests a socio-administrative 
gap, which is one of the weaknesses in financial terminology that translates into 
financial inefficiency and administrative bottle-neck. The creation of the national 
Planning Commission (NPC) by the new government administration led by Jacob 
Zuma shows a positive endeavour toward addressing this policy and institutional 
weakness. When reflecting on best practices on key issues that needed to 
receive attention in intergovernmental fiscal relation at the operational level, it 
appeared that a strong proportion of respondents, essentially 65.7% (19 
respondents) put in priority efficiency and effectiveness; in fact 31.4% (almost 9 
respondents) agreed with fiscal autonomy and harrmonisation, 1.45% (one 
respondent) with fiscal equality ad fiscal federalism and 1.4% (one respondent) 
was not sure. This corroborates, as a matter of fact, the need for a serious 
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relationship over financial and policy alignment between and across sectoral and 
three spheres of government. 
 
6.2.4  CONCLUSIONS ON THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL 
RELATIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR FISCAL AND FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
The discussion in chapter 3 has shown that the proposed constitutional 
amendments have trigged a new set of problems or questions regarding fiscal 
relations between the three spheres of government in South Africa. In fact, it has 
been noted that such amendments have also solved some of the problems that 
were introduced by the current version of the Constitution. It is thus clear that no 
version of the Constitution would constitute a panacea to all the problems that 
exist in a given fiscal system. Hence, regulations and guidelines are important in 
perfecting the intentions of the Constitution. The discussion in this section 
focuses on conclusion of the chapter and policy proposals, in view of the 
potential problems that the amendments to the Constitution have introduced. 
 
With regard to intervention related to section 100 and 139 in this paper, we have 
spent a number of times discussing that the intervention powers of the 
Constitution given to both national and provincial spheres of governments 
undermine the status of the local sphere of government  by allowing them to 
assume responsibilities  for both exclusive and legislative obligations. It was 
concluded that this treats local government as an inferior sphere of government – 
a tier in the old apartheid Constitution rather than a sphere in the new democratic 
dispensation as opposed to other two counterparts. Regardless of the 
constitutional or developmental mandate it carries to deliver services (refer to 
chapter 2), implement government programmes and priorities and change the 
lives of local people, the local sphere has remained as a terrain of truncated and 
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atrophied policy formality, appoint of policy reformism to be added as a 
necessary appendix for justification in legislature. In addition to that, there are 
certain problems associated with the design of the intervention of key findings 
that include the following:  
 
The Constitution foresees a reactive rather than a proactive intervention role of 
the national executive to both the provincial and the local spheres of government. 
Section 100 (1) (a) of the Constitution argues that “…when a province or 
municipality cannot or does not fulfill an obligation in terms of legislation or the 
Constitution”, section 139 (1) (a) of the Constitution provides the same for the 
province in relation to a municipality. This suggests that the national and 
provincial governments only intervene when the relevant spheres of government 
have already failed to meet their obligations in terms of legislation or the 
Constitution. This provision is supported by subsection (a) which says that the 
national or provincial executive may intervene by taking any appropriate steps to 
ensure fulfillment of that obligation, including “…issuing a directive to the 
provincial executive or the municipality, describing the extent of the failure to fulfill 
its obligations and stating any steps required to meet its obligations” (Republic of 
South Africa, Act No. 108 of 1996: 76). 
 
It is important to note that there is a range of factors that can lead to a sphere of 
government not fulfilling its obligations. This may include, inter alia, but not 
limited to, factors such as inefficient managerial or political actions such as 
unfunded mandates, abusing borrowing powers or inefficient tax collection 
techniques. It was the contention of one of the interviewed senior management 
Director that “…until the alignment funds with functions and their elimination of 
unfunded mandates have been achieved, delivery will remain at unacceptable 
levels…this should be prioritized and receive attention from the side of national 
government, together with the simplification of some legislative procedures such 
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as the forging of suitable partnership or the acceptance of unsolicited bids that 
would address service delivery”.60 
 
Other factors contributing to failure to fulfill obligations might originate from 
external conditions in which the municipality or province has minimal or no 
control at all. By disregarding the possible causes of failure and reactive actions, 
the Constitution thus authorizes the national and provincial government to take 
worst intervention steps at a later stage61. Although regulations and guidelines 
are common practice in the public service, the Constitution however, does not 
regard them as one of the mechanisms of intervention where the performance of 
a certain sphere of government is deteriorating. Giving advice would be 
necessary, especially in the case where the national or provincial executive or 
the oversight agency has reason to believe to failure to fulfill executive or 
legislative obligations62.  
 
Section 155 of the Constitution is amended by the addition of subsection 8, which 
requires national legislation to provide for the exercise of authority on behalf of 
the municipal council to solve a serious and persistent financial emergency in the 
municipality. As mentioned earlier, it is clear that this amendment was trigged by 
the provisions of chapter 11 of the Municipal Finance Management Bill (2000). 
This further more, makes it clear that the agency has been established to take a 
reactive rather than a proactive role to financial emergencies in the municipality. 
                                            
60 Interviews conducted with Christopher Gavor - Director of Valuation, Metropolitan City of Cape 
Town. 
61 There is a set of factors that the national and provincial government can take to prevent failure 
to fulfill obligations. This includes the national or provincial executive or even an independent 
oversight body giving advice to the relevant province or municipality about how to go about doing 
certain things. It can also involve putting into place regulations or guidelines relevant to certain 
areas of management in the province or municipality.  
62 Chapter 11 of the Municipal Finance Management Bill (2000) establishes a Municipal Finance 
Emergency Authority, as a juristic person outside the public service but within the public 
administration as envisaged in section 195 of the Constitution. Its main function is “…overseeing 
the administration of municipalities declared to be in a financial emergency with a view to 
normalizing their financial affairs.” 
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The principles outlined in this paper show that the intervention powers of the 
provincial and national spheres of government have complicated the current 
constitutional amendment so far. In the first instance, the provincial and national 
spheres of government have their intervention powers extended to include 
assumption of municipalities’ legislative in addition to executive obligations63. It 
could be argued, especially in line with this that the constitutional amendment 
has introduced the hierarchical arrangement with respect to the local and other 
spheres of government. Secondly, the Constitution does not put in place 
guidelines for timing of municipal interventions between the provincial and 
national sphere of government. It, to the contrary, introduces direct 
intergovernmental fiscal relations between the three spheres of government. It 
could have been better if the Constitution provided for a pre-intervention process 
of consultation not only with the sphere of government concerned, but also with 
the other sphere that also has the authority to intervene64. This could resolve the 
problem of timing and stimulate the quality of interventions within the context of 
financial and fiscal cooperative government system. 
 
It was clear from the discussion above that the introduction of section 100 (3) (b) 
of the Constitution crated a lock-in effect regarding the assumption of municipal 
legislative authority by the national executive. This is more likely to be the case if 
the provincial executive pre-empts and intervenes to assume a legislative 
responsibility of any municipality. It was asserted earlier that, the assumed 
municipal legislative obligation becomes a provincial obligation. According to 
section 100 (1) the national executive cannot assume and exercise this particular 
                                            
63 The amendment in itself presupposes that failure to fulfill an obligation on the side of the 
municipality signals incompetence and is, therefore, equivalent to inferiority 
64 Intervention in this case, would be a result of a consultation process between all the relevant 
stakeholders, as this would avoid arbitrary interjections or intervention overrides that are likely to 
happen in the current arrangement 
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responsibility, even if the province fails to fulfill it. The result of this could be 
compromise of service delivery effectiveness. 
 
The problem with bridging finance results from mismatches between service 
delivery needs and revenue inflows. This means hat those departments whose 
revenue inflows and expenditure needs coincide have no need to resort to 
bridging finance. Instead, those departments whose revenue inflows in a given 
month are more than expenditure requirements have an option to invest the 
funds in the markets so that they could earn positive interest rates65. The 
difference between the two would be the costs for borrowing. If at any point in 
time the departments with surpluses and others with deficits, an internal 
borrowing market could be created for the whole of government. In this case, 
those departments with surpluses would be required to make the funds available 
in a specially designed bridging finance pool. This pool would then be made 
available to finance mismatches in revenue and expenditures in other 
departments during the course of the financial year66. Thus subnational 
government can borrow bridging finance funds from this pool at very low or even 
zero interests’ rates. This would then be repaid during the same financial year 
without costs of borrowing attached. The ultimate effect of this pool would be to 
channel revenue to where it is needed most at any point in time during the 
financial year, i.e., those departments that under spend during certain months of 
the year lend money to those that overspend67.  
                                            
65 Those whose revenue inflow is less tan expenditure are forced to go to the market to borrow. 
However, borrowing should be repaid with interest, thus for a given estimate of revenue for a 
financial year, departments that face deficits from one month to another will necessarily deliver 
less than similar departments whose revenue and expenditure are perfectly matched. 
66 The 12 months according to which companies and organizations budget and account. In the 
private sector, this varies from company to company. 
 
67 The arrangement outlined above would make more sense in the case of provinces since most 
of their revenue comes from the transfers. It would require that transfers to provinces are made 
on a monthly or even weekly basis at amounts equal t expenditure obligations for that particular 
period.  
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In conclusion, it might be fair to stress here that for those municipalities that 
collect more own revenue than is needed; they would be required to deposit the 
surplus with the fund. Departments would still have to be required to borrow in 
accordance with realistic and expected inflow of revenue during the financial 
year. The ultimate effect of this arrangement would be to centralize the cash 
management activities of all the spheres of government thereby promoting an 
efficient allocation of funds in government. This would prevent departments from 
adjusting service delivery levels because of the costs of borrowing and eliminate 
any need to go to the private sector when funds are still available in-house. 
 
6.2.5  CONCLUSIONS ON METHODOLOGICAL ORIENTATION ON 
COOPERATIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
Considering the scope, composition and delineation of the study (section 1.5); on 
methodological orientation (chapter 4) the content in this section is based on the 
following general conclusions. This could postulate the following arguments that 
sound and efficient cooperative government has a strong positive impact on the 
financial and fiscal management system in South Africa. As a corollary, it follows 
that highly trained government officials can improve the efficiency of institution 
operating in many different contexts, i.e., public, development and lead to more 
responsible decision-making processes with regards to fiscal policy framework, 
intergovernmental transfers design and delivery of goods and services. 
 
The theory employed and the background information gathered from my field 
research informed the consolidation of findings and enlightened the researcher 
on the shaping of a balanced opinion based on empirical data. Evidence and 
lessons from experience maintain that qualitative research approaches are 
appropriate in instances in which not much has been written about the subject 
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under investigation. Qualitative methods of data collection are often identified 
with participant observation, in-depth interviewing, fieldwork and ethnographic 
study; and data enhances as in-depth knowledge is yielded, correcting any 
misrepresentations or new representations about the subjects in the study. In this 
study a convenience sampling methodology was chosen through rational choice. 
It consisted of identifying respondents who, according to the judgment of the 
researcher, witnessed an acquisition of knowledge, experience and expertise in 
the areas concerned by the study in order to meet the requirements of the 
methodological design. 
 
The fundamental theme under this research was a phenomenological one, where 
the actor’s perspective is the empirical point of departure – it is this focus upon a 
real life experience of people that made this type of methodology for the 
researcher to know people personally and to see them as they are, to experience 
their daily struggle when confronted with real life situation in order to interpret and 
describe the actions of people. The researcher drew a sample of 30 people from 
which a total number of 21 respondents (almost 70%) of selected interviewees 
responded to questions. 
 
In conclusion, the main dimensions of the research methodological framework of 
the general purposes of this study covered four dimensions, i.e. the attempt to 
measure as stipulated above, the challenges of cooperative government from a 
constitutional  or legislative point of view in the hope to find out how this would, 
as a matter of fact, have implications on the intergovernmental relations for the 
sub-national spheres of government in South Africa; test the validity of whether 
insight into institutional arrangement for intergovernmental fiscal relations is a key 
factor, leading both to the eradication of maladministration and inefficiency in the 
public sector; have an inquiry from academics and experts in the field into the 
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nature of key theoretical factors and principles constituting a strong and sound 
financial and fiscal management system in a decentralized political dispensation. 
 
Besides, it strove to find out whether the present intergovernmental fiscal system 
in South Africa, is based on sound practices in terms of efficiency, effectiveness 
and equity, and whether it might be able to change the lives of the poor for the 
better. Although the convenience and purposive sampling are very efficient 
methodological techniques in the research pertinent to social sciences; especially 
when it comes to handling data with a small sample size as is the case in this 
study, such a technique has its limitations in that the researcher feels reserved to 
generalize the results to the whole South Africa, as a corollary the findings based 
on the City of Cape Town postulated in this study are not representative of the 
whole public sector in South Africa and much research is still needed in this 
regard.  
 
6.2.6 CONCLUSIONS: EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL GRANT IN SOUTH AFRICA  
 
The study of intergovernmental grant design (chapter 5, key problem area 5) is 
presented to illustrate the applicability of how conditional transfers are 
administered across sectoral departments and how planning for HIVB/AIDS in 
the departments of Health, Education and Social Development is aligned to 
achieve efficiency and effectiveness with regard to the financial management 
system under study. Some specific findings included the following:  
 
As far as literature has demonstrated on conditional grant and unconditional 
grants including HIV/AIDS CG, Education grant and Social Development grant; 
central government’s objectives on conditional grants are often conflicting and as 
a corollary, the determination of the single best grant formula requires that 
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priorities be set on those objectives. In addition, the paper provides evidence in 
support of several other conclusions, i.e. a simple grant design can often attain 
central government objectives as well as a complex design. The price incentives, 
especially in the form of variable matching grants, can work as well as mandates 
in raising expenditures and contributions by grant recipients68.  
 
In the absence of appropriate incentives, regulations in the form of either 
minimum expenditure mandates or maintenance of expenditure effort 
requirements are needed to prevent grant recipients from reducing their own 
financial efforts. In this case, a central government can best leverage the effect of 
its transfers on total expenditures by including some measures of the local 
jurisdiction’s ability to finance, or fiscal capacity in the grant formula. As the paper 
has shown, the administration of central government grants requires the capacity 
to design the grant for efficiency and equity, to set transparent implementing 
regulations, to monitor and review financial flows and related grant conditionality, 
to provide operational control and review of grant-funded programs and to 
evaluate the distribution and implications of grants on performance. This falls 
under the sectoral departments and some could be contracted if appropriate 
capacity does not exist.  
 
The key element in ensuring financial accountability to the central government 
lies outside the sectoral departments and provides a serious challenge to both 
appropriate grant design and to cooperative government. Strong public financial 
management is a key for decentralized and centralized systems of government69. 
Steps which should include sub-national governments’ capacity should include 
revised public administration laws to require modern financial accounting and 
                                            
68 When using price incentives, the average matching rate has to be significant to realistically 
attain spending and finance objectives. 
69 Subnational governments receiving the grants also have administrative responsibilities, chiefly 
in preparing proposals and keeping accurate and timely financial accounts that provide 
information required for review and audit. 
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auditing, earmarked portions of grant funds to cover grant-funded programs, 
creation of central government financed centers to administer the accounts of 
several small jurisdictions and the establishment of effective incentives for the 
provision of timely information. 
 
In conclusion to the above, the design of grants has a significant effect on public 
expenditures, local revenue generation, and the mix of services provided at the 
sub-national government spheres. Most of the theoretical predictions were 
supported. For instance, one of the three types of intergovernmental categorical 
grants reviewed showed significant implications on total sub-national 
expenditures for HIV/AIDS in health care, Education as well as Social 
Development cross-sectoral services. Moreover, information was provided on 
several controversial questions. Examples used demonstrate statistical evidence 
suggesting that general (lump sum type) grants (subsection 5.7.5) had improving 
implications on these services, but this also hampered the local areas autonomy 
and self-control or confidence to generate own revenue for HIV/AIDS in health 
care, Education as well as Social Development cross-sectoral public services.  
 
Intergovernmental grants generally have a positive effect on local expenditure for 
these services at sub-national level. Nevertheless, the findings from this analysis 
have so far suggested that the type of intergovernmental grants matters and 
even under well-controlled situations local areas can use certain types of grand 
funds for tax relief rather than merely maximizing local services. As already 
mentioned above, future research needs to address the importance of monitoring 
in determining the effect of different types of grants, and to examine output and 
outcome in terms of natural units (i.e., number of hospitalizations and people 
under total relief) rather than focusing on expenditures alone.  
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The researcher concludes that the provision of HIV/AIDS in public health care 
services is increasingly shifting from central government to sub-national areas. 
Yet central government continues to bear financial responsibility for the majority 
of these services. One implication of this trend is that the success of national 
government policies becomes dependent on its ability to influence the behavior of 
local areas. In order to influence sub-national spheres successfully, central 
government needs to be able to predict the implications of different types of grant 
contracts and to anticipate the likely consequences of different strategies. 
 
6.3  CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
 
The key findings and conclusions of the study show that the objectives, as set out 
in section 1.3 of chapter 1 have been met. As a matter of fact, the following 
observations have been made: A strategic landscape of the study has been 
developed. It identified priority areas on the  basis of which cooperation has been 
incorporated in the South African institutional design as one of the contributory 
factors  to the formulation of an institutional principle based on  lessons of 
experience underpinning the way in which, cooperation has been effected within 
the context of the South African constitutional framework. 
 
The theoretical relevance of financial and fiscal relations within the context of 
cooperative government has received attention and the experience it fosters to 
local government officials to be able to align their expenditure budget with IDP 
strategy, operating budget and service delivery programmes has been 
highlighted. 
 
The regulation and applicability of a broad framework of constitutional legislation 
and the implications it fosters on intergovernmental financial and fiscal relations 
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in South Africa has been earmarked as key elements toward success or 
hindrance to policy efficiency. 
 
The empirical study on the theoretical consideration of intergovernmental grant 
design and its rationale in the post-apartheid South Africa within the broader 
national and provincial context has received attention. 
 
The major methodological dimensions and elements that determine the capacity 
to handle the research problem under study, using different qualitative as well as 
numeric statistical tools in order to analyze the data and interpret the results have 
been developed and addressed. This provided a user-friendly framework in order 
for the researcher to test the soundness of the empirical study and make 
contribution to the body of existing knowledge. 
 
The second objective of the study has been met. This include recommendations 
on future priority areas for research and analysis, the presentation of a large 
chunk of both primary and secondary sources, including authoritative authors 
dealing with various dimensions of the subject, and the presentation of a list of 
Appendices for practical application to make sense of the subject under study. 
The study recommendations are that cooperative government, as a strategic 
cross-cutting terrain is the center of causes both chaos and solutions of any 
policy in any country. It should be regarded, together with fiscal and financial 
management in conjunction with related methodologies, as a critical instrument 
for the public and private theoreticians and academics susceptible to help build 
strong centers of coordination and consultation over policy issues to strengthen 
decision making skills.  
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6.4  RECOMMENDATIONS AND ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The following are some specific recommendations for future research: 
Research priorities should be aligned to the objectives and functioning 
mechanism of cooperative government within the South African context. 
 
The culture of networking with different key players between and across sectoral 
and three spheres of government should be enhanced as this increases 
institutional capacity-building, participation and communication – thus enhancing 
the scope for decision-making skills.  
 
Financial and fiscal, rather than political alignment should receive valuable 
support in the determination of funding allocation in order to integrate policies 
with budget and feed into implementation of services at the grassroots level. This 
initiative should involve all the spheres, especially economic and social hubs and 
their representatives when important financial decisions are made. 
 
Legislation and policies that are cumbersome to the delivery process should be 
amended or simplified, and funds allocated where basic service delivery are felt 
most. 
 
Government should encourage proactive intervention rather than reactive 
camouflaged under the softness of diplomatic muscles in its endeavour to 
intervene in sub-national spheres and should encourage provinces to generate 
own revenues as that is the case for most metros and related municipalities. 
 
Much could be done to ensure that education, health and housing 
responsibilities, which are the catalyst development determinants at the center of 
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social transformation and dignity of people, are prioritized along IDP and 
devolved to local municipalities to avoid mismatch and speed up the process of 
delivery. 
 
Transnet, Spoornet, Acsa, Portnet and Eskom, which are the key economic 
driving forces of the City of Cape Town fall outside the responsibility scope of 
local officials in the City. It could command loyalty if these big governments 
owned companies could prioritize their plans within the framework of IDP and 
local authorities should be mainstreamed to have a share in the running of these 
SOEs companies. Without this element efficiency and effectiveness might be a 
very difficult exercise to achieve. 
 
A focus on the appropriate institutional arrangement through the creation of 
centers of excellence and skills should receive attention.  
 
Central government should strive to avoid the top-down IDP alignment process, 
since all the needs felt by the respective communities fall within the scope of 
national and provincial responsibilities, far beyond the financial and legislative 
power of those local municipalities that have the constitutional mandate to 
address them. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
LIST OF INTERIEW  
 
SECTION 1:  PRIORITISED GOVERNMENT’S INTERVENTIONS  
QUESTION 1a: 
In the context of the state intergovernmental grant transfers to sub-national 
spheres, number the most appropriate intergovernmental principles and 
mechanisms in order of priority: 
? Equitable share 
? Increase infrastructure grants to sub-national spheres unconditionally than 
usual 
? Adopt BIG to help poor families in South Africa 
? Direct more funding to lower spheres where people’s needs are felt most and 
basic service implemented 
? Deregulation (the government should not have direct intervention in the 
markets, but should create an administrative framework conducive to the success 
of liberalization policies in respective sub-national spheres of government). 
? BBBEE and SMMEs. 
? Other (reward successful municipalities that demonstrate administrative 
maturity rather than outsourcing its public services). 
 
QUESTION 1b: 
In the context of state’s cooperative government dispensation, which specific role 
should higher spheres of government play to facilitate a smooth implementation 
services by lower spheres: 
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? Strategic coordination and grand central government orientation (devolve 
power to province and metropolitan cities within a general framework and grand 
orientation by leaving them with the choice of means of revenue sources). 
? Disengagement of state ‘get out of the way’. 
? Infrastructure development (ensure among local municipalities the uniform 
financial and maintenance of infrastructure involving central government 
responsibilities. 
? Education and research (by increasing higher education and research and 
devolving education responsibility to municipalities  as this is the case in 
developed countries such as UK). 
? Intervention of macroeconomic type from central government (create a 
conducive legislative, administrative and fiscal environment to the delivery of 
services in lower spheres and development). 
? Other 
 
QUESTION 2 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Applicable legislation 
needs to be changed as it is very cumbersome and not beneficial to service 
delivery at lower spheres of government: 
? Strongly agree                     ? Agree 
? Strongly disagree                                            ? Disagree 
? Not sure                                             ? None of the above 
 
QUESTION 3 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: government policies 
related to the political culture of the presidency undermine the tax cost of sub-
national spheres’ capacity to spend basic services at the local level: 
 
? Strongly agree      ? Agree 
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? Strongly disagree                                   ? Disagree 
? Not sure                                                         ? None of the above 
 
QUESTION 4 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: fiscal autonomy of every 
sphere is always respected, and government in other spheres does not encroach 
on geographical and functional responsibilities of other entities in other spheres: 
? Strongly agree      ? Agree 
? Strongly disagree                                   ? Disagree 
? Not sure                                                         ? None of the above 
 
QUESTION 5 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: the availability of financial 
and technical resources at sub-national sphere of government mean nothing 
without the appropriate capacity to implement them. 
? Strongly agree      ? Agree 
? Strongly disagree                                   ? Disagree 
? Not sure                                                         ? None of the above 
 
SECTION 2: THE CHALLENGES OF COOPERATIVE GOVERNMENT IN 
TERMS OF FINANCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM 
 
QUESTION 6 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: a framework for policy 
alignment in line with delivery is steal weak and unclear between the three 
spheres of government and across district and local municipalities and should 
receive attention: 
?  Strongly agree      ? Agree 
?  Strongly disagree                                  ?  Disagree 
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?  Not sure                                                         ?  None of the above 
 
SECTION 3:  
FACTORS AND PRINCIPLES CONSTITUTING THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
TRANSFER SYSTEM 
QUESTION 7 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Given the challenges of 
cooperative government in South Africa, matching transfers distort local priorities 
in that they favour bigger and richer Metropolitan cities on the expense of poor 
municipalities that can raise enough revenues: 
?  Strongly agree      ? Agree 
?  Strongly disagree                                  ?  Disagree 
?  Not sure                                                         ?  None of the above 
 
QUESTION 8 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The causes of fiscal 
inequality and inefficiency are due to central government failure to equalise the 
revenue and use horizontal mechanisms of transfers and grants to sub-national 
spheres of government: 
?  Strongly agree      ? Agree 
?  Strongly disagree                                  ?  Disagree 
?  Not sure                                                         ?  None of the above 
 
QUESTION 9 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: In reference to the 
Municipal Systems Act, government should give more unconditional grants to 
provinces who need them than to local municipalities close to the people, but 
have no capacities to manage them: 
?  Strongly agree      ? Agree 
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?  Strongly disagree                                  ?  Disagree 
?  Not sure                                                         ?  None of the above 
 
QUESTION 10 
Is IDP successfully aligned and coordinated with reference to planning and 
delivery of services between the three levels of governments and across districts, 
local municipalities and Agencies in the case under discussion? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
QUESTION 11 
List the most appropriate mechanisms that you think can improve cooperation 
between three spheres of government and across Agencies. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
SECTION 4: KEY ISSUES IN THE DESIGN OF IGFR SYSTEM 
QUESTION 12 
In reflecting on best practices at the operational level, number in order of priority 
the issues that should, in your opinion receive attention in terms of 
intergovernmental relations: 
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?  Fiscal harrmonisation      ? Fiscal equality 
?  Fiscal efficiency                                   ?  Fiscal federalism 
?  Not sure                                                                    ?  Fiscal autonomy   
? Fiscal effectiveness                                                    ?  All of the above   
?  None of the above    
                                                        
QUESTION 13 
In your opinion, what do you think are the causes of fiscal inequality or inefficacy 
in South African intergovernmental relations and how would government address 
them? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
QUESTION 14 
Please comment on the various challenges that face government on the various 
spheres between and across sectors and departments in its attempt to making 
cooperative government work better. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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APPENDIX B: LIST OF INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED  
 
No 
Observations 
Names Designation   
1 Mike Richardson 
 
Ruschda Cummings  
Chief Financial officer 
 
Support Assistant 
CFO 
2 Lodi Venter 
Ria Schamrel  
Treasurer 
Personal Assistant 
Director 
3 Johan Steyl 
Lucille Mays  
Budgets  
Personnel Assistant 
Director  
4 Nothemba Lepheana  Expenditure  Director  
5 Isolda Schellhase  
Melany Collop  
Support Services  
Personnel Assistant 
Manager 
6 Leonard Shnaps  Supply Chain Management  Director  
7 Lisle Alexander  Personnel Assistant  
8 Louise Luller  
Nomikhosi Khumalo 
Shareholding Management 
Personnel Assistant 
Director  
9 Wayne Muller 
Maydene Cleophas  
Finance & Lease 
Personnel Assistant   
Director  
10 George van Schalkwyk 
Poria Kotshoba 
Inter-service Liaison 
Personnel Assistant 
Director  
11 Trevor Blake  Revenue  Director  
12 Christopher Gavor  Valuations  Director  
13 Christo de Coning  Governance, Public Policy  
and Management 
 
14 Jaya Josy FFC Commission Expert 
15 Musa Zamisa  Budget Researcher IDASA 
 
 
 
 
 
